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INTRODUCTION
Start this way. Everyone wants to be happy (DRN  VI 26, EpM  122). What 
people want, when they want this, is to live well, to have a good life, to 
succeed in their lives (NE  1095al8-20). These phrases are not identical, nor 
is their meaning perfectly clear, but neither point nullifies the substantial 
truth here. Over and above all the specific things that people want and 
pursue, they want, quite in general, to be happy.
This desire naturally produces two questions. First, w hat is 
happiness? Second, how can we get it, whatever it is?1 The second 
question arises in an obvious way: if we want something, then we want to 
know how to get it -  since we want happiness, we want to know how to get 
it. The first question arises, as Aristotle points out (NE 1095al7-22, 1097b22- 
24), because to say that everyone wants happiness is not yet to say anything 
very definite about what happiness is. Everyone can agree that they want 
to live well, precisely because 'living well' is left somewhat vague. But 
since we will be more likely to achieve happiness if we have a clear notion 
of what it is, we will very much want to have such a clear notion.
1 Cf. DRN  V I26-28, 'exposuitque [Epicurus] bonum summum quo tendimus om nes/quid
foret, atque viam  monstravit, tramite p arvo/q u a possemus ad id recto contendere cu rsu / 
Seneca DVB I 1, and Aristotle EE 1214al4-15, 'rcpwxov 8e ( j k e j i x e o v  e v  xivi xo eu ^fjv icai rccoq 
k x t i t o v / but as em erges from  his following rem arks, A ristotle's n&q Kxqxov is not as 
immediately practical as the statements Seneca or Lucretius. See also Mitsis EET 11, and 
Striker EHEE  169-173.
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2If we consider the Epicurean response to these questions, it will put 
the subject m atter of the rest of the thesis into better perspective. 
Happiness, according to the Epicureans, consists in the absence of bodily 
pain (cc7cov{oc) and the freedom from mental disturbance (ocxctpoc i^cx). The 
characterization here is essentially negative, and Epicurus's language bears 
ample witness to this fact.2 At least two things are odd here. First, even if 
we understand this to mean that happiness is a life of physical and mental 
painlessness, rather than just a momentary condition, nevertheless the 
Epicurean position seems too passive. Lack of pain, even a whole life of it, 
does not appear to have enough positive content to make up a truly happy 
life. As the Cyrenaics put it, this life seems like the condition of a sleeper 
or even of a corpse (DL H 89, U 451). Second, and still odder, the Epicureans 
identified painlessness with the greatest pleasure (EpM 131, De Fin I 37-38). 
Even if happiness is painlessness, however, it looks like sheer perversity to 
pass off lack of pain as any pleasure -  much less the height of pleasure. 
These are genuine and serious problems for the Epicureans, but I am not
going to answer them.
In order to consider the Epicurean answer to the second question -  
how can we achieve happiness, whatever it is? -  I will simply take it to be 
true, for the sake of argument, that happiness is the conjunction of dt7tov{a 
and dxocpa^ia. Given that this is so, how can we get it? Put short, the 
Epicureans thought that we could achieve physical painlessness by 
satisfying, at a minimal level, our need for food, drink, clothing, and 
shelter. As Epicurus says, 'The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be
2 c f .  dXuina U 458, 520, 526; d o x ^ a ia  EpM  127, U  526 and dvoxtaiata U 450; ditovia U
2, 431, 450; and, last but not least, d tap a^ia  EpH  82, EpM  128, U  2, 519, 520.
3thirsty, not to be cold' (VS 33, and cf. EpM  130-132, KD  18, D RN  II 20-21). 
Apparently they took our natural physical needs to be quite meager — bread 
and water would suffice for food and drink (EpM 131).3 As for the other 
side of happiness -  lack of mental disturbance -  the Epicureans believed 
that people can achieve this only if they learn about the nature of the 
world and of themselves (EpH  81-82, KD 11, 12, 21, 22). Only in this way 
can people free themselves from the most common sources of anxiety and 
disturbance, namely fears about the gods and celestial and meteorological 
phenomena, fears about death, and excessive desires. Knowledge of the
world and of oneself will bring peace of mind.
It may not be immediately apparent how knowledge could affect 
emotions and desires, but the Epicureans can answer this doubt. They 
explained that a person's emotions and desires take root in that person's 
thoughts. If, for example, a person believes that the gods are omnipotent 
and evil, she will fear them. Accordingly, the Epicureans can change her 
feelings, if they can show her the truth -  namely that the gods take no 
trouble over her and that they pose no threat to her happiness. In such a 
way a gain in knowledge and understanding can lead to a change in 
emotion or desire. The Epicureans believed that most people lead troubled 
lives because of false beliefs which make them anxious, afraid, and eager 
for the wrong things. Once people learn the truth, their disturbing 
emotions and desires will give way to calm and to simple, easily satisfied
desires.
3 Good health was important too, but little is said about it. Perhaps because it is,
relatively, out of our control?
4In the De Rerum Natura, Lucretius provides some of the necessary 
knowledge. In particular, he offers lessons on the gods, celestial and 
meteorological phenomena, and death. Since his work covers physics in 
such great detail, his ethical concerns can become lost in the shuffle. E.J. 
Kenney, for exam ple, claim s that 'in  the D .R .N .  the trad itional 
subordination of Canonics...and Physics...to Ethics...is reversed' (10, n .l). 
But the account that I have offered so far show s this to be a 
misunderstanding. Knowlege of physics is needed in order to achieve 
tranquillity, so all along, the lessons in physics are, in a sense, ethics by 
other means. Physics remains firmly subordinated to ethics. Ultimately, 
his physics lessons amount to a course of emotional therapy .4 We may 
find such a means of treatment odd, but not if we remember that he means 
to alter our feelings by means o f  changing our thoughts.
In what follows, I examine the treatment that Lucretius offers of the 
fears of death in book III. His arguments, in particular those concerned 
with non-existence,5 have received a great deal of attention recently. As an 
example, nearly every essay in a recent book of philosophical essays on 
d eath 6 takes up the Epicurean arguments about non-existence. For the 
most part, respondents have started from the provocative claim that 'death 
is nothing to us' (DRN m  830, EpM  124-125). But, as Stephen Rosenbaum
4 The therapeutic character of m uch of Hellenistic, and especially Epicurean,
philosophy, has been the focus of much recent attention. See especially, J.-A. Voelke La 
philosophic comme therapie de I'ame: etudes de philosophic hellenistique (Paris: Cerf, 
1993) and M. Nussbaum The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
5 See Chapters 3 and 4.
6 The Metaphysics of Death ed. J. Fischer (Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press,
1993).
5makes clear,7 this is not the best way into the problem since the Epicureans 
used this claim in a number of ways all at the same time and it is easily 
m isunderstood if taken too literally.® The approach I take here is 
som ewhat different. I have tried to build up the Epicurean case by 
following the structure that I find in Lucretius. The goal is to lay out 
Lucretius's argument as clearly as possible, and to evaluate it primarily on 
its own terms.
The large scale structure is as follows. As I said, the bulk of the 
thesis tracks the course of Lucretius's therapy of the fears of death. As a 
necessary preliminary, however, the first chapter lays out in more detail 
the Epicurean theory of emotions and their treatment. In particular the 
chapter centers on fear and, even more narrowly, the fears of death. I 
argue that Lucretius groups the fears of death under two main headings: 
fears if the soul survives death, and fears if the soul is destroyed at death. 
The next two chapters take up these worries in this order: chapter two 
considers the fear of Hades, and chapter three the fears about annihilation. 
Since Lucretius's argum ent about annihilation has alw ays attracted 
controversy and criticism, chapter four is devoted solely to reviewing 
objections to his argument. After a brief conclusion, the thesis ends with 
three appendixes which discuss tangential matters at greater length than 
would otherwise be possible.
7 I take him to make this clear, but I doubt that he takes the point this w ay himself.
He is merely concerned to point out, against Steven Luper-Foy (see next note), that the claim  
is ambiguous and should not be taken too literally ('Epicurus and Annihilation' MoD  297).
8 For exam ple, it is obviously nonsense if it is taken to mean that we should never
think about death at all, since the Epicureans spend plenty of time arguing, and hence 
thinking, about death. Plutarch, with characteristic lack of sym pathy, tries to use this 
against the Epicureans (Non posse 1092c), as does Steven Luper-Foy 'Annihilation' MoD 272- 
273.
CHAPTER ONE 
EMOTIONS AND THEIR CURE
According to Lucretius, people's fears are often as foolish as the childish 
fear of the dark. He clearly finds the analogy compelling since he repeats it 
three times (II 55-61, m  87-93, VI 35-41). On each occasion, the verses round 
off a book's prologue in which Lucretius describes the miseries that men 
cause themselves through false fears and empty desires. Such fears, he 
tells us, are no more justified than those of children, and such childish 
adults need reason and knowledge, both of which Lucretius provides in his 
poetry. In this way, the comparison provides a smooth transition from a 
v ividly  described unhappiness to an Epicurean lesson -  where the 
instruction is meant to cure the misery that Lucretius has just described.
Since this thesis follows the path of one such lesson, the analogy 
provides a helpful introduction to Lucretius's conception of emotion and 
reason. At the end of the proem to Book HI, Lucretius writes:
nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 
interdum nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 
quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque (87-93).
Just as boys tremble and fear everything in dark shadows, 
thus sometimes we are afraid in broad daylight of things 
w hich are no more fearful than those which boys in 
shadows quake at and imagine will happen. Hence, the 
vision and understanding of nature rather than the sun's 
rays or the clear shafts of the day must scatter this terror of 
mind and these shadows.
6
7Lucretius has just described the horrors that the fear of death causes, and 
these transitional verses lead into his accounts of the soul's nature and of 
post-m ortem  non-existence (94-829, 830-1094). The analogy deserves 
attention since it should indicate how the fears are related to the accounts.
First off, it is significant that the analogy is with children. Children's 
thoughts are proverbially w eak and unclear, and their fears are 
correspondingly unjustified and vague. Children presumably don't know 
much about the world and how it works; it takes time and experience, at 
the very least, to learn and absorb such knowledge. Thus, to compare 
adults with children already implies that the adults are less than properly
rational or knowledgeable.
Obviously, the rest of what Lucretius says about the boys' fears only 
reinforces this suggestion. The boys are afraid in the dark -  this point is 
twice repeated (88 , 90) — presumably of things that they only half see, if 
even that.1 Moreover, Lucretius links their fear to imagination about the 
future. This too suggests that there is something vague and insubstantial 
about the boys' thoughts. Even more strongly, I take there to be an 
implication of error and falsity. Perhaps the children hear a sound or see a 
shadow, and they have some vague notion of a monster coming to get 
them. But of course, there is no monster. Their ideas are, in all these 
ways, both false and confused. If the analogy holds true, then adult fears 
about death are similarly confused and false.
For the children, the cure is daylight, but adults require knowledge 
and understanding. So long as people are in the dark about the soul's 
nature, they will continue to be afraid, whether for its destruction or for its
l Cf. 'caecis /  in tenebris' (87-88), for the mention of blind darkness.
8survival.2 Lack of knowledge leads to fervid imagination about what may 
happen after death, just as the darkness allows the boys terror to run wild. 
In order to scatter the adults' fears, Lucretius proposes to explain the nature 
of the soul, and he compares this to the effect of daylight on the boys fear. 
In the light of day, it becomes clear that there is no monster, and once a 
person learns the nature of the soul, it becomes clear that, say, there is no 
hideous afterlife.
These features of the analogy suggest quite a lot about Lucretius's 
understanding of fear. It seems clear that people are afraid because of what 
they think. The child thinks that the sound is a monster, and so he is 
afraid; the adult thinks that his soul will undergo hideous punishment 
after death, and so he is afraid. Since ignorance produces false and 
confused ideas and these ideas in turn produce fears, in a manner of 
speaking ignorance produces false and confused fears. What you don't 
know, emphatically can harm you. At the same time, however, emotions 
shift in response to changes in people's ideas. Once the child stops 
imagining that there is a monster, the fear disappears, and once our ideas 
about death change, so will our emotional attitude towards it. Hence if 
Lucretius can change what we think, he can change how we feel.
But if the analogy illuminates how Lucretius views fear and its cure, 
it also creates a number of problems. First off, is it really appropriate to say 
that children are afraid because of what they think, or does this attribute 
too much rationality to the process? To put it another way, if Lucretius 
finds adults so confused and ignorant, why does he blame their thoughts at 
all? Perhaps the real culprit is that they don't think enough. The second
2 Cf. 1 102-135.
9feature of the comparison may break down as well. Reason and knowledge 
should dispel adult fears just as daylight dispels the children's fears. But if 
the adult fear is so unreasonable and stupid, it is not clear how reason 
could do this work. Even more strongly, we may wonder already at the 
point about children. We all know, after all, that when evening returns, so 
do the monsters: the light does not really cure the fear since it only offers 
temporary relief. By now the analogy is likely to seem false or radically
flawed.
There are two serious criticisms to consider here. The first is that 
Lucretius has no coherent conception of emotion. He appears to say, all at 
the same time, that the fear is rational and irrational, that it is the result of 
what people think but also the result of their ignorance. The second 
problem is intimately related to the first: will his arguments really be as 
effective as he imagines? If fear is so overwhelmingly irrational, how can 
reason be of any use? Lucretius appears much too optimistic, given his 
very pessimistic ideas about most people's cognitive maturity. If the fear of 
death is really like a child's fear of the dark, then it has little or nothing to 
do with reasonable thought and hence knowledge w ill have little or no 
effect on the fear. His own analogy shows up the flaws in Lucretius s
conception of emotions.
Lucretius has answers to both problems, but it is necessary to look at 
more than just the analogy. An adequate answer to these puzzles calls for 
a fuller analysis of the theory of emotions that Lucretius presupposes, and 
in particular his conception of fear and the fear of death. The analogy 
suggests that fear is connected to thought and reason, but also to ignorance, 
without addressing the apparent conflict. Similarly the analogy insists that
10
reason is the cure for troubling emotions, but it does not explain how 
reason fills this role. Once we step back a bit and consider the psychology of 
the emotions, we will be in a better position to answer such puzzles.
I proceed, then, as follows. In the next section, I consider the 
emotions generally, and I try to show where, according to Lucretius and the 
Epicureans, thought fits into emotions. After that, I look more specifically 
at fear and the fear of death. Then, I consider Lucretius's assessment and 
treatment of the emotions, with special attention to the fear of death. In 
the conclusion, I return to the puzzles in order to consider what solutions 
the fuller analysis provides.
One final point. In many ways other ancient theories of the 
emotions are easier to study than the Epicurean theory. We have more 
straightforward accounts for other ancients, especially Aristotle and the 
Stoics,3 and there has been a great deal of excellent research on Aristotelian 
and Stoic em otions .4 In addition, the Aristotelian and the Stoic theory 
form a useful contrast, since they are, in many ways, polar opposites. 
Hence, in my account of the emotions in Epicurean authors, I will often 
refer to A ristotle and the Stoics by way of comparison, example, and 
contrast.
3 Cf. Rhet n  1-11, N E  in  6-9, IV 5; and S V F  m  Ethica VII, DL VII 110-118, TD  m -IV.
4 The bibliography is immense, but for a start see, in A. Rorty Essays on Aristotle's 
Rhetoric (Berkeley: U niversity of California Press, 1996), the essays of S. Leighton, J. 
Cooper, G. Striker, D. Frede, and M. Nussbaum ; and, for the Stoics, M. Frede 'The Stoic 
doctrine of the affections of the soul' and G. Striker EHEE 270-280.
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Lucretius's prim ary conception of the emotions has three parts6 — an 
emotion is (1 ) a mode of feeling which mediates between (2 ) a way of 
seeing the world and (3) action. How a person views the world determines 
the emotional state of that person, and the emotional state, in turn, leads 
to certain actions or inclinations. So, for example, if I find something 
threatening and dangerous, I will feel fear, and my fear will incline me to 
flight or, more generally, avoidance (cf. D RN  I 102-135). This tri-partite 
picture of em otion as cognition, feeling, and action is fam iliar from 
A ristotle .7 To take one emotion, he defines anger as 'a painful desire for 
what one takes to be revenge because of what one takes to be a slight' (Rhet 
1 3 7 8 a 3 0 -3 1 ).8 This definition also contains the three elements: (1) a 
perception, here of insult, (2) a feeling, here of pain, and (3) an inclination
to action, here to revenge.
But this is much too vague. Although theories as diverse as those of 
Aristotle and the Stoa can involve these three elements,9 the interesting
5 In reconstructing Lucretius's views on the emotions, I have learned a great deal from  
the following works: J. Annas 'Epicurean Emotions' Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 30 
(1989), 145-164 and H P M  Chapter 9; P. Mitsis E E T ; M. Nussbaum  ToD ; and J. Procope 
'Epicureans on A nger' Philanthropia kai Eusebeia (Gottingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht,
1993), 363-386.
6 In this chapter I deal exclusively with the psychology of the emotions. But the 
Epicureans also provided a physical analysis of the passions. See Appendix 1: Materialism  
and the emotions.
7 For Aristotle's theory in its historical, especially its Platonic, context, see William  
Fortenbaugh 'A ristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions' in Articles on Aristotle ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(London: Duckworth, 1979), 133-153.
8 Cf. De An  403a29-403bl and Top 127b33-34, 151al5-16,156a31-34.
9 I should say that I am  returning to a somewhat earlier understanding of the Stoic 
theory, as found in, say, Michael Frede 'The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul' in 
The Norms of Nature (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1986), 93-110 and A.C. 
Lloyd 'Em otion and Decision in Stoic Psychology' in The Stoics ed. John Rist (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 233-246. Some more recent interpreters, especially  
M artha Nussbaum, have focused so narrowly on the cognitive side of the emotions that it 
m ay seem that this is all there is to the Stoic account.
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questions are more specific. How are the three item s them selves 
understood? How are they related? And which ones are given pride of 
place in the account of emotions as a whole? For example, two things 
strongly distinguish the Stoics from Aristotle. First, the Stoics are much 
more concerned with cognition and action than they are with feeling, 
whereas Aristotle has a real interest in studying the phenomenology of 
em otion s .10 Second, the Stoics conceive of the cognitive element as an 
actual judgm ent whereas Aristotle believes that it can be som ething 
w eaker, perhaps an appearance .11 In order to say som ething truly 
informative about Lucretius and the Epicureans, it is necessary to say more, 
first about which features of the emotions they emphasize and second, 
about how they conceive of those elements.
Like the Stoics, Lucretius is especially concerned with cognition and 
action. Although Lucretius mentions various phenomenological aspects 
of different emotions, e.g. that anger feels warm (III 288-289), he does not 
study phenomenology in detail. Solely on the basis of what Lucretius says 
about the feel of emotions, we could not even distinguish some very 
distinct emotions. For instance, both fear and love are 'frigida' (fear: EH 290- 
291; love: IV 1060). What will adequately distinguish these two emotions 
are their characteristic attitudes and actions. A lover takes someone to be 
highly desirous and pursues that person, but someone in the grip of fear 
perceives a threat and tends to avoid it (love: IV 1052-1057; fear: III 65-68). 
Lucretius does not spend much time carefully analyzing the feel of
10 See Dorothea Frede 'Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's Rhetoric' in Essays on Aristotle's 
Rhetoric ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 258-285.
11 C om p are SV F  III 380, 456 with Rhet 1377a31-32, 1382a21-22. See also the 
com m entary of Aspasius on the Nicomachean Ethics in CAG  19, pages 44.33-45.10.
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different emotions, but he does lavish attention on their cognitive causes 
and the behavior that they typically produce.
This may seem odd since Lucretius is a hedonist, and thus we might 
expect him to be very concerned with felt qualities of emotion; but the 
specifics of Epicurean hedonism make it reasonable that Lucretius lack 
detailed concern with feelings.12 In brief, Epicureans took our ethical goal, 
the highest pleasure, to be a state of physical and mental painlessness.13 
Once this state is reached, pleasure can be varied but not increased. These 
variations, however, add nothing to our happiness, and so they are not of 
great intrinsic interest. Since what matters is a negatively defined state, the 
positive felt qualities of specific pleasures drop out as unimportant. Hence 
it makes good sense that Lucretius is unconcerned with the intricacies of 
how emotions feel. Insofar as they disturb our painless state, they are bad, 
but beyond that, subtle distinctions in how they feel bad are not relevant to 
happiness. So Lucretius can call both love and fear 'frigidae curae' without 
more careful discrimination, because all that concerns him is that they are 
painful curae.
Actions, on the other hand, matter a great deal to Epicurean ethics. 
In fact, the Epicureans sometimes describe ethics as the part of philosophy 
concerned with choice and avoidance, where these polar terms exhaust the 
field of action at a general level.14 Lucretius and other Epicureans consider 
not merely individual actions but also larger patterns of behavior. Fear of 
the gods drives men not just to single acts of devotion but towards an
12 For support of my interpretation of Epicurean hedonism, see Mitsis EET  Chapter 1.
13 See DRN  R 16-19, EpM  131-132, and De Fin I 37-38.
14 DL X 117, 129, De Fin I 29-30, and G. Striker EH EE  30-31. Also see Aristotle Rhet
1360b4-6.
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entire lifestyle of (futile) piety (V 1161-1168, 1194-1203). Similarly, love and 
fear can infect the whole of a person's life (IV 1121-1140, III 37-40). 
Lucretius spends, by far, the greater part of his time on patterns and groups 
of action rather than on individual, one-off cases. Again, this makes good 
sense since, as a eudaimonist, his concern is with the shape of an entire 
life .15
Finally, we come to the cognitive aspect of emotion. According to 
the Epicureans, how a person sees matters determ ines the person's 
emotional attitudes. So if a person thinks that the gods are all-powerful, 
all-knowing, and vindictive, that person will fear the gods (EpH 76-77, 81, 
EpM  123-124, DRN  V1161-1225, VI 68-78). Similarly, if a person thinks that 
someone has deliberately harmed him, he will be angry (Philodemus De 
Ira XXVII 32-39, XL 32-35, XLVI 28-35). And in the case that most concerns 
us, when a person views death as harmful, that person will fear death 
(EpM  124-127, EpH  81, D RN  101-135). In all these cases, the emotions flow 
from the person's view of how things are. In general, it seems, what a 
person thinks about a given situation or fact motivates specific attitudes 
towards that situation or fact.
We should avoid the overly simple idea that an em otion results 
from a single, isolated thought. Our everyday way of speaking might 
suggest this simplistic idea, as when someone says, 'I saw the dog coming at 
me, and I became afraid.' This suggests that the mere thought of the dog 
approaching was enough to incite the fear. In fact, such statements are 
elliptical, and the thoughts which give rise to emotion are more complex.
15 See my introduction, as well as G. Striker EH EE  170-173 and J. Annas M oH  27-46, 
entitled 'Making Sense of My Life as a W hole.'
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Here, for instance, the fear derives from the thought that the dog is 
approaching and angry, that angry dogs are likely to bite, and that such bites 
are painful and therefore bad. Thus the emotion results from a complex 
mix of thoughts, and this mix contains both factual elem ents, e.g. that 
angry dogs bite, as well as evaluative elements, e.g. that pain is bad. Some 
of the thought is specific, e.g. that this dog is approaching and angry, and 
some of the thought is quite general, e.g. that angry dogs often bite and that 
pain is bad. Naturally, not all of this information consciously occurs to the 
person at the time.
The Epicureans appear to have been well aware of the complexity of 
the thoughts which produce emotion. In the case of anger, Philodemus 
makes it abundantly clear that the emotion requires more than the bare 
thought that one has been harmed. Anger follows from the thought of 
harm combined with the thought that the harm was intentional (De Ira 
XLVI 28-30, cf. XL 32-33, XLI 31-34, XLVI 18-22, XLVIII 5-11). Moreover the 
intensity of anger varies according to how great a harm is perceived (XLVII 
32-41).16 Lucretius gives similar indications in the case of fear of the gods. 
Briefly put, he argues that certain features of men's visions of the gods lead 
them to hypothesize (correctly) that the gods are blessed, immortal, and 
exceedingly powerful. And then men (incorrectly) attribute the workings 
of the heavens to the gods since they can find no other explanation for 
such phenomena. After that, every case of bad weather becomes a portent 
of divine anger -  a limitless supply of baseless fears. The point here is 
simply that the chain of ideas which leads to the fears is somewhat long 
and tangled.
On this point, see J.F. Procope 'Epicureans on Anger' 375-376.
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In sum, the Epicurean view of emotions is roughly this. A person 
forms various views of the world, and these views result in varied 
emotional states and tendencies. For example, my views on death may 
lead me either to desire it or to fear it -  fear it, if I take it to be an 
impending evil, but desire it if I take it to be a great benefit. The resultant 
emotions possess intrinsic characters that are pleasant or painful -  they feel 
a certain way and affect us, just by our having them. Moreover, emotions 
and emotional dispositions lead to various actions and patterns of action. 
Anger m otivates revenge just as love motivates pursuit. Where the 
emotion is strong and general enough, it can dominate the entire character 
of a life -  think of how love or anger can be the most important thing in a 
person's life.
m
It should be possible to carry over the tri-partite analysis from emotion to 
fear and from fear to the fear of death. Emotions are feelings which result 
from cognition and lead to action. So we can ask, for the particular 
emotion fear, How does it feel?, What kind of cognition does it result 
from?, and What kinds of action does it lead to? In the same manner we 
can move from fear to its species, the fear of death. Although Epicurean 
authors rarely pose and answer these questions explicitly, their answers are 
easy to infer from what they do say.
First and foremost, fear is painful and disturbing. Lucretius and 
Epicurus both link fear with distress and anxiety (DRN  I I 19, 48, III 461, 826, 
903, VI 645; EpH  81-82). Diogenes of Oenoanda offers fears first among the 
disturbances which trouble the soul (34 VI 6-VII 4). M ost strikingly,
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Lucretius uses an extreme case of fear to demonstrate how much the mind 
can affect the body:
verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens, 
consentire animam totam per membra videmus 
sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto 
corpore et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri; 
caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus, 
denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus 
saepe homines (m  152-158).
But when the mind has been struck by a very strong fear, we see 
that the entire soul throughout the limbs shares the feeling, and 
sweat and pallor arise on the whole body, and the voice cracks, 
and speech fails; the eyes grow dark, the ears ring, the limbs 
buckle, and finally we often see men collapse as a result of the 
mind's terror.
Lucretius also characterizes fear as cold: it is perceived as a chill, and he 
connects this with the trembling which often accompanies fear (III 290-291, 
299-301).
The thought which produces fear is that of a future evil. A person is 
afraid when she perceives something as an impending threat. Epicurus 
implies this in a principle which he offers about fear and rationality: it is 
unreasonable to fear something which w on't really be harmful when it 
occurs (EpM  125). His language makes it clear that the evil which fear is 
directed at is in the future: 63are (idraioq o A,eycov 5e5ievai xov Qdvatov ov% 
cm A/urcfiaei rcapajv, aXX' cm X.U7tei ueA,A.cov. o yap rcapov ouk evoxA.ei, 
TCpoaSoKtDuevov kevon; A-wcet.17 We can see the same point in Diogenes of 
Oenoanda, who describes those who avoid a fire fearing that they will die 
because of it (cpoPcnjpevoi 8 i ’ outov tcd GavaTco 7iepi7tsaeia6a i 35 II).
17 Stupid is the person who says that he fears death not because it zuill hurt when it 
occurs, but because it hurts in anticipation. For whatever is not troubling when it occurs gives 
only em pty pains zvhen it is expected to occur.
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The action which naturally results from fear is flight or avoidance. 
In the case of a clear and distinct fear, Diogenes of Oenoanda tells us, we 
flee some obvious evil, as when we avoid a fire (35 II 4-7). Lucretius 
explains that so long as men are driven by fear they long to have fled and 
gotten themselves clear of the perceived threat (III 68-69). This would have 
been axiomatic for the Epicureans since fear is itself painful and it is the 
perception of an impending pain or evil. Since the natural response to 
pain is avoidance,1® and fear is painful twice over — intrinsically and as the 
expectation of something painful -  the natural response to fear is also 
avoidance.
So far this is all highly traditional and non-controversial. Both Plato 
and Aristotle agreed that fear was painful (Phlb  47el-3 , R het 1382a21). 
Philosophers of all stripes believed that fear was directed at a (perceived) 
future evil.19 To judge from the ease with which Socrates and Laches 
agree, common sense also saw fear as a jtpoaSoKia geAAovToq kockou 
(Laches 198b7-cl; cf. the Suda s.v. (popoq). Aristotle considers fear to be a 
process of chilling (PA 692a25-27, Rhet 1389b29-32), a conception which he 
shares with the ancient medical tradition .20 Both the Greek and Latin 
languages presuppose the connection between fright and trembling — think 
for example of the words (ppiicn and horror. Homer uses the later word for 
fear, cpopoq, to mean 'flight', and Aristotle would have essentially agreed 
with Epicurus that fear was naturally suited to flight and avoidance,
18 Cf. EpM 127-131, DRN  I I 16-21, De Fin 1 30.
19 Laches 198b7-cl, Protagoras 358d5-7, N E  1115a9, DL VII 112, 5V F  III 388, Alcinoos 
XXXR, pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes I (3' 14-15.
20 See the extrem ely inform ative article of H elm ut Flashar 'Die m edizinischen  
Grundlagen der Lehre von der W irkung der Dictung in der griechischen Poetik' Hermes 84  
(1956), 12-48.
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insofar as it was a perception of pain (De An 431a8-16). Very likely, we too 
will find this conception of fear uncontroversial, since this conception is, 
in essence, ours as well.21
The fear of death feels no different than any other fear, except that 
the feeling is stronger than most other cases. The fear of death is very, very 
painful. It seems that the strength of a fear is a function of the size and 
severity of the perceived evil.22 And the fear of death frequently stands, 
with the fear of the gods, as one of the strongest fears in human life -  t o  
(p p iK t o S e a r a T o v  o u v  tg jv  kockcov o  G a v a x o q  o u Qe v  rcpoq q g a q  (EpM  125).23 
Death is seen as one of the worst things that we face, and as a result, the 
fear of death is one of the most painful and disturbing fears. The other 
point worth noting, in this regard, is that since it is so common and so 
vehem ent, the fear of death becomes exemplary of disturbing painful 
fear.24
Fear leads to avoidance, and so does the fear of death, but in a 
complicated fashion. The Epicureans were aware that if a person thought 
something was likely to kill him, he would avoid that thing. Diogenes of 
Oenoanda describes people who avoid a fire since they fear it might kill 
them (35 II 5-10). But from such a simple origin the fear of death blossoms 
and grows more complex. Both Cicero and Lucretius explain that the fear 
of death can pollute and destroy a person's whole life (De Fin I 49, DRN  EH 
37-40). As Lucretius puts it the fear 'leaves no pleasure clear and pure' (40).
21 My Random House Webster's College Dictionary s.v. 'fear' offers 'a  distressing
em otion aroused by im pending danger, evil, pain, etc., whether the threat is real or 
im agined.'
22 Philodemus makes the same point about anger: De Ira XLVII 32-41.
2 3 Cf. NE  1115a26 (poPepamxtov 8 ’ o Gdvaxoq.
24 EpH  81-82, DO 34 V I14-V H  3, 35 II 5-10, De Fin 149.
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Men who fear death become greedy and power-hungry, apparently in an 
effort to secure protection from the attacks of nature and other men (De 
Fin 1 49, DRN  EH 69-77). Philodemus adds, however, that such men do not 
even enjoy their riches: they become miserly and ungrateful, fearing that 
they may outlive their resources (EF XVII-XX). The fear of death squeezes 
happiness from both ends -  it increases the desire for wealth and power, 
but it decreases the enjoyment and secure use of these very things. In this 
way, many people wreck their entire lives because they seek to avoid death.
This analysis shows that the Epicureans did not limit themselves to 
individual actions when considering the effects of emotion. Because they 
take a wider view, they can offer a richer explanation of just how harmful 
the fear of death is. Not only is it extremely painful in its own right, but it 
also leads to a lifestyle that is laborious and destructive of peace of mind -  
both for the individual and for the larger community. Both Cicero and 
Lucretius connect civil strife with the desires which the fear of death causes 
(De Fin I 49, D RN  III 70-86). With a limited amount of influence and 
riches available, inordinate desires lead very naturally to political 
instability and unrest. The fears of death infect whole cultures as well as 
entire lives of individuals.
The spread of the fear of death produces one startling paradox: as a 
result of their fear of death, people sometimes come to commit suicide. 
Epicurus hints at this idea, when he writes, 'As for the many, sometimes 
they flee death as the greatest of evils, but other times they choose it as the 
cessation of life's evils' (EpM  125-126). Cicero, Lucretius, and Seneca, 
however, give the paradox its full force.25 Lucretius puts it thus.
25 De Fitt 1 49, DRN  HI 78-82, U 496-498 (Seneca reporting Epicurus's views).
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intereunt partim statuarum et nomiius ergo; 
et saepe usque adeo mortis formidine vitae 
percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae 
ut sibi consciscant maerenti pectore letum 
obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem (m  78-82).
Sometimes men perish on account of statues and prominence; 
and often, because of the fear of death, hatred of life and the sight 
of light takes hold of people to such a degree that they kill 
themselves with a grieving heart -  they forget that the source of 
their troubles is this fear.
Initially people pursue power and wealth as means -  they seek such things 
in order to protect themselves from death -  but over time riches and fame 
come to seem intrinsically valuable. As a result, a person without them 
appears to have no reason to go on living. Thus, in a roundabout fashion, 
the fear of death leads to a desire for death.
We need to consider, finally, the cognitive roots of the fear of death. 
In general fear results from the expectation of something bad. Now it 
should be overwhelmingly obvious that people do fear death and that the 
fear does stem from their thought that death will, somehow, harm them. 
All of this is likely to seem so obvious that it is easy to miss a crucial point, 
namely that there is not simply one reason to fear death. Fear results from 
the thought of future evil, but there is no limit on what a person takes to 
be evil and there is little limit on how people understand death. One 
person may fear death because she takes it to involve a painful process of 
dying, while another may fear it because of his belief that he will lose his 
friends and loved ones. It is more appropriate, therefore, to speak of the 
fears of death rather than the fear of death.
This plurality, however, poses a problem for the Epicureans. They 
wish to consider the fears at a more general level, and so they need a way
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to organize them into larger groups. As one solution, they sometimes 
employed a Socratic arrangement. In the A pology , Socrates considers 
whether death is bad, and he organizes his inquiry around two options: 
after death, the person who dies either survives in some form or the 
person is entirely destroyed (40c5-9). This dilemma provides a useful way 
of arranging our thoughts about death, and the Epicureans take it up for 
just this purpose. In the Letter to Herodotus Epicurus explains the fear of 
death as resulting from belief in myths or lack of sensation (81).26 These 
are Socrates's two options: the myths offer an afterlife, and lack of 
sensation is another way of describing total destruction .27 Lucretius 
organizes De Rerum N atura III around the same dichotomy. After he 
explains the nature of the soul (94-416), he first takes up the issue of the 
afterlife (417-829), and then he considers the total destruction of the soul 
(830-1094). The division provides the Epicureans with a natural and 
general vantage point from which to view the fears of death.
This arrangement does not cover every possible reason to fear death, 
but it is by no means trivial. Fears remain which are not easy to place in 
either category, for instance the fear that comes from the thought of a 
painful death. Nevertheless, the dilemma does highlight thoughts which 
are perennial reasons to fear death. In particular, we will fear death, on the 
one hand, if we think that it is the transition to Hades and eternal torture, 
and on the other hand, if we think that at death we cease to exist and lose 
all the benefits of life. Hence, the organization encompasses and delineates
26 For discussion of this difficult paragraph, see Appendix 2: Letter to Herodotus 81.
27 Socrates himself presents annihilation as the com plete lack of sensation. Compare 
Epicurus's use of avaia0r|cna (EpH 81) with Socrates's statement p-qSE cd'a0ri<nv |i t i5 e v 6<; e* e i v  
t o v  T E 0 v E C O T a ...| rn 5 £ p ia  aiaQticiq e c t t iv  (40c6-7...9).
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im portant considerations about death, even if it is not absolutely 
exhaustive.
IV
Ideally, people come to have true views of the world and the emotions 
which result from such views are appropriate. Since evaluative thought, 
our ideas about what is good and bad, play such a crucial role in our 
emotions, it is essential that we learn what really is good and bad. But it is 
also essential that we come to have a solid grasp on factual matters, that is 
on the nature of things, in order to understand the situations that we 
encounter during our lives. So for example, in the case of fear, we want, 
ideally, only to fear what really is a potential harm. And thus we need to 
learn what really is bad -  for the Epicureans pain -  and what things in the 
world are potential sources of pain -  e.g. fire or hunger. Finally, a person's 
em otion should correspond in size to the object of the emotion. Fear 
should correspond in intensity with the severity of the potential harm. So 
there are three ways in which an emotion can be correct and appropriate: 
first, if it stems from a proper sense of good and bad, second, if it possesses 
accurate factual support, and, third, if it fits its object in size or intensity.
Although the Epicureans are much more interested in wrongheaded 
and harmful emotions, that is not to say that they have no interest in more 
positive cases of emotion. According to Diogenes Laertius, the Epicurean 
wise man 'will be especially susceptible to certain passions -  that would not 
im pede his wisdom ' (7id0eai ( t ia i )28 |ia*Aov a\)axe0f|aea0ai • o k  av
28 I accept here, as H.S. Long does not, Bignone's addition of tia i . The parallel in 
Philodemus -  avaxeOfiaeiai tiaiv opYaiq o ao<po<; (De Ira XLI 30-31) -  makes the addition hard  
to resist. Cf. J. Annas 'Epicurean Emotions' 158, n.26 for this parallel.
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£|i7to8 t(jcci 7tpoq trv  acxpiav). The fullest description of such emotions 
comes from Philodemus in his De Ira. He contrasts 'natural' anger with 
'em pty' anger.29 His most significant characterization of natural anger is 
this:
cruviaxaxai yap arco xo[u] pA.£7tetv, ox; t] (pTjaiq £%£i xcov 
jcpaypaxcov, Kai piiSev ^ euSoSo^eiv ev xatq a[/u]miExpT|a£Gi 
xwv £A,a[xx](D(idxcov Kai xaiq KoA,da£<n xa>v (3A,a7tx6vxcov 
(XXXVHI 32-39)
It comes about from seeing the nature of things and from 
having no false beliefs about the correlation of damages 
and about the punishments of harmful people.
Here we find the key points: an emotion is appropriate when it results
from a true view of how things are30 and corresponds in intensity with its
object. Although Lucretius does not discuss 'natural' emotions as such, he
does imply that some emotions are appropriate. When he says that a
person can become angry too easily or become afraid too quickly (311-313),
he suggests that it is also possible to become angry and afraid justifiably -
that is with appropriate ease and speed. He does not state what these
justifiable emotions would be like, but it is reasonable to assume that he is
thinking along the same lines as Philodemus: an emotion is justified
insofar as it relies on a true view of matters.
It may seem, however, that fear can never be positive for an 
Epicurean. Fear is painful and disturbing -  it is a form of xapaxR (Rhet 
1382a21) -  and the Epicureans think that our goal is to be entirely without 
pain and disturbance: they want dxapa^ia. Although an emotion like fear 
may be based on a true view of m atters, so this argum ent goes,
29 For the contrast, see J. Annas 'Epicurean Em otions' 147-159 and J.F . Procope
'Epicureans on Anger' 368-377.
3<J Clearly q (p-uaiq xcov itpaynaxcov is the perfect caique of natura reru m , which is
exactly what Lucretius sets out to teach his readers.
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nevertheless an Epicurean would reject it since the emotion is painful and 
thus bad. This is a serious objection to the claim that the Epicureans could 
endorse any painful emotion.31 It turns out that the Epicureans considered 
the matter themselves, and they defend their acceptance of certain painful 
em otions .32
A first, and somewhat weak, rationale is that painful emotions are 
an inescapable part of human life. Epicurus explains that the gods are 
entirely without anger or gratitude, 'for all that sort of thing relies on 
weakness' (KD 1). Since nothing can harm or benefit the gods, they have 
no impetus to be angry or grateful. But Philodemus uses this to make the 
converse point: unfortunately, human beings are subject to harm and 
benefit, and also susceptible to the emotions which result from such 
treatm ent, namely anger and gratitude (De Ira XLIII 14-41, XL 6-22). 
Lucretius makes a similar point, somewhat more generally. All human 
beings have natural inclinations to one emotion or another, and 'one 
should not think that such evils can be entirely tom  out' (III 310).33 The 
weakness in this argument is that emotion may be inescapable, but that 
does not show that it is at all good. Some features of human nature are 
regrettable, even if they are unavoidable.
But Philodemus also offers a more cogent defense of certain painful 
emotions. He starts from a distinction: anger may be painful and thus bad,
31 Phillip Mitsis first brought this objection to my attention.
32 In what follows, I rely very heavily on J.F. Procope 'Epicureans on A nger', but the 
application of the arguments about anger to the case of fear is my innovation -  for which he 
should not be blamed.
33 N ote that the 'evils' here are not the emotions per se but rather the tendency  
towards an emotion regardless of whether the emotion is justified. Lucretius does not say 
that fear is unconditionally bad; he says that it is bad, e.g., always to incline to fear, even 
when fear is not warranted.
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in one sense, but it helps to secure safety and security,34 and thus it is good 
in another sense. Anger is beneficial overall insofar as the good gained is 
greater than the pain of anger. This argument relies on an im portant 
Epicurean point about happiness. Epicurus argues that since our goal is 
maximum painlessness overa ll, it is sometimes in our interest to reject 
pleasure or choose pain. When a pain can produce or lead to a greater 
overall pleasure, e.g. taking a shot to cure a debilitating illness, then it is 
well worth undergoing the pain. Conversely, when a pleasure now will 
cause greater pain later, then it is unreasonable to choose the immediate 
pleasure despite the eventual pain (EpM 128-130). So the mere fact that an 
emotion like anger is painful, does not make it unconditionally bad. Since 
it helps to secure a lasting benefit, namely safety, it is beneficial overall. A 
parallel argument could be made about fear: it is disturbing and hence, in a 
sense, bad, but since it leads people to avoid pain and disturbance, it helps 
to secure a life of painlessness, and hence it is a net good. Thus, it is 
possible to support even painful emotions on basic Epicurean grounds
In a way, the second defense leads back to the first. If we were all- 
powerful, then there would be no question of weighing goods against evils 
in this manner. Since nothing could harm us, there would never be 
reason for a disturbing emotion. But since we are susceptible to harm in 
countless ways, then even painful emotions may be beneficial overall, 
provided that they increase net d tap a^Ia . So it seems that the Epicureans 
have good reason to welcome even some painful emotions, and they have 
no reason to reject all painful emotions out of hand. In the ideal case, an
34 Presumably he thinks that anger serves to scare off attacks and m istreatm ents. W e 
m ay doubt this specific claim, but that doesn't affect the overall thrust of his argum ent.
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emotion will reflect a correct assessment of how things are and it will lead 
to appropriate action. Even if it is somewhat disturbing, its overall effect 
can be positive if it leads to actions which yield greater painlessness, on the 
whole, than would occur without the emotion. It is no doubt disturbing to 
fear an approaching, angry dog, but the fear will lead to hurried flight, and 
that is certainly better than the alternative.
The Epicureans believe that the fears of death fall far short of this 
ideal. First off, the fears originate in false ideas about death. Using the 
Socratic dichotomy -  death is either the absolute end, or it is not -  we can 
give a rough organization to some of the more important ideas behind the 
fears of death. If death is the end, many people think that this utter 
nothingness is a horrible shadowy state, and they fear for the loss of the 
goods of life. If death is not the end, then many people anticipate an 
afterlife of eternal suffering. All of these notions, say the Epicureans, are 
wrong, and so the fears they give rise to are correspondingly flawed .35 
Moreover, the fears lead to a host of actions meant to fend off death, e.g. 
the hoarding of money and power. Such aversion is doubly bad: first, it is 
pointless since there is not good reason to be anxious about death, second, 
it leads to lifestyles which are themselves difficult and disturbing. Hence 
the fears of death are, like any fear, intrinsically disturbing, but in addition 
they depend on false ideas and they lead to pointless and harmful 
behavior. The fears are bad not just because they are intrinsically painful, 
but because they are painful, false, and detrimental to life as a whole. Since
33 It would be premature for me to justify this now. I take up the arguments which 
Lucretius offers for these claims in the following chapters.
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these fears are so wrongheaded and harmful, the Epicureans take great 
pains to cure people of them.
In one sense, then, the task before Lucretius is clear and his response 
is correspondingly straightforward. He wants to stop people from fearing 
death. Because emotions result from our view of things, the obvious way 
to change a person's emotions is to change that person's views. Just as 
obviously, the m ost straightforward way to do that  is by means of 
argument. We find, for the most part, Lucretius doing just this in Book EH: 
he argues that death is the end, so we should not fear any afterlife, but that 
non-existence is not bad, so we should not fear it either. These are 
certainly large, complex, and controversial subjects, and thus Lucretius 
faces great obstacles if he is to carry his case. But there is nothing especially 
remarkable about these difficulties, that is they are the ordinary kinds of 
problems that anyone faces when arguing for a complex and controversial 
thesis. In this sense, the only limitations on Lucretius are the limitations 
of his own arguments.
But there is another, less straightforward tangle of difficulties for 
Lucretius. Many people's attitudes towards death are not just wrong, they 
are also seriously confused. People often fear death, but deny their fear or 
underestimate its effect on their lives (41-93), or they fail to see clearly what 
they think about death (870-893), or they do not realize that they are 
miserable because of their fears of death (1049-1075). Such people certainly 
have false ideas about death, but their problems go deeper than that: they 
also have false ideas about themselves. They are likely to reject Lucretius's 
arguments as unnecessary, and this adds an entirely new level of problems. 
No matter how good an argument Lucretius offers, it will do no good if
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people fail to listen or only listen half-heartedly. Those who can not, or 
will not, face their own problems squarely are hard for Lucretius to reach 
much less help.
At first glance, Lucretius's tone does not seem well-suited to this 
difficulty. Bluntly put, Lucretius rarely misses an opportunity to remind 
his readers how stupid and miserable most people are -  apparently his 
readers included .36 It is unclear why this abuse should help his readers 
rather than simply infuriate them. When Lucretius compares adults to 
frightened, foolish children, how will this increase his readers' desire or 
willingness to learn?37 The answer, I believe, is that such abuse helps by 
forcing the reader to look more closely at the misery of his or her life. Lack 
of reflection and self-awareness leads to complacency and errors about 
one's own motivations, and the abuse is meant to help in this regard.
Lucretius is certainly abusive and hostile, but there is a method to 
his madness, so to speak. He paints a picture so ugly that you cannot tear 
yourself away: it is like watching a train wreck. Since the lives which 
Lucretius describes are so glaringly awful, a person cannot help but want to 
avoid them. The sense of horror which such images produce should serve 
as an impetus to reflection. Such vivid, even lurid, images cannot be 
brushed aside, and it is only natural to compare one's life with such awful 
p ic tu re s .38 So one way this method can lead to self-awareness is by
36 C onstrast Phillip M itsis 'C om m itting Philosophy on the Reader' Materiali e 
discussioni per I' analisi dei testi classici 31 (1993), 111-128. He suggests that Lucretius 
employs rhetoric to make the reader sympathize with the all-knowing persona of the poet 
rather than with the miserable m ass of mankind.
37 Note that at least formally Lucretius includes himself in this analogy, since it is 
cast in the first-person plural 'sic nos in luce timemus' (ID 88).
38 The idea that one could im prove oneself, ethically, by com paring one's life to that 
of others is a Democritean inheritance. See D RN  I I 1-13 and DK 68 B91 with the discussion  
of David Konstan Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 4-10.
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showing people that they need help. Only once they adm it this, will they 
begin to consider what really drives them.
But the vivid depictions serve another function beyond causing 
reflection: they actually contribute to the much-needed analysis. Consider 
two cases. First, fears of death impel men to pursue money and power. 
The fear itself, which they will not acknowledge, fills their mind with 
anxiety and distress. Worse still, in a misguided and unreflective attempt 
to flee death they heap up money and power. These pursuits are laborious 
and bound to cause only further misery, both directly and because of their 
harmful consequences: a greedy person is always longing for more, even to 
the point of betraying family or country. Second, even if they deny that 
they worry about an afterlife, people often show a suspiciously vehement 
concern for the fate of their corpse. How can this be so, unless they harbor 
some notion, however confused, that the corpse is them?39
By means of such portrayals, Lucretius actually articulates our 
motivations for us. We either will not or cannot get clear about our own 
lives. Lucretius helps to move this process along by providing the tracks 
along which self-inquiry should run. We should wonder why money and 
glory seem so desirable, and why the fate of our dead bodies nags at us so. 
If we turn our attention in these directions, we will be pursuing the right 
connections, the connections which habit and confusion leave us blind 
to .40 If he has hit upon an impression that we hold, say that it will hurt to 
be cremated, then his method helps us become better aware that we hold
39 These examples are paraphrases of in 41-93, 870-893.
40 N ote that, for the m om ent, I sim ply assum e that Lucretius offers the right 
connections. For now I want only to show how the therapy is meant to work. W hether or not 
he is articulating the impressions that are really acting on us, he is articulating som ething.
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such a thought and also better aware of how the thought disturbs us. Once 
a person has a better grasp of his thought, he can consider how the 
impression fits in with his more reflective and stable beliefs, say that dead 
bodies feel nothing at all. First the person must see the contradiction, then 
he can remove it.
This method should be understood in the light of what Philodemus 
says about the treatment of anger. In his De Ira Philodemus is engaged in a 
num ber of controversies, against common sense, other schools, and 
against other Epicureans. The debate which concerns us was aimed at a 
certain Epicurean named Timasagoras,41 who appears to have claimed that 
there was little point in arguing with angry people since they were 
incapable of reasoning about their emotions (De Ira VII 6-9). Even more 
specifically, Timasagoras denied the usefulness of the practice of rebuke (to 
yeyeiv), and Philodemus defends the method against his criticism (De Ira I 
7-11). Philodemus argues that it is precisely because emotional people are 
unreasonable that rebuke is beneficial.
Philodemus describes rebuke as the practice of placing the evils of an 
emotion in clear sight. His most informative description is this:
[dvaypdcp]cov ta  pev d[Y]voo[6|j.ev]a teAiax;, t[a] 5 ’eiq A.ti0tiv 
dcpvypiva, ta  8 ’dvE7tiA.oYiatov>peva toiq ye |i£YS0£cn.v, ei |ui0£v 
etepov, ta  S ’ovk d0poco<; ye 0ecopo6|ieva, Kai ti0eiq ev o\|/ei 
p.£YdA,[Tiv] £V7ioi£i <ppucT|v, 6S[cr]t£ toft nap’ aotov eivai 
7tpocru7co|iVTia0£vtoq dn:o(pi)Yeiv paiSicoc;
By writing out those things which are utterly unknown, or 
those which have become forgotten, or those which have 
not been properly considered -  in size at least, if nothing 
else -  or those which are not contemplated together, and by 
placing these in view one introduces a great fright, so that a
41 For more on this whole issue, see John Procope 'Epicureans on Anger' 377-381, whose 
account I follow closely.
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person will easily flee these things, if it is brought home to 
him that it is in his power (sc. to do so) (De Ira EH 5-18).
According to Philodemus, rebuke can shock an emotional person, and this
shock can lead to reflection. If the evils of an emotion are laid out clearly
to view, rebuke will function as a rhetorical slap in the face. In particular,
the method focuses attention on those matters that emotional people don't
see, or have forgotten, or underestimated, or have not considered in the
proper context.
These are exactly the kinds of matters which Lucretius is concerned 
with. People deny or diminish the importance of the fears of death (41-93) 
-  these are cases of not seeing or underestimating emotional troubles. 
Others fail to understand the emptiness of their lives in the light of their 
fears of death (1049-1075) -  such people don't make the right connections. 
Finally, even once people agree that there is no sensation in death, they 
continue to fear for their corpses (870-893) -  in such a situation, a person 
has a correct understanding in one area, but does not apply that 
understanding elsewhere. This is another example of a failure to integrate 
one's knowledge.
Lucretius employs vivid depictions of misery in just the manner 
Philodemus recommends. As I said earlier, no matter how good his 
arguments, Lucretius will make no headway with people who ignore him. 
Although Lucretius never explicitly mentions the practice of rebuke, the 
discussion in Philodemus is bound to remind us of the De Rerum Natura. 
Philodemus alludes to the use of rebuke in discussions of erotic desire (De 
Ira VII), and in this connection, Julia Annas has already suggested that 
Lucretius provides the practice that goes along with the theory we find in
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Philodem us's.42 This seems clearly right, and I would add that rebuke also 
pays a major role in book E l as well. Just as Philodemus suggests, Lucretius 
makes use of abusive, hyperbolic portraits in order to bring home the 
suffering that the fears of death cause, and by doing so he hopes to make 
the reader take real stock of himself and his emotions.
V
By way of conclusion, I want to return to the problem s I found in 
Lucretius's analogy between the fear of adults and children who are afraid 
of the dark. The first problem was that Lucretius implied that emotions 
were both reasonable and irrational. The second problem was to explain 
Lucretius's expectation that reason could cure a person of such 
unreasonable passions.
The first problem turns out to be a sophism , although a very 
attractive one. Emotion can be rational and  irrational because the words 
are being used to mark two different contrasts. An emotion is rational 
insofar as it is the result of some kind of thought, as opposed to something 
mechanical, like the operation of a person's autonomic nervous system. 
Here 'rational' contrasts not with 'irrational' but with 'arational'. An 
emotion that is rational in this sense can also be irrational if the thoughts 
which underlie it are weak, unwarranted, and false. The contrast to 
irrationality is good  reason. There is a sense in which nothing can be 
irrational unless it is rational, that is based on some kind of reason. Even
42 'Philodemus' rem ark in VII that "w e are used to doing this" for erotic desire recalls 
Lucretius' theatrical display in Book IV' (146, n. 3).
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the worst, most irrational thought is still a thought; only a reason can be a 
bad reason.
We can apply this more specifically to Lucretius's understanding of 
the fears of death. These fears, like all fears, are rational in the sense that 
they result from what people think about death. The fears of death, 
however, are massively irrational in another sense: they result from a false 
and confused view of death, and they lead to disturbing and harmful 
action. Thus, there is no inconsistency if Lucretius implies, in the analogy 
of adult and childish terrors, that the fears of death stem  from people's 
thoughts and  that people's thoughts on the matter are false and disturbing.
But irrational emotions can be rational in another sense, and this 
leads to the second problem. To say that an emotion is rational may be to 
say that it is the kind of thing that can become reasonable -  it is amenable 
to reason, even if, at the moment, it is hopelessly confused .43 Since every 
emotion results from a person's view of matters, even if the view  is 
m assively wrong or incoherent, every em otion can at least becom e 
reasonable — provided that the view improves. Through learning and 
reflective scrutiny, our thoughts can move towards truth and coherence, 
no m atter how bad they are. Hence an em otion w hich stems from a 
wrongheaded viewpoint can be improved by reflecting on the thoughts
43 Cf. NE  1098a4-5, where Aristotle points out that something can 'have reason' in two 
ways: to g£v <u<; £7tut£i0£<; X.6y(p, to 8 ’ <b^  e % o v  k cu  Siavooupevov. S o  even Plato s appetitive 
part of the soul would be 'rational' in this first, and w eaker, sense. This is the sense in 
which 'rational' or 'having reason' contrast with 'm echanical' or 'aration al'. The m ore 
ordinary contrast is between the two things Aristotle describes in the passage quoted above, 
where the first is irrational, since it cannot really think for itself, and the second is rational 
because it has the capacity to do so. But, and this is the crucial point, both of them  are 
'rational' in the first, weaker sense.
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which it stems from. In this way, reason can change and improve 
em otions.
This helps to explain Lucretius's optimism, even in the face of all 
the ignorance and confusion he so vividly describes. He can improve 
matters by showing people the truth about death. The bulk of Book EH 
attempts to do just this. Emotions based on false thoughts can be terribly 
confused, but they can always improve, provided that the false thoughts 
change for the better. Lucretius obviously believes that he has the truth, 
and he thinks that by argument he can bring other people to see it as well. 
If he does so, their fears will dissipate. So, as wrongheaded as they may be, 
the fears of death are rational insofar as they can improve under the 
guidance of reason.
But this does not answer for everything, and there is a way in which 
the analogy is potentially misleading: it suggests that reason alone  can 
bring a person around. As Lucretius says, what adult fears need is the 'ratio 
naturae' -  a knowledge of the truth about the nature of things. But in 
some cases, people need more than knowledge, at least in the beginning. 
People who deny their fear or who underestimate its importance will not 
even listen to reason, and so Lucretius's arguments may fall on deaf ears. 
Lucretius can deal with this problem by using the method that Philodemus 
calls 'rebuke', and so I don't mean to suggest that the problem is insoluable. 
The point is that the analogy which Lucretius makes, although basically 
sound, simplifies the issue somewhat. Reason cures fears like the light of 
day, but in some cases reason cannot even get started until after Lucretius 
shocks his readers into paying attention. In such cases, Lucretius employs 
rebuke in order to drag people to the light of reason.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE OF THE SOUL AND THE FEAR OF HADES
Lucretius breaks down the fears of death into two main groups -  fear that 
the soul survives death, and fear that the soul does not survive death. 
This chapter examines his case against the first fear, the fear of an afterlife. 
O f course, not every afterlife is terrifying. The idea of an eternal paradise 
after death is actually appealing, and many people may even look forward 
to it. The afterlife that people fear, however, is Hades -  a place of 
judgment and, very likely, eternal punishment. Lucretius believes that he 
can cure us of the fear of Hades if he can convince us that the soul is 
mortal. In order to prove the mortality of the soul, he lays out a detailed 
theory of the soul's physiology. In addition, he offers a psychological 
account of the origin of anxiety about Hades; this account allows him to 
give a non-supematural explanation for the fear, but it also gives him an 
opportunity to consider various ideas about happiness and the good life.
n
As a preliminary, however, we need to deal with an initial obstacle. Many 
critics, both ancient1 and modem ,2 suggest that Lucretius should not have
I
1 E.g., Cicero TD 1 11 & 1.48, and ND  I I 5; Seneca Ep 24.18. More generally see Juvenal
2.149-153 and Propertius II 34.53-54.
2 E .g., Bailey II 993-995; R.M. Ogilvie The Romans and their Gods in the Age of
A ugustus  (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), 86; Charles Segal Lucretius on Death and 
Anxiety  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 17-19. More generally, see Franz 
Cum ont Afterlife in Roman Paganism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922), especially 
ch ap ter II 'The N ether W orld', and Richm ond Lattim ore Themes in Greek and Latin 
Epitaphs (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), especially chapter II and chapter 
V II.
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treated the fear of Hades at all since that fear was not a real concern in his
time. Cicero, for example, writes:
Quae est anus tarn delira quae timeat ista quae vos [sc. 
Epicurei] videlicet, si physica non didicissetis, timeretis, 
"Acherunsia templa alta Orci, pallida leti, nubila tenebris 
loca"?
What old woman is so crazy that she fears those things which you 
[Epicureans! would obviously fear if you had not learned physics, 
'Orcus's deep regions of Acheron, pale places of death, clouded in 
shadows'?' (TD 148).
Perhaps Lucretius's attack on the fear of Hades is a simple irrelevancy.
Lucretius himself anticipates and answers this charge (41-93). At the 
beginning of book HI he offers up hypothetical objectors who claim not to 
need any Epicurean wisdom. These people don't need help, they say, since 
they know the nature of the soul. In fact, replies Lucretius, these people 
are all bluster: they have no knowledge about the soul, and thus they are 
subject to false beliefs, fear, and misery. Such people are deeply in need of 
Epicurean teaching no matter what they may say. Moreover, the fear of 
death fills their lives with distress in ways that they have never even 
considered. According to Lucretius troubling desires for things like money 
and political power stem, in large part, from the fear of death. These lines 
are a clear attempt to answer the charge of irrelevancy, even if it is less
clear how adequate a response they are.
But scholars and commentators have not made much use of these 
verses when they address the problem. Instead they have offered 
hypotheses based on Lucretius's social position, on his intended audience, 
or on his relationship to his sources. It would be a near-endless task to go 
through all the views which have been put forth, and I will not do so since
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it would not be very profitable.3 But two prominent types of response are
particularly important.
Cyril Bailey presents a clear version of the first type of view. In his 
commentary, and in an earlier work on Roman religion,4 Bailey takes the 
line that Lucretius has mistaken the contemporary scene. According to 
Bailey, the Greeks of Epicurus's time did believe in Hades, but Lucretius's 
Roman contem poraries did not. Lucretius takes over his teacher s 
arguments wholesale, and he does not adjust or remove the treatm ent of 
the fear of Hades, even though his contemporaries had no concern for 
such ideas. Thus, Lucretius has not, in this instance, sufficiently adjusted 
his Epicurean lessons for his Roman audience. It should be stressed that if 
this view is correct, then Lucretius's arguments are irrelevant — at least for
his Roman audience.
Now there are some things that might be said for this response. It is 
true that Lucretius declares his devotion to Epicurus's philosophy in 
elaborate and fulsome language; in particular, at the beginning of book EH 
he declares his desire to follow Epicurus rather than to compete with him 
(3-8). According to Lucretius, Epicurus is in an entirely different league 
from himself. Such a declaration could induce us to see Lucretius as an 
overly devoted follower. We could further hypothesize that as a bookish 
intellectual, Lucretius developed his view of human psychology more by
3 In addition to the discussions of Bailey and Segal mentioned above, I have found the 
following to be especially useful or insightful: E.J. Kenney Lucretius De Rerum Natura Book 
III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4-5 and com m entary ad loc.; Benjamin 
Farrington Science and Politics in the Ancient World (New York: Barnes & N oble, Inc., 
1965), 179-212 & 'The Meaning of Persona in De Rerum Natura HI 58' Hermathena 85 (1955), 
3-12; Monica Gale Myth and Poetry in Lucretius (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press,
1994), chapter 2 'The cultural background: myth and belief in late republican Rom e'.
4 Bailey II 993-995 , and Phases in the Religion of Ancient Rome (B e rk e le y : 
University of California Press, 1932), 218-221.
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reading Epicurus than by looking at the people around him. Such a story 
could account for a gap between the fears which Lucretius attacks and the 
fears which his contemporaries actually held.
N evertheless, on consid eration , this response seem s very 
unsatisfying. First of all, Bailey's answer, if correct, may explain Lucretius, 
but it does nothing to justify him. To put it another way around Bailey 
gives a reason for Lucretius's behavior, but it is not a reason that Lucretius 
could offer in his own defense. In fact, it makes him out to be a bit stupid; 
he sim ply m isunderstands contem porary beliefs about death. An 
explanation that can give Lucretius good  reason for doing what he does 
would be, to this extent at least, more compelling than Bailey's. Secondly, 
the answer fails on its own terms. Bailey claims that such beliefs as 
Lucretius attacks were more prevalent in Epicurus's Greek world; but 
Plutarch, speaking as a Greek to Greeks,5 makes exactly the same argument 
against Epicurus as Cicero does against Roman Epicureans (Non posse 
1104b-d and 1106d-f). Thus, the problem is only pushed a step back: we 
explain Lucretius by Epicurus, but now we need some justification for 
Epicurus. In view of these problems it is reasonable to look for another 
explanation.
Benjamin Farrington advances a type of view that is starkly opposed 
to Bailey's. He contends that Lucretius is attacking a real fear, but not a fear 
of the educated elite. On Farrington's interpretation, Lucretius is writing 
for the common man, and the common man was in the grip of the fears 
which Lucretius attacks. Hence Lucretius is perfectly on target, and the
5 See Charles Segal, ' Within the Creek world the lightness with which m en treat 
such fears of the afterlife forms another of Plutarch's objections to the efficacy of Epicurus's 
philosophy' (18, m y emphasis).
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mistake is that of m odem  scholars, who have supposed that the Ciceros
and Senecas speak for everyone.
This view has some intrinsic merit, and in addition it has one 
distinct advantage over an approach such as Bailey's. Farrington properly 
recognizes the Epicurean desire to help all people -  regardless of 
educational or social status .6 If Farrington is correct, then Lucretius 
composes his poem in a manner consistent with this larger Epicurean 
policy. Moreover, Farrington's answer is superior to Bailey's insofar as it 
saves Lucretius from the charge of misunderstanding or misrepresenting 
his audience. As I said before, this is a point in favor of a proposed 
interpretation.
Neither of these advantages, however, should compel us to accept 
Farrington's interpretation without futher argument. On the one hand, it 
needs to be shown that Lucretius does, in fact, compose his poem for the 
common man', whoever that may be. On the other hand, we cannot give 
Lucretius an argument or interpretation merely because it makes him look 
better. Interpretative charity is only one consideration, and we must 
temper it with a respect for the texts. The first issue is a notorious crux, 
and unfortunately Farrington does not defend his view. In addition, his 
view does a poor job of explaining what Lucretius says in his own defense.
Once we ask for whom the De Rerum Natura was intended and who 
would, or could, have had access to its teachings, we open up a nest of 
problems -  none of which will allow clear answers. We do not have
6 For this feature of Epicurean philosophy see especially M artha Nussbaum  ToD  
Chapter 4  'Epicurean Surgery'. In the preface to an introductory reader in Epicurean  
philosophy, D.S. H utchinson offers a sym pathetic portrait of the Epicurean desire to 
address audiences with varying levels of sophistication and education: The Epicurus Reader 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), xii.
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anywhere near enough positive evidence to make useful assessm ents 
about even so basic a matter as literacy in the late Roman R ep ublic/ Even 
if we could answer this question, however, it is not obvious that the poem 
is intended for a large, non-elite audience .8 No less a Latinist than 
Quintilian described Lucretius as 'difficilis' (XI 187). Hence even if there 
were a sizeable number of people who could read in late Republican Rome, 
it is unclear that the tone and style of the De Rerum Natura were meant to 
attract them. Worst of all, we do not have clear and independent evidence 
that a large number of non-elite Romans did harbor the fears and beliefs in 
question .9
It must be said that Farrington does not even begin to address, much 
less answer, these concerns. His style is essentially assertive and general. 
While this accounts for the provocative and often stimulating quality of 
his work, it does little to put these larger worries to rest. Since the 
presumptive weight of tradition sees the poem as a piece of high culture, 
aimed at an educated elite,10 a contrary view would have to carry a heavy 
burden. Unfortunately, Farrington never acknowledges such difficulties;
7 This view is by no means uncontroversial. My opinion has the support of, am ong  
others, E.J. Kenney, 'No quantitative estimate of the extent of literacy at any period in the 
Roman world is possible' CHCL II 10 and Miriam Griffin, who is sceptical of our ability to 
guage the level of Roman literacy, C A H  DC2 689. For a lengthy statem ent from  the other 
side see W.V. Harris Ancient Literacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 149- 
284; Harris argues that the level of Roman literacy was quite low, overall less than 15%, in 
the Late Republic and Im perial Period. See also A.-M . Guillemin Le public et la vie 
litteraire a Rome (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1937), 1-37.
8 Contrast, e.g., Monica Gale 89, T.P. Wiseman "Ihe Two Worlds of Titus Lucretius' in 
Cinna the Poet and other Roman Essays (Surrey: Leicester University Press, 1974), and  
Alexander Dalzell 'Lucretius' in CHCL II.
9 For this problem, see especially F. Cum ont and R. Lattimore. Both authors draw  
hesitant but, nevertheless, low estimates of a common belief in the afterlife.
10 See M. Gale 89, A. Dalzell 208-209, and E.J. Kenney 5. But again contrast T.P.
W isem an.
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worse still, it appears that we do not have the evidence to answer such 
questions, even once they have emerged.11
Even if we pass over these problems, a more serious objection to 
Farrington still remains, namely that his answer concedes much too much 
to Cicero and his ilk. Farrington essentially takes such people at their 
word: they do not believe in Hades, and, thus, they do not need any help 
from the Epicureans. But, as we will see, Lucretius rejects the second half 
of this claim explicitly, and his argument, once properly understood, casts 
doubt on whether he would accept the first half. Thus, Farrington, 
however sympathetic he may be to Lucretius, does not do justice to what 
Lucretius says in his own defense. In view of this, I think that we do 
Lucretius no favors if we construe this part of the poem as narrowly 
directed at the unwashed masses.
There is, however, another strand in Farrington 's argum ent. 
Farrington briefly mentions that even the Ciceros of the world could use 
some Epicurean teaching insofar as they harbored a belief in an afterlife — 
even if not the horrible Hades associated with such figures as Tantalus and 
Sisyphus. Speaking of the Epicureans in general, he writes:
They further[12] had the ambition to sweep out of the 
minds of men like Cicero him self the Pythagorean and 
Platonic belief in the immortality of the soul which Cicero, 
in the same passage of the Tusculans, immediately goes on 
to avow (186).
For Lucretius the belief in immortality, with or without an accompanying 
belief in Hades, is itself a huge mistake. Thus, men prey to this confusion
11 For w hat it is worth, I do not think that we can answ er such questions w ith the
evidence that we possess, and so I suspend judgment on the matter.
12 I.e., in addition to the goal of curing common people of the fear of Hades.
still require Epicurean treatment. Farrington goes on to make another 
crucial point, 'And, said the Epicureans, where error still lurked, there 
terror might easily raise its head' (186). The point, I take it, is that if people 
lack knowledge, they are still susceptible to the fears which they disavow; 
their beliefs and emotions are liable to wobble irrationally. Monica Gale 
also alludes to this idea.13 This position is the one which Lucretius offers 
on his own behalf. Neither author, however, shows that this was explicitly 
Lucretius's answer, nor do they deal with the larger philosophical issues 
which this answer raises. Thus, there is still room for a more detailed 
statement of this position.
Lucretius makes a stronger case in his own defense than his scholarly 
defenders have done. He acknowledges that people often say  that they 
don't fear death and that their lives are fine, but he offers two compelling 
reasons to doubt their boasts.14 First, what these people do belies what they 
say. And, second, their lives display a pervasive misery which Lucretius 
traces back to the fear of death. Thus, Lucretius argues, first, that people 
don't see their own fear, and, second, that they don't see how awful their 
lives really are. People do need Epicurean teaching, and they need it more 
than they can imagine.
Before he sets down to explain the nature of the soul, Lucretius 
justifies his account. He readily admits that people often deny that they
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13 See especially page 93.
14 The structure of Lucretius's argument is crystal clear in D.P. Fowler's 'Lucretius and 
Politics' Philosophia Togata (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 135-140, and I have found his 
analysis very helpful. Also good is M artha Nussbaum's account of the 'diagnostic' part of 
the treatm ent of the fear of death in Lucretius -  ToD 195-201.
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need any of his help, but he thinks that he can show their self-satisfaction 
to be mistaken. First, we can consider what such men say:
nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos
infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti
et se scire animi naturam sanguinis esse
aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas, [46]
nec prorsum quicquam nostrae rationis egere, [44] 45
Often men claim that diseases and a life without glory are more 
fearful than death's Tartarus, and that they know that the nature of 
the mind is composed of blood or even of wind, if by chance this is 
how things strike them, and they say that they need our teaching 
not at all.
Lucretius's opponents claim to know that the soul is a physical thing, and 
as a result of this, they say that they do not need any Epicurean teaching. In 
the context of this debate, the soul's corporeality must be tantamount to its 
m ortality .15 Thus, these men should not believe, on pain of inconsistency, 
in an afterlife o f  any sort. This would make sense of their boasts as a 
whole: they know that the soul is physical and mortal, and thus they do 
not fear death nor do they require any Epicurean therapy.
Lucretius presents these men with a practical refutation. I call it 
'practical' since the refutation hones in on their actions rather than their 
avowals. Lucretius does not explicitly show that these men have two 
opposed beliefs. Instead he shows that some of their actions conflict with 
their professed beliefs. They say that they do not believe in an afterlife, but 
when their lives go to ruin, they show, by their behavior, that this cannot
15 Strictly speaking, of course, these two claims are not identical nor does the former 
entail the latter. A person could consistently believe that the soul was physical, but 
because of his view of physics, still find it to be immortal. If we interpret these lines, 
how ever, in this very strict w ay, then we leave Lucretius with no argum ent at all. 
Therefore I take it that by 'animi naturam  sanguinis esse/au t etiam venti' (43-44), Lucretius 
must have understood not only (1) that the soul is physical but (2) that the soul is mortal.
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be true -  at least not straightforwardly so. In order to make his point, 
Lucretius imagines the same men in bad straits:
extorres idem patria longeque fugati 
conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 
omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt 
et quocumque tamen miseri venere parentant 
et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu' divis 
inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 
acrius advertunt animos ad religionem (48-54).
These same men, exiles from their country and driven far from 
m en's sight, tainted by a sham eful accusation, they live 
overcom e by every m isfortune, and still w herever these 
miserable men come to, they sacrifice to their ancestors and 
slaughter black cattle and make offerings to the Di Manes. In 
trying times, they turn their minds far more keenly to religion.
From the standpoint of logic, actions do not conflict with beliefs, but 
nevertheless there remains an obvious enough inconsistency in this 
picture. For the logician it is beliefs, or even more strictly  their 
propositional content, w hich can contradict one another or be 
in co n sisten t . 16 Actions, however, do not enter into logical relations, 
although of course beliefs or propositions about action can do so. 
Nevertheless if someone says, 'I don't believe that there is a beer in the 
refrigerator,' but still he goes to the refrigerator to get a beer, something has 
obviously gone wrong. In this way we often describe actions as conflicting 
with beliefs or with other actions. Thus there is an intuitive, albeit 
informal, sense in which Lucretius challenges his opponents.
In fact, we can produce an even stricter conflict. If we believe, as 
many have and do ,17 that a person's beliefs play a causal role in his
16 See, for exam ple, the brief com m ents on consistency in W ilfred H odges Logic 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 13-16.
17 Cf. Aristotle De Motii Animalium 7, with Nussbaum's essay 4  in Aristotle's De Motu 
Anim alium  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). See also Colin M cGinn The
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actions,18 then we can ask how the relevant beliefs in Lucretius s example 
hang together. On the one hand, these people claim to know that the soul 
is mortal. Since knowledge trivially implies belief, they should also 
believe that the soul is mortal. On the other hand, they sacrifice to the 
deified dead, who are immortal souls. But this action appears to require 
the belief that (at least some) immortal souls do exist - that is, at least those 
to which these men sacrifice. Without such a belief, the action of sacrifice 
to the deified dead, who are immortal souls, seems obviously irrational. 
Why would anyone sacrifice to an entity whose very existence he denies? 
Since knowledge that the soul is mortal is incompatible with belief in the 
deified dead, Lucretius can offer his opponents a pointed dilemma. Either 
(a) their action relies on a belief that is inconsistent with their claim to 
knowledge, or (b) their action is missing a belief without which it is 
irrational.19
If, as it seems, this dilemma is exhaustive, then the objectors are in 
an impossible position. Either they give up their claim to knowledge, or 
they admit to being irrational, at least locally. Presumably no one chooses 
to be or to stay irrational; hence, it is hardly a live option for Lucretius s 
opponents to declare their own irrationality. As a result, they have no real 
choice but to give up their claim to knowledge. But it was this (alleged)
Character of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) Chapter 5 'A ction ' and also 
Donald Davidson 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' in Essays on Actions & Events (Oxford. 
Oxford University Press, 1980), 3-19.
18 E.g., if I am  cold and I believe that this is a coat and I believe that coats w arm  
people, then, other things being equal, I am likely to go for this coat; and it seems clear that 
m y beliefs about coats and cold were at least a partial cause of my action.
19 Ultimately I think that this kind of theory of action is what underlies the initial 
intuition that actions can conflict with beliefs. We m ay not theorize about it, but m ost of us, 
I believe, already think that we act, at least partially, on the basis of our beliefs. Hence, I 
doubt that anything of substance hangs on whether we classify the refutation in one manner 
or the other.
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knowledge which supported their boast not to need any Epicuran ratio ; 
hence if they lose the one, the other becomes vulnerable. Lucretius has 
rather neatly shown that his opponents are not in the strong position that 
they claim for themselves.
Although these men claim knowledge, they fall short even of stable, 
clear beliefs. When they initially profess to know about the soul, they say 
'that it is composed of blood or even of wind, if by chance this is how 
things strike them' (43-44). These people do not have a clear grasp on what 
they think, nor do they hold their views very strongly. They speak as the 
mood strikes them, and their opinions vary. Even more obviously, they 
are in a muddle later, when they make sacrifices to the deified dead. On 
the one hand, they have a notion that souls don't survive death, but, on 
the other hand, they also have a notion that when things go badly, they 
must have offended their dead ancestors. Apparently, they fail to see that 
i f  their dead ancestors exist, then (at least some) souls do survive death. 
Their thoughts on this matter are impressionistic rather than clear and 
distinct. They wobble incoherently back and forth among a group of 
thoughts which they do not fully understand and which they are only 
weakly committed to.
In the second part of his response, Lucretius challenges his 
opponents at an even deeper level. He points out that their lives are filled 
with miserable and destructive pursuits, and he argues that the fear of 
death is a leading cause of these pursuits. He lays it on rather thick here, 
and I will offer only a brief sample.
homines dum se falso terrore coacti 
effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 
sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque
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conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes, 
crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris 
et consanguineum mensas odere timentque (68-73).
So long as men are driven by a false terror and they wish to have 
escaped and to have gotten themselves far clear, they disturb the 
republic with civil bloodshed, and they greedily increase their 
riches -  heaping slaughter upon slaughter; cruelly they rejoice in 
the sad funeral of a brother, and they hate and fear the tables of 
their relatives.
These verses employ the method of rebuke that I discussed in 
Chapter 1. Lucretius paints a deliberately hyperbolic portrait of the horrors 
of civil war in order to stun his readers and force them to look more 
closely at their lives. The images are certainly horrible, and nobody would 
willingly choose the world that Lucretius describes. Moreover, Roman 
readers would have found the descriptions distressingly familiar. As 
commentators have noticed, these verses are reminiscent of the historical 
and political writings of Cicero and Sallust, and they reflect the very real 
horrors that Rome underwent in the later part of the first century.20
Most importantly, Lucretius suggests an aetiology of the 'greed and 
blind lust for political power' (59) -  'they are nourished, to no small degree, 
by the fear of death' (64). This thought, which can be traced back to 
Epicurus (KD 7, U 458),21 runs as follows. People fear death, and so they 
wish to avoid it. Since poverty and powerlessness leave one vulnerable to 
the whims of nature and those with power, people seek money and 
influence so that they may be more secure.22 Over time, however, this
20 For example, C. Martha, quoted in Kenney, writes, 'C 'est du Salluste en vers.' See
also Kenney and Heinze ad loc., and D.P. Fowler 'Lucretius and Politics' 135-140.
21 So Kenney and Fowler.
22 Cf. 'dulci vita stabilique' (66), and dotpaXeia and datpaAiiq pioq (KD 7).
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reason for seeking wealth and honor is forgotten, and the desires take on a 
life of their own.
It is hard to assess this aetiology. It would be unreasonable if 
Lucretius claimed that the fear of death was the only cause of these desires, 
but he does not claim this. He only claims that the fear of death is not 
insignificant in this regard. This claim has a much better chance at 
acceptance. At the very least, if Lucretius is wrong, then he is owed an 
account of the vehemence of these desires. If the fear of death is a partial 
cause, then we could have such an account. The vehemence of the desires 
would be a result of their having two underlying causes. First, we want 
money and power because we find them attractive on their own, and, 
second, we want them because we think that they will protect us from 
death.23
If we gather his two responses together, we can see the full force of 
Lucretius's defense. The original complaint was that Lucretius spent too 
much time and effort on a fear, the fear of Hades, which few or no 
contemporary Romans held. Lucretius answers his critics first by shifting 
focus from belief to knowledge and from the narrow question of Hades to 
the broader issue of post-mortem survival. He argues that people do not 
have real knowledge of the nature of the soul and that although they deny 
a belief in Hades, they cling to some notion of an afterlife -  as their actions 
dem onstrate.24 Second, he argues more generally that something is very 
wrong with people's lives and that the popular cry of 'All fine' is just plain 
false. He traces the problems in part to the fear of death. And he suggests
23 Martha Nussbaum ToD suggests something like this line of thought (196 ,198).
24 Cicero, for exam ple, argues for the im m ortality of the soul, on Platonic and
Pythagorean grounds, in the same work in which he mocks belief in Hades -  TD  I.
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that greater self-awareness and a better knowledge of the soul's nature will 
improve matters.
This defense as a whole seems to me very strong. In particular, 
there is no call for Kenney's assertion that Lucretius was m aking the 
dogmatic point that 'salvation was only to be found within the "fa ith "' (81). 
Lucretius does believe that the Epicurean position is correct, but he 
certainly does not simply assert that here. He considers a serious objection, 
and he rejects it with arguments. His behavior is precisely the opposite of 
the religious dogmatism that Kenney implies by his talk of Epicurean 
'salvation' and 'faith '. An ancient Epicurean takes a more sym pathetic 
view, and he makes the right connections between knowledge and fears -  
especially the fear of Hades - and happiness:
felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas 
atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum 
subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari 
(Georgies II 490-492).25
ffl
Now that I have shown that Lucretius has justification for his discussion 
of the soul's nature and the fear of Hades, we can consider his case. It 
consists of two main parts.26 First, Lucretius lays out the Epicurean theory 
of the soul and the relationship of the soul and body. Much of this theory 
is directed specifically against two beliefs: (1) that the soul could exist and 
function without a body, and (2) that it could suffer the torments of Hades.
25 'Happy is he who was able to learn the causes of things, and he trampled under foot 
all fears, and inexorable doom, and the roar of greedy Acheron.'
26 Farrington (1955) notes that Lucretius argues in this two-stage manner (7).
Secondly, Lucretius gives a psychological explanation of how the 
(erroneous) beliefs and fears concerning Hades arise in the first place.
Lucretius devotes most of book III, lines 94-829, to a detailed 
exposition of the Epicurean theory of the soul. In one way or another, all 
of this material is relevant to our questions concerning the soul's post­
mortem survival and its afterlife. But in order to make matters more 
manageable, I have selected two strands of argument - one meant to show 
that the soul cannot survive without the body, and the other meant to 
show that the standard picture of Hades is impossible. Obviously, if 
Lucretius can prove the first point -  that souls cannot exist or function 
without bodies, then he has already shown a fortiori that disembodied 
souls do not exist in Hades. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the latter 
arguments separately since they involve a fascinating debate concerning 
the nature of perception.
In order to prove the first thesis -  that the soul cannot function or 
even exist without a body -  Lucretius argues as follows. First he uses the 
axioms of his atomic theory to demonstrate that the soul is a composite, 
material body. He then uses other axioms of the atomist system to prove 
that the soul is mortal, since in Epicurean physics no composite body is 
immortal. In addition to this he argues that the soul is so intimately 
connected to its body that it cannot survive, even for a brief time, the 
separation of soul from body that occurs at death. This last point does not 
merely restate his other claims: when Lucretius proves that the soul is not 
immortal, he shows only that it must suffer destruction at some time or 
other, but so far we do not know when. This leaves open the possibility
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that the soul survives -  for some indeterminate time -  without its body. 
Lucretius makes it his business also to deny this possibility.27
Lucretius's argument that the soul is m aterial is brief and 
straightforward. He presents his case in lines 161-176 thus:
(1) The soul affects physical things and is affected by 
physical things (161-164,168-174).
(2) Affecting and being affected cannot occur without touch 
(165).
(3) Touch cannot occur without body (166).
(4) Therefore, the soul must be (some kind of) body (166- 
167,175-176).
This argument is extremely forceful and plausible. The first premise 
appears very strong; Lucretius offers perfectly obvious examples of such 
interaction: the mind directs the body to move about as it wishes (162-164), 
and when we are struck by external blows the mind suffers with the body 
(170-174). The third premise also seem s uncontroversial, and the 
conclusion does follow. Furthermore, the second premise is an axiom of 
the atomic physics which Lucretius has set forth in books I and II.
The claim in the second premise concerns causality. Lucretius 
asserts that all doing or being affected -  i.e. all causal interaction -  is 
ultimately reducible to bodily interaction. Only bodies can do or experience 
anything. At a gross observable level, this should seem intuitive. In order 
to move a book or a chair, we must lay hands on it. Even such 
phenomena as sight and hearing, which at first do not seem to be physical, 
can be explained in such a way that they are physical events. Such physical
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27 It m ay seem  odd that Lucretius would bother him self over such an unlikely 
possibility, but we know that at least some ancients, especially the Stoics, took the idea of 
a brief post-m ortem  existence seriously. See S V F  I 522 for Cleanthes and II 809 for 
Chrysippus.
interactions surely do hold a very primitive place in our conception of 
causality.28 All of this lends conviction to the second premise .
Nevertheless, Lucretius's argument is not by itself an air-tight proof 
that the soul is material. The second premise, although plausible and 
intuitive, is by no means uncontroversial. Plato, for example, would 
vehemently deny that all causal interaction takes place between bodies. In 
the P haedo, Socrates argues that beautiful things are beautiful and big 
things are big because they participate in the respective Forms of beauty 
and bigness (100b-101b2). Now this passage is notoriously opaque and its 
precise m eaning correspondingly controversial, but this much is clear: 
Socrates describes here some form of causal interaction which is non- 
b o d ily .29 In addition, the soul for Plato is non-material, and it too is 
involved in such non-bodily causation. In the face of such views, it must 
be said that Lucretius does not so much prove that only bodies enter into 
causal relations as assert a world view in which this is the case. On the 
other side, however, much the same can be said of Plato: Socrates opens his 
account in the Phaedo by hypothesizing the Forms (100b5). Both Lucretius 
and Plato can offer arguments against the other side's position, but it is
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28 See P.F. Strawson, 'I am  suggesting, then, that we should regard m echanical 
transactions as fundamental in our examination of the notion of causality in general. They 
are fundamental to our own interventions in the world, to our bringing about purposed  
changes: we put our shoulders to the wheel, our hands to the plough, push a pen or a button, 
pull a  lever or a trigger,' in Analysis and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 
1992), 118.
29 For m ore details, see the comments of R. Hackforth Plato’s Phaedo (Cam bridge: 
Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1955) and David Gallop Plato: Phaedo (O xford: O xford  
University Press, 1983). Am ong articles especially worth mentioning are Gregory Vlastos 
'Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo' Philosophical Review 78 (1969), 291-325 and Gail Fine 
'Form s as Causes: Plato and A ristotle,' in A ndreas G raeser ed. Mathematics and  
Metaphysics in Aristotle (Bern: Haupt, 1987), 69-112.
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obviously much harder to prove one view or the other conclusively. This
appears to leave us with a tense standoff.
From a historical point of view, however, we can say something 
more in favor of Lucretius. The Platonic view has it that the soul is an 
entirely different type of substance from matter. This view is commonly 
known as 'substantial dualism', and its most famous modem exponent is 
Descartes. This theory faces many obstacles, but most relevant to our 
inquiry, it owes us an explanation of how the soul and body interact. If the 
soul and body are such radically different types of thing, one material and 
the other immaterial, then how are we to explain the manifest fact that our 
minds and bodies enjoy such close connections? Nothing is so common as 
a physical phenomenon causing a mental one -  say a cut causing a pain -  
or conversely a mental phenomenon triggering a physical reaction — say a 
fear causing a shiver. It is one thing to assert that not all causes are 
physical, but it is quite another thing to explain how  bodies and non- 
material substances do, or for that matter could, affect one another so 
intimately. Obviously the medium of touch is ruled out since the whole 
point about non-material substances is that they are intangible. But it 
remains deeply mysterious what other causal mechanism could explain 
the interaction of the physical and the mental.30
Lucretius directs his reader's attention to exactly this problem, both 
in this argument and throughout the book. In the passage at hand, he 
offers two obvious examples of the close connection of the mental and the
30 This point is not in any way original; my goal is simply to show how Lucretius fits 
into a well-known debate. In The Character of Mind, Colin McGinn offers a good discussion 
of these worries about dualism (24-25). His chapter is a clear introduction to the debate and  
its standard moves.
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physical. On the one hand, we move our bodies as we choose and our 
facial features often reflect our mental state (162-164). On the other hand, 
when a weapon strikes a person, that person is liable to swoon, pass out, or 
become extremely disoriented (170-174). It seems impossible to deny such 
occurences as well as other, parallel cases, and in this way Lucretius forces 
his dualist opponents to address the question of interaction. This is still 
less than an a demonstration of materialism, but it does put a very heavy 
burden of proof on the dualist's side.31
If we take Lucretius to have shown that the soul is corporeal, it is a 
short path to his proof of its mortality. His explanation of the soul's nature 
provides the transition between these two theses. In brief, Lucretius 
explains that the soul is an extremely fine body, composed of four types of 
atoms -  fire-like, air-like, breath-like, and a fourth, nameless type (177-257). 
These elements combine and make up the soul, which divides its 
functions between two parts. The a n im a , or non-rational part, is 
responsible for sensation; it is spread throughout our entire frame (143- 
144). It takes in sensory data and passes it along to the anim us, or rational 
part, which is centrally located in the chest (138-140). This part of the soul 
is responsible for our higher m ental functions, and it transm its its 
commands, e.g. for movement, to the limbs via the a n im a . For our 
immediate purpose, the crucial part in all this is that Lucretius shows the 
soul to be a composite body -  i.e. one made up of numerous individual
31 In fairness, I should say that I have only offered futher arguments on behalf of the 
materialist. For the other side, see Dominic O'M eara 'Plotinus on How Soul Acts on Body' in 
Platonic Investigations (W ashington, D.C.: Catholic University of Am erica Press, 1985), for 
the ancient world; R. Richardson 'The "Scandal" of Cartesian Interactionism ' M ind  91 
(1982), 20-37, for Descartes; and E.J. Lowe Subjects of Experience (Cam bridge: Cam bridge 
University Press, 1996), Chapter 3, 'Mental Causation,' for a contemporary dualist.
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atoms. This proves to be the linchpin for his proof of the soul's 
m ortality.32
In order for anything to be immortal, according to Epicurean physics, 
it must meet (at least) one of three conditions.33 It must either (a) be 
entirely solid and indivisible, or (b) not be such as to suffer blows, i.e. be 
intangible, or (c) be entirely enclosed on all sides so that it has no space into 
which it could break up. No composite body can meet the first condition; 
only the individual atoms are entirely solid. All composite bodies contain 
void in them, and thus they are liable to the damage produced by blows. 
Only the void is intangible; hence, no body of any kind can m eet the 
second condition. Finally, only the summa summarum, the universe as a 
whole, meets the third condition; the universe is everything, and there is 
nothing else, not even empty space, outside of it. Everything else is within 
the world, and thus it has room into which to break down.34
The upshot is simple, direct, and forceful. The soul is a composite 
body in the world. It cannot, therefore, meet any of the three conditions 
for immorality. Insofar as the soul is composite, it cannot satisfy the first 
condition; it is not entirely solid. Insofar as the soul is a body, it cannot 
satisfy the second condition; it is not intangible. Insofar as the soul is in
32 For more detail on Epicurean theory about the soul, see the texts and com m entary in 
Long and Sedley §14. Good secondary discussion can be found in G.B. Kerferd 'Epicurus' 
doctrine of the soul' Phronesis 16 (1971), 80-96; J. Annas H PM  137-151; and R. Sharpies 
'Lucretius' account of the composition of the soul' Liverpool Classical Monthly 5 (1980), 117- 
120.
33 I derive this argument from 806-818. These lines also occur, with minor changes, at 
V 351-363 in the course of an argument that the world is not eternal. The repetition of this 
argum ent is in keeping with its a priori character, and it does nothing to cast doubt on the
?enuineness of either occurrence of the verses.4 For this last condition, which is somewhat odd, it is useful to look at the material
and commentary in Long and Sedley §4. Don't get your hopes up, however, since the point 
remains stubbornly weird.
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the world, it cannot satisfy the third condition; it is not without room to 
dissolve into. If the soul is immortal, then it fulfills (at least) one of the 
three conditions. But it does not fulfill any of the conditions. Hence, it is
not immortal. There it is.
At this stage, Lucretius has shown that the soul is mortal, but he also 
offers us reason to believe that the soul perishes specifically when we die.35 
His argument, lines 323-330, is as follows. He accepts the traditional 
definition of death as the separation of soul from body.36 By way of 
example, however, Lucretius advances an analogy which suggests that the 
soul cannot survive its separation from the body: to take the soul out of 
the body is like trying to take the odor out of incense (327-328). This latter 
separation seems obviously impossible; just so, Lucretius argues, it is 
impossible to drag the soul out of the body intact (animi atque animae 
naturam corpore toto/extrahere haud facile est quin omnia dissoluantur 
329-330).
He can support this analogy by reference to the soul's fragility and its 
very intimate relationship with the body. Lucretius has explained that the 
soul's nature is extremely fine and tenuous (179-180, 199-200); this makes it 
reasonable to expect it to be fragile.37 In addition, Lucretius understands 
the intimacy shared by soul and body to be physical and not merely
35 As I said, the soul's being m ortal does not, all by itself, determine when the soul 
dies. Lucretius needs further argument if he wishes to maintain that it dies at some specific
^ m e - • TT36 This w ay of understanding death shows up first, and pre-theoretically, in Homer; 
see II 14.518-519, 16.856-857, and 22.362 and Od 10.560 and 11.65. It is also a common  
philosophical belief: see Plato Phaedo 61c, Democritus DK  68 A  106.12-14, and SV F  II 790. 
The last one is especially cute: Chrysippus uses the definition as a premise in an argument 
designed to prove that the soul is corporeal. For his argument, see Julia Annas HPM 40-41.
37 Although this part of the theory is at a distance from the later proof, Lucretius 
flags the earlier point and warns his reader of its general importance: quae tibi cognita res 
in multis, o bone, rebus/utilis invenietur et opportuna duebit (205-206).
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metaphorical. Body and soul affect each other so deeply and are so co- 
responsive because they are physically interwoven. These considerations 
support Lucretius's use of the incense analogy since they shore up the 
claim that the soul cannot be removed from the body without suffering 
destruction.38
With these arguments, Lucretius has made the bulk of his case. He 
has given his readers good, if not absolutely final, reason to believe that the 
soul is corporeal. He has demonstrated that if it is a composite body, it 
cannot be immortal. And, even more specifically, he has contended that 
the soul does not survive death -  i.e. its separation from the body. From 
all of this a reader could already easily deduce that disembodied souls do 
not suffer torments in Hades. All Lucretius need do is nudge the reader 
towards this natural inference: if souls do not survive death, then a fortiori 
they do not survive death and then suffer torments in Hades. In fact, 
however, Lucretius offers an additional, independent argument against the 
belief in Hades. This argument is well-worth reviewing since it sheds light 
on a fascinating ancient debate about the nature of perception.
Lucretius attacks a very general picture of Hades, the elements of 
which are neither unusual nor surprising. When a person dies, her body 
ceases to function, but her soul continues to function without a body. The 
soul makes a journey to Hades where it is judged for its previous
38 Later in the book there is a similar, but m uch weaker argum ent (425-444). In that 
argum ent, Lucretius com pares the soul and body relationship to that of a liquid and its 
container. This analogy, however, works against his larger point that the soul is not in this 
w ay a discrete thing that could be poured into or out of a body: the atoms of a functional soul 
are fully woven into the atomic fabric of a living, functional body. The image of water and 
container is thus seriously misleading, as Julia Annas notes HPM  147-151. I have focused on 
the stronger analogy. For other expressions of the idea that body and soul are thoroughly 
interrelated, see Epicurus EpH  64-66 -  as tortuous a piece of writing as you could want - and 
Diogenes of Oenoanda 37.
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embodied life. If the soul is given a positive judgment, it is rewarded. If it 
receives a negative judgm ent, then it pays the penalty -  these 
punishments are a recurrent focus of attention.
For our purposes, the most important feature of this picture is its 
depiction of disembodied souls performing or undergoing activities that 
are similar to those which people undergo and perform when alive, i.e. 
when they have bodies. The souls in Hades speak, see, listen, walk, and, 
what is most important, they suffer pain. Lucretius directs his attack 
against these features of the imagined post-mortem survival, in particular 
against the idea that disembodied souls can have sensory experiences.
Lucretius uses his theory of the soul and sensory perception to show 
that the standard picture of Hades is impossible. A disembodied soul 
cannot have sensation alone, since in order to enjoy sensation, it would 
need the sense organs. But of course, the whole point about disembodied 
souls is that they don't have bodily organs anymore. He argues as follows:
(1) Praeterea si immortalis natura animaist 
et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro,
quinque, ut opinor, earn faciundum est sensibus auctam
(2) nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis 
possumus infemas animas Acherunte vagari. 
pictores itaque et scriptorum saecla priora
sic animas introduxerunt sensibus auctas.
(3) at neque sorsum oculi neque nares nec manus ipsa 
esse potest animae neque sorsum lingua neque aures:
(4) haud igitur per se possunt sentire neque esse (624-633).
(1) Moreover if the nature of the soul is immortal and it is able to 
perceive after it is separated from our body, then we must bestow 
it, I suppose, with the five sensory organs. (2) Nor can we conceive 
in any other manner of infernal spirits wandering around in 
Acheron. Thus, painters and previous generations of writers have 
brought souls forth equipped with sensory organs in this manner.
(3) But a soul cannot separately possess eyes nor nose nor even a
60
hand, nor a tongue nor ears. (4) Therefore, it is in no way possible 
that a soul perceive on its own nor exist.
The structure of the argument is complex, but relatively clear. In the 
first step, Lucretius claims that if disembodied souls have sensation, then 
they must have the five sense organs. In the second step, he directs this 
thought to the afterlife. His point, I take it, is that, since the standard idea 
of the afterlife includes sensory activities, the souls in Hades must have 
the sense organs -  as he has argued more generally in the first step. He 
supports his claim by reference to the poets and painters, who depict the 
souls in Hades performing such activities and with sense organs. Thirdly, 
Lucretius argues that it is impossible for disembodied souls to have the 
sense organs, and thus, in the fourth step, he concludes that disembodied 
souls cannot have sense perception or even exist -  at least as this existence 
in Hades is standardly represented.
This argument is initially quite compelling. The first premise -  that 
sensation requires bodily organs of sense -  is, no doubt, intuitive. The 
second step is not hard to justify.39 if we think of Homer or Horace's Odes, 
it seems uncontroversial that the poets attibute sensation and sense organs 
to the souls of the dead.40 Homer imagines Odysseus talking with the 
souls of the dead in Hades (Od 11), and Horace imagines the souls of the 
dead gathering to listen to Sappho and, even more, Alcaeus (Odes II 13.24- 
32). When Lucretius mentions p ictores, he is probably thinking of such 
images as those referred to in the Captivi: 'vidi ego multa saepe picta quae
39 Lucretius could have also added philosophers to his list of those who 'sic animas 
introduxerunt'. Socrates, for example, in the Apology imagines himself conversing with the 
souls of the dead and going about his business pretty much as he had in Athens (41al ff.).
40 Cicero, who gives a version of this same argument, also refers to the poets in this 
context, m ost specifically to the underworld scene in the Odyssey (TD I 36).
61
A cherunti fierent cruciam enta' (998).41 The third step -  that a soul 
without a body cannot have its own hands or eyes or what not -  seems to 
be just a given. Finally, the conclusion does follow.
Nevertheless the argument is by no means entirely secure. The 
problem is the first premise. However intuitive it may be, and however 
appealing it may be to us now, Cicero denies it outright during a debate 
about post-mortem survival (TD I 46). He argues that the soul can enjoy 
perception (of some kinds)42 without a body. In fact, he argues that all 
along, even when the soul is embodied, it is the soul alone which is 
responsible for sensation (of some kinds). The organs of sense merely 
provide the pathways for the transm ission of sensory inform ation. 
Lucretius was aware of this vulnerability in his argument, and he was also 
familiar with the theory about sensation that Cicero advances. Earlier in 
the book, Lucretius offers arguments against this theory and in support of 
his own position. Although neither author makes explicit mention of the 
other,43 this issue does offer an excellent opportunity for a real dialectic.
The doctrine about sensation that Cicero advances and Lucretius 
denies had numerous ancient supporters, and it is often known as the 
'w indow ' theory of perception because the eyes and other organs were 
described as 'windows' through which information travelled to the mind. 
According to Sextus Empiricus, Heraclitus was an advocate of such a 
theory: he claimed that the mind looked out through the sensory pathways
41 Both Bailey and Kenney refer (ad loc.) to this bit of Plautus and also to Polygnotus's 
Delphic painting of the underworld scene from the Odyssey.
42 He limits his claims to sight, smell, and hearing; for whatever reasons he leaves 
out touch and taste.
43 W e know, however, that Cicero had read Lucretius (adQ II 10.3), and I cannot bring 
m yself to believe that he did not have him in mind throughout the first book of the 
Tusculans. Nevertheless there is no real way of proving this.
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as if through windows (Adv Math VII 129).44 Sextus also attributes this 
theory to Strato and Aenesidemus (Adv M ath VII 350). The Stoics also 
held such a theory (SVF  II 857-858, 861-862, but all of 850-862 is relevant). 
M ost famously, Socrates proposes a view in the Theaetetus according to 
which we perceive not with but through  the senses.45
It is only in Cicero's T uscu lans, however, that this theory is used 
specifically to argue that perception can continue after the soul and body 
separate;46 and this purpose greatly affects the character of the window 
theory. This use of the theory reveals that it admits a stronger and a 
weaker interpretation.47 On the stronger view, the sense organs play no 
active role whatsoever in the process of sensation. They are merely the 
openings to tunnels through which the world gets to the soul, and the soul 
w ill continue to have sensory experiences even after it is separated from 
the body. On the weaker view, however, the sense organs are necessary 
means for the perceptions that embodied souls have; here the claim is only 
that the significant work in perception gets done in the rational soul once 
the sensory data has been transm itted from the sense organs. M ost 
im portantly, on such a view a disembodied soul could not continue to
44 Sia tcbv aia0T|TiiCGjv jcopcov toarcep 8ia  t i v o jv  OuplStov T tp o tc u y a q  (sc. o  ev fipiv vox>q).
45 For the Theatetus passage see the article of Myles Bum yeat 'Plato on the Gram m ar 
of Perceiving' Classical Quarterly 26 (1976), 29-51. In what follows, I focus mainly on the 
physiology of the theory. Readers who are m ore, or also, interested in the epistemological 
implications should consult Myles Bum yeat 'Conflicting Appearances' Proceedings of the 
British Academy 65 (1979), 69-111.
46 Unless H eraclitus believed that a i  \|rux°d oapwvtai icaG’ "AiStiv (D K  22 B98) 
because of his belief in the theory which Sextus attributes to him. Our evidence, however, 
is much too thin to make such a leap.
47 Bum yeat (1976) sketches out, although not in so many words, these two positions, 
and he argues that Plato held the weaker version (37-38 and 51). It seems to m e that the 
Stoics also advanced the weaker version; see S V F  II 854, 859. Our evidence for the other 
proponents of the theory is too meager to make any judgment.
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have sensory experiences since the bodily organs provide necessary means 
for the acquisition of such experiences.48
In the debate between Cicero and Lucretius, therefore, only the 
stronger interpretation is at issue. Only this version will provide the 
ammunition necessary to prove that the soul can enjoy sight and so forth 
without a body. Hence Cicero must prove or maintain the strong version 
of the window analogy, and correspondingly Lucretius need only refute 
this version. The other interpretation, although intrinsically interesting,49 
is not a significant player in this argument. I w ill first look at two 
Lucretian arguments against the idea that the soul alone perceives, and 
then I will consider two Ciceronian arguments in favor of this thesis.
Lucretius argues at length against the strong window theory and its 
denial of bodily perception (350-369). His first argument (350-355) is that 
the phenomenology of sensation makes it clear that our bodies do feel: if 
we consider a normal case of touch it seems just obvious that we do feel 
things on our bodies. And what else, he asks impatiently, does it mean to 
say 'bodies feel'? This argument is clearly forceful -  we do in the normal 
course of affairs take it to be obvious that our bodies feel things, indeed our 
normal use of words seems to demand this. Nevertheless the argument 
has a serious drawback. In the face of a theoretical argument, like Cicero's,
48 See Plotinus En IV 4.23-32, ei 5 t| t i  vuv uyieq Xeyopev, 5 i ’ opyavcov 8ei aaipaxiKoiv 
Taq aia0naei<; yiveaSai. icai yap t o u t o  aic6A.ou0ov t ©  t t iv  yuxTiv TtavTTi acojraToq e^co 
yevopevTiv pnSevoq avxiXapPdveaBai aia0T|Tou.
49 Indeed, as a theory of perception, it has a lot more to say for it than the version that 
Cicero and Lucretius argue over. One point that often goes unnoticed: once properly spelt out, 
the weak version turns out to be very close to Lucretius's own theory. The difference is more 
term inological than substantive: w hat a Stoic calls 'percep tion ', an Epicurean  calls 
'opinion'; but both believe that this activity, call it w hat you will, takes place not in the 
sensory organs, but rather in the mind, which processes and centralizes the sensory  
information from the various organs. Hence the strong contrast which Aetius draw s between 
the Stoics and Epicureans (Doxographi Graeci, ed. Diels, p. 414) is seriously misleading.
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that bodies do not actually or really or in fact perceive, it is no good for 
Lucretius merely to assert that it certainly feels like they do. The whole 
point of Cicero's theory, and of those like it, is to explain that sensation is 
not what we normally take it to be. Yes, it feels like we perceive a cut on a 
finger right there on the cut finger. The theorist, however, will claim that 
this is merely the appearance that the process gives, but that the reality is 
quite different.50 At best Lucretius's first argument is going to produce a 
stand-off: the phenomenology of sensation suggests that bodies feel, but 
many theorists deny this and offer an alternative explanation of the 
phenom ena.
Lucretius turns the next part of his attack on the analogy that Cicero 
and others used to explain their theory. Since the phenomenon of 
sensation does seem to imply Lucretius's view, the theorists owed some 
other account of the facts, and the window analogy served this purpose. 
No great surprise - Lucretius was not amused.
dicere porro oculos nullam rem cemere posse 
sed per eos animum ut foribus spectare reclusis, 
difficilest, contra cum sensus ducat eorum: 
sensus enim trahit atque acies detrudit ad ipsas, 
fulgida praesertim cum cemere saepe nequimus, 
lumina luminibus quia nobis praepediuntur. 
quod foribus non fit; neque enim, qua cemimus ipsi, 
ostia suspiciunt ullum reclusa laborem. 
praeterea si pro foribus sunt lumina nostra, 
iam magis exemptis oculis debere videtur 
cemere res animus sublatis postibus ipsis (359-369).
It is difficult to maintain that the eyes can perceive nothing but that 
the mind looks out through them as if through open doors, since 
the feeling of the eyes inclines us otherwise. For the feeling of the 
eyes drags and pushes toward the eyes themselves, especially when,
50 See SV F  R 854 , 862.
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as often, we are unable to make out flashing objects since our 
lights51 are impeded by the lights. But this does not happen to 
doors, for the open doorways through which we see have no 
difficulty. Moreover, if our lights are like doorways, then the mind 
ought to perceive matters even better with the eyes tom  out — posts 
and all.
Lucretius uses a door instead of a window,52 but nevertheless he is clearly
referring to the same analogy.
His first argument against the analogy, 363-366, points out that bright 
lights affect our eyes and can, temporarily, blind us. This suggests that our 
corporeal natures are not entirely passive in the process of perception, 
since it is specifically the organs which are troubled — they blink and tear 
up. In the case of our looking through open doors, however, it seems 
obviously absurd to say that the doors are given trouble by the bright light. 
But this is what we would expect if the analogy were correct and our eyes 
were like the open doors. There is, however, an answer open to a
supporter of the analogy.
Cicero explains that although these pathways to the mind exist, 
nevertheless, there can be problems with the transmission of sensory 
perception because of the corporeality of the sense organs and our bodies:
quamquam foramina ilia, quae patent ad animum a corpore, 
callid issim o artificio  natura fabricata est, tam en terrenis 
concretisque corporibus sunt intersaepta quodam modo (TD I 
47).
51 Lucretius in this passage repeatedly puns on a com m on idiom: 'lights' here equals 
'eyes'.
52 Cicero's 'fenestrae' and Lucretius's 'fores' both seem to stand for the Greek 'GupiSeq', 
which properly means 'window s'. I do not understand why Kenney says Cicero s fenestrae, 
which are properly window-openings, blurs the image' (124 on line 360). It seems rather 
that Cicero's translation is more accurate in this instance. No substantive m atter, however, 
hangs on whether one uses a door or a window in the analogy.
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Although nature crafted with surpassing artistry these pathways 
which stretch from our body to our mind, nevertheless they are 
blocked in a way by earthy and congealed matter.
Thus although our eyes may have problems transmitting the information
of certain sensations, e.g. glaring lights, this sort of problem can be
explained as a legacy of the body's corporeal nature.53 This amounts to a
slight modification of the original analogy: the eyes are like a window or
door with a screen, and sometimes the screen, i.e. the corporeal organ, can
block things from entering. But the overall thrust of the analogy is
preserved, and Lucretius's first pass does not show that the eyes play a
necessary role in perception nor does it refute the claim that the soul does
all the work in perception. At best it shows that the corporeal organs can
play a negative role in the process of perception.
But Lucretius offers another argument that is more sucessful (367- 
369). Lucretius claims that if the doorway analogy is the correct account, 
then the soul ought to see even better with the eyes removed, i.e. with the 
path to the soul less obstructed. But obviously this is not the case: without 
eyes, we go blind. There does not seem to be any good answer to this 
problem available to the proponent of the doorway analogy.
Even worse, the proponent's answer to the first argument only 
increases the force of the second argument. The first answer explained 
some problems in perception, when the soul is embodied, by recourse to 
the corporeal nature of the body, which was said to obstruct certain sensory
53 See Plato Phaedo 82d9-e5, 'Lovers of knowledge know that philosophy takes hold 
of their souls once they [the souls] have been utterly bound and glued into the body, and that 
the souls are forced to look at what exists through the bodies as if through a prison rather 
than look itself through itself, and that the souls are whirled around in total ignorance.' 
This sort of passage also helps to show that the answer Cicero employs is not merely ad hoc, 
there was a general tendency to blame the corporeal body for the ills of the soul in general, 
not only the defects of perception.
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impressions. On this account, however, the soul should perceive better  
with such obstructions removed. Cicero himself goes on in the passage 
which I quoted above, 'cum  autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res 
obiecta impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit'54 (I 47). But if we 
remove the bodily organs, that is, on Cicero's strong window theory, the 
obstructions, far from sensation improving -  it disappears.
Cicero, of course, has his own objections from the other side. To 
begin with, he points out that when the mind is sick or distracted, even if 
the sensory organs are functional and healthy, we do not see or hear,
saepe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis atque 
integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus nec audimus (I 46).
Often when we are impeded by thought or by some kind of 
illness, we neither see nor hear although both eyes and ears are 
open and healthy.
I take it that this argument refers to such phenomena as so-called 'blinding 
headaches' and to situations where a person does not notice what he sees 
because he is thinking or otherwise distracted.55 Cicero claims that these 
sorts of cases imply that the soul is what really perceives, but this does not 
follow.
The Epicurean account of m ind-body relations is perfectly  
compatible with the sorts of cases that Cicero mentions. In fact, Lucretius 
even (partially) bases his theory on such cases. So, for example, early on in 
his description of the soul, Lucretius explains that if the rational soul
54 'W hen, however, there is nothing except the soul, no hindrance will prevent it from  
perceiving each thing's nature.'
55 In fact even in the case of such headaches or lapses in attention, it is not true that 
the person in question literally loses all sight. But I will waive this objection in order to 
consider Cicero's deeper point, namely that the state of our mind can affect the state of our 
sensory perceptions.
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(anim us) is extremely disturbed, then it can disrupt the proper functioning 
of the senses (152-160). But this does not show that the soul does all the 
perceiving, it only shows that the state of a person's mind can affect the 
state of that person's senses. Since Lucretius believes that the soul as a 
whole is closely interconnected, this is no obstacle to his theory.
Cicero's complaint would only work against this theory if Lucretius 
had argued that the body had perception independently of the soul. But 
the whole point of the Epicurean theory is that the com pound  of the body 
and the soul has certain capacities that neither of the individual parts 
possesses alone.56 Although the strong doorway theorist does believe that 
the soul alone perceives and can perceive even without a body, Lucretius 
does not claim, nor does he need to claim, that the body alone perceives 
and can perceive even without a healthy soul. Thus, it is no evidence 
against Lucretius that the state of the soul can affect the process of 
perception. Indeed, it would count against the theory which Lucretius 
offers if this were not this case.
Cicero's second objection attempts to use the unity of consciousness 
to show that the soul alone perceives. He points out that we perceive 
dissimilar features with the same mind:
quid, quod eadem mente res dissimillimas comprendimus, 
ut colorem , saporem , calorem , odorem , sonum? quae 
numquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum 
omnia referrentur et is omnium iudex solus esset (TD I 46).
W hat of the fact that we grasp the most varied features with 
the same mind, as, e.g., color, taste, heat, odor, and sound?
The mind would never know any of these things by means
56 See Epicurus EpH  63-64 and DRN  III 333-336; for discussion, see Julia Annas H PM  
148-151.
69
of its five messengers unless everything were relayed to it 
and it was the sole judge of all.
If the various senses each did their own perceiving, then it would be a
mystery how these varied perceptions could come to be the perceptions of
some one person. When I see and smell a flower, it seems that there is
some one subject of both sensations. But if all the senses operate
independently, what unifies the various perceptions?
Cicero's argument recalls a line of thought from Plato's Theaetetus. 
Socrates uses a similar argument to convince Theaetetus that the soul is 
the subject of all our perceptions, and that it merely uses the senses as 
equipment. As Socrates puts it, 'It would certainly be bizarre, child, if many 
specific senses sat in us, as in wooden horses,57 but all these things did not 
converge to a single type [of thing], either the soul or whatever it should be 
called' (184dl-4).58 Just like Cicero, Socrates is searching for an explanation 
of how the various senses come to be the senses of some one person.
Once again, however, the objection fails because the Epicurean 
theory can guarantee for the unity that the objection desires. On the 
detailed Epicurean account of perception, one part of the soul, the 
irrational or sentient part (anim a, to ocA,oyov pipoq) is spread throughout 
the entire frame and another part, the rational part (an im u s, to A.oyikov 
liepoq) is centrally located in the chest. The two parts, however are 
intimately connected, and they form a unity (III 136-144 and U 311-312). 
The rational part receives the sensory information from the individual 
sense organs and unifies this information so that it forms the sensory state
57 This extrem ely com pressed simile refers to the Trojan horse: the senses are the 
soldiers and our bodies are the horses. If this is how sensation worked, it would indeed be an 
awfully bizarre process.
58 For everything about this argument, see M. Bum yeat (1976).
of one m ind.59 As Diogenes of Oeneonda puts it, 'the soul inherits the 
things w hich are seen by the eyes' (DO 9III3-6). Thus, the unity of 
consciousness does not pose a problem for the Epicurean theory of the 
soul.
Lucretius wins this debate hands down. The opposing position 
needs to claim that the soul alone perceives and that the bodily organs play 
no necessary role in the process. But this account cannot explain the 
manifest interdependence of the body and the soul in sensory processes. 
Lucretius's account, on the other hand, is w ell suited to explain this 
interdependence, and, in addition, it agrees with our inner experience of 
sensation. He argues that sensation is a capacity of a soul-body compound 
and that neither soul nor body can have sensation without the other. This 
account does quite well as an explanation of the phenomena and, more 
specifically, as a denial of the strong doorway theory of perception.
This concludes my analysis of the physical side of Lucretius's case. He 
shows that the soul's nature is corporeal and therefore mortal, and he 
specifically argues that the soul does not survive its separation from the 
body -  that is, the soul does not survive death, not even briefly. Moreover 
Lucretius demonstrates that the idea of Hades requires an impossible 
combination of disembodied souls and normal sensory perception. This 
shows that the fear of Hades is unfounded twice over. First, souls do not 
survive, and thus they do not survive and go to Hades. Second, what
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59 See A .A. Long Hellenistic Philosophy2 (London: Duckworth Press, 1987), 'Epicurus 
had no knowledge of the nervous system , and we m ay m ost easily think of the anima as 
fu lf i l l in g  the function of nerves— reporting feelings and sensations to the anim us and  
transmitting movement to the limbs' (52).
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people fear -  judgem ent, punishment, and pain -  cannot happen to 
disembodied souls. So even if souls did survive, the standard picture of 
Hades would be impossible.
IV
Lucretius goes on, however, to tackle the fear of Hades from a narrowly 
psychological angle. Lucretius has given his readers good reason to believe 
that the standard picture of Hades is impossible, but in order to make his 
argument, he has relied on the common representations of the afterlife: sic 
animas introduxerunt (630). As a result the reader m ight want an 
explanation of why these images are so common. It is hard to believe that 
so many people could be so wrong. Lucretius strengthens his case if he can 
explain why these beliefs arise in the first place.
Lucretius offers allegorical interpretations of the various depictions 
of torment in Hades (978-1023). According to his explanation, all of these 
images are really projections of our current fears and desires onto an 
imaginary afterlife -  in vita sunt omnia nobis: all of these things are in our 
lives (979).60 The rock which forever hangs over Tantalus represents the 
threat of the gods; his reaction is our terror. The incessant tortures of 
Tityos display the lover's anguished torments. Sisyphus and his futile 
labor exemplify the pointless hunger for political office. A person who 
pursues pleasure after pleasure, always longing for the next one, can see his 
life in the myth of the Danaids. Finally, the monsters, Cerberus and the
60 This is the m ost important claim in the entire section, and accordingly it is repeated  
seven times in the space of forty-five lines: 979, 982, 992, 995, 1005, 1014, and 1023. The 
effect is overwhelm ing and typically Lucretian as he returns to this crucial claim  again and 
again and again.
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Furies and Tantalus, signify the guilty fear of punishment for criminal 
deeds.
Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the discovery of 
Lucretius's sources. They are especially interested in whether Lucretius is 
follow ing Epicurus here or adding something, either from some other 
source or on his own.61 I will leave this question to one side and focus 
more on the role that these lines play in Lucretius's argument. Although 
m ost scholars are also somewhat concerned with this, they tend to 
underdescribe the importance of these lines. As it turns out these verses 
perform no less than four functions for Lucretius -  two directly against the 
fear of death and two on behalf of Epicurean ethics more generally.
The first, and perhaps most important, role that these lines fulfill is 
that they give a clear, non-supernatural explanation of why these 
particular images are so common and so forceful.62 This is the role that I 
alluded to above. In order to get a clearer understanding of what is 
required and what the lines do, it is necessary to remember Lucretius's 
dialectical position. Lucretius has argued that the idea of Hades and eternal 
punishment is incoherent: it requires that disembodied souls perform and 
undergo activities which require bodies. But the reader, although
61 The literature on this subject is predictably large. For a start, see Barbara W allach  
Lucretius and the diatribe against the fear of death (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 83-90; David  
Konstan Some aspects of Epicurean Psychology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 23-25; F. Cum ont 
'Lucrece et le symbolisme pythagoricien des Enters' Revue de Philologie 44 (1920), 229-240; 
R. Heinze T. Lucretius Carus De Rerum Natura Buch III (Leipzig: Teubner, 1897), 184; Bailey 
II 1158; and P. Boyance Lucrece et I'epicurisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1963), page 181. Monica Gale's discussion is brief but better focused and more enlightening 
(93-94).
62 Previous scholars have generally noticed this function of the verses. See Boyance 
181, Konstan 24-26, and Gale 93-94. Boyance makes the crucial points, first, that Lucretius 
w ould have realized that the freqency of these images demanded an explanation and, 
second, that the explanation should find some real basis for the myths.
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persuaded by these arguments, may still have doubts. After all, the images 
that Lucretius denies are omnipresent, and this seems to show something. 
Surely, it might be thought, they could not have come from nowhere. 
Worse still, the images of Hades are not just omnipresent; they also have a 
very strong hold on people - they affect people intensely. Again the 
vehemence of these fears should point to something.
By explaining these images as projections of fears that people have 
now onto an imagined afterlife, Lucretius can answer these doubts. These 
fears and images do not come from nowhere; in fact their sources are right 
before our eyes. To take one example, the fear of the gods is an almost 
universal phenomenon, according to Lucretius. And thus the image of 
Tantalus, which in a confused way represents this fear, is equally common, 
and the source of the image is a perfectly real feature of the natural 
w orld .63 The strength of the image, in turn, is also easily explained: it is 
just a function of the vehemence of the fear that produces the image. 
Lucretius gives an analogous explanation of all the other images as well. 
Thus, Lucretius can explain, via this rationalistic interpretation of the 
myths, why the myths exist at all, why they are so common, and why they 
have such a strong grip on people's minds.
Secondly, it is sometimes thought that the fear of death is just one 
side of a coin, the other side of which is the love of life. E.J. Kenney cites 
with approval George Santayana, Nothing could be more futile...than to 
marshall arguments against that fear of death which is merely another 
name for the energy of life' (Kenney 32). He also quotes Cornford, 
'Epicurus, it is true, abolished the terrors of hell; but he also abolished the
63 See Gale 93-94.
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joys of heaven' (33). If these arguments seem appealing, then we may 
come to treasure the fear of death, even as represented in the terrors of 
Hades. It may seem that this fear is a positive force in our lives since it 
increases the love of life, or at least it goes along with such an increase. By 
m eans of his allegorical reading of the myths, how ever, Lucretius 
demonstrates just how wrong-headed and self-defeating such a belief 
would be if by the 'fear of death' we mean 'the fear of the terrors of hell'.
gy graphically describing these fears and their sources, Lucretius 
shows what a destructive affect they have on people s lives. After reading 
Lucretius's descriptions, it would be awfully hard to maintain that these 
im ages can improve a person's life, or even that these im ages are 
compatible with an increased love of life. Both the fear of such tortures 
and the lives that these tortures represent are thoroughly miserable. To 
dwell on these images is not to increase the love of life. Just the opposite, a 
life spent thinking about such tortures would be a hideous, shrunken 
existence; such a life would provide a textbook case of pathological fear 
wrecking a person's happiness. This does not show that fear of death 
s im p lic ite r  is unhealthy, but it does show that the fear of H ades, in 
particular, is unhealthy and unsuited to a happy life.
The vivid portraits of the terrors serve another analogous, but more 
general, function. Just as some people believe that the fear of death is 
positive, some people also believe that the lives which the portraits 
represent are positive. Someone might, say, find a life of politics to be 
ennobling and dignified; Lucretius rem inds his reader that it is a 
neverending struggle to maintain the favor of a fickle public. In each case,
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Lucretius demonstrates the misery of such lives by revealing their negative 
features.64
Lucretius stresses, again and again, that the miseries he describes are 
right here, before our very eyes 65 As I said, the primary function of such 
references is to argue that these terrors are here and not in Hades, but they 
also serve to show that these terrors are here and not in Hades. Lucretius 
gives us reasons to rethink our attitudes towards each of the lifestyles that 
these images represent: Is piety a force for good or a crippling phobia? Is 
passionate love worth the attendant anxiety and disturbance? Do pleasure 
seekers really enjoy anything, or are they forever looking for the next good 
thing? Is crime worth the risk of punishment?
No doubt these representations are som ew hat extrem e, but 
Lucretius could respond that he did not create the myths. As he has 
already implicitly agreed, they have to come from somewhere; he merely 
attempts to explain the hold they have on us. We find these stories 
gripping, according to Lucretius, because they are so familiar. If someone 
objects that it is tendentious of Lucretius to claim  that th ese  myths 
represent these lifestyles, then they owe him an alternative explanation of 
the images' origin and power. On Lucretius's interpretation of the myths, 
however, a true understanding of these lifestyles shows that we need a
better life, not a better afterlife.
Finally, these images also serve as an implicit advertisement, so to 
speak, for the Epicurean life. The Epicureans recommended a quiet, almost 
ascetic lifestyle.66 They urged a withdrawal from political life and a
64 See Gale 94.
6 5 This list bears repeating: 979, 982, 992, 995, 1005 ,1014 ,1023 .
66 See the DRN  I I 1-61, and Epicurus's EpM  127-133.
detachment from passionate love. Such a life would have no need for 
crime, and it would not trouble about the gods since they do not trouble 
about us. This lifestyle might not immediately appeal to most people. 
Lucretius's allegories act as a flanking maneuver. Rather than praise the 
Epicurean life, Lucretius shows the ugliness in a number of other lifestyles.
Lucretius does not merely drop in this sort of advertisement and 
leave it hanging without support. In various other places in the poem, he 
offers more extended discussions of these various fears and troubles. The 
fear of the gods is obviously a recurrent focus of the poem.67 The dangers 
of love occupy Lucretius in the conclusion to book IV (1037-1287).68 The 
drive for political power is dealt with elsewhere in book EH (59-93) and in 
the proem to book II (37-54). Similarly, the life of a pleasure seeker is 
criticized in book III (912-930, 931-951) and the proem to book II (1-61 
p assim , esp. 14-36). Finally, someone who lives the simple life which 
Lucretius recommends in book II would have no need for crime and its 
attendant fear of punishment. Thus, even if it does not discuss ethical 
topics at great length, the poem does give the novice a clear picture of the 
benefits of the Epicurean life in distinction to a number of other lifestyles.
V
In conclusion, Lucretius makes a much better case against the fear of Hades 
than is sometimes thought. He attacks this fear, even if some people 
disavow it, because he can show that people lack knowledge about the soul 
and hence that their actions and beliefs towards post-mortem survival are
67 See I 62-109, V 1161-1240, and VI 50-67.
68 For a provocative discussion, see M artha N ussbaum  ToD C hapter 5 'Beyond  
Obsession and Disgust,' 140-191.
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inconsistent and unstable. This justifies his account of the nature of the 
soul and his attack on the fear of Hades. He makes a strong case against 
substantial dualism, and at the same time he gives a powerful account of 
the souTs interdependence with the body. Once he has done so, he uses 
this interdependence to show that disembodied souls cannot perform or 
undergo the kinds of activities that the terrors of Hades involve. Thus he 
removes the grounds for the fear of Hades. Finally, he gives a clear and 
cogent explanation of how the fear arises in the first place, and he uses the 
images of Hades's tortures to make a number of subtle and far-reaching 
points about the desirability of various lifestyles.
CHAPTER THREE 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL AND NON-EXISTENCE
I
Lucretius cannot win. The more successful he is against the fear of Hades, 
the more he reinforces other fears. In order to show that the fear of Hades 
is empty, Lucretius explains the nature of the soul, and he demonstrates 
that the soul is destroyed at death, the separation of soul from body. There 
is no need to fear Hades because souls do not survive death, and thus they 
never go to Hades. But many people take no comfort in this sort of 
argument because they fear the soul's destruction as much as other people 
fear survival in Hades.1 Lucretius structures the book around these two 
basic options: either the soul survives or it doesn't. And he attempts to 
show that we have nothing to worry about because it does not survive, but
its destruction is not bad.
Many fears cluster around the thought that the soul is destroyed at 
death, just as many fears fall under the thought of death. The species is as 
complex as the genus. Lucretius treats four main worries about the soul's 
destruction, and he treats all of them with variations of one argument. 
The four fears are, first, that if the soul does not survive death, we are 
doomed to a terrible, eternal non-existence, second, that after we die our 
bodies will suffer various harms, third, that non-survival robs us of all the 
goods of life, and, fourth, that non-survival leads to the loss of future
1 See Plutarch Non posse 1104-1106. Nothing really relies on there being different
people, some of whom fear survival and some of whom fear non-survival. I don't doubt that 
there could be people confused enough to fear both or, perhaps, people who shift back and 
forth between one or the other fear.
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potentials. In answer to all these worries, Lucretius argues that nothing 
can harm us, once we don't exist, since harm requires an existent subject.
n
The main argument takes up lines 830-869. This section as a whole is 
extremely complex, and it contains a number of hypothetical objections 
and responses.2 In order to present Lucretius's case in as clear a manner as 
possible, I will first write out the argument schematically. Afterwards, I 
will unpack it in more detail and deal with problems. The argument, then, 
is this:3
(1) A person is a compound of a body and a soul 
(838-839,845-846).
(2) [a] Death is the separation of the body and the 
soul, [b] In the course of this separation, the soul is 
destroyed and the body begins to decay, [c] Death is 
thus, by (1), the destruction of the person who dies 
(Book HI passim , but especially [a] 838-839, [b] 425- 
444,580-591,772-775, [c] 838-840,845-846).
(3) Something can harm a person only if the person 
exists when the harm occurs (862-864).
(4) But, by (2)[c], a person does not exist, once dead 
(838,840,864-865,867).
(5) Therefore, by (3) and (4), nothing can harm a 
person, once dead (864-865).
[(6) It is not rational for a person to fear what that 
person has good reason to believe w ill not be 
harmful when it occurs (EpM  125).J 
(7) Therefore, there is nothing fearful about being 
dead (866).4
2 I address the unity and organization of this section briefly in Appendix 3: The two
thought experiments in m  843-861.
3 Since I have simplified and reorganized the argument, I include textual references.
4 There have been a number of important versions of this argument. The one I offer is 
m y own, but I have learned a great deal from D. Furley 'N othing to us?' The Norms of 
Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 76; S. Rosenbaum MoD  121-122; and 
M. N ussbaum  ToD  201-202. W ith this argum ent it is also worthwhile to com pare Sextus 
Empiricus PH  m  229, pseudo-Plato Axiochus 365c-365e, 369b3-369c, and EpM  125.
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The overall shape of the argument is clear. On the basis of previous 
arguments (93-829), Lucretius asserts that death is the utter destruction of 
the person that dies. He then claims that nothing can harm a person when 
that person does not exist. From these two claims, Lucretius infers that 
when a person is dead nothing  can harm that person. On the strength of 
this, he concludes that death, by which he means non-survival, should 
hold no terrors for us. The obvious, although unexpressed,5 reason for 
this final claim is that it is irrational for a person to fear something that he 
has good reason to believe will not, and indeed cannot, harm him.
Although his line of thought seems clear, Julia Annas argues that 
Lucretius either misunderstands or misrepresents his own argument. The 
alleged mistake or misrepresentation is his claim that 'death is nothing to 
us...since the nature of the soul is found to be mortal' (830-831).6 Annas 
points out that, according to Lucretius, this conclusion -  that death is 
nothing to us — goes through even if the soul survives death, i.e. its 
separation from the body. As Lucretius argues, even if the soul survives, 
death still does not matter to us since we are the compound of soul an d  
body and this compound is certainly destroyed at death — notwithstanding 
whether the soul survives alone (843-846).7 Hence even if the soul were 
immortal, Lucretius could maintain that death was nothing to us. Annas
5 This is why I put premise (6) in brackets. Although Lucretius does not explicitly
state this premise, Epicurus does and he does so in the context of an argument against the 
fear of death (EpM 125). As I will discuss below Epicurus's argument is not entirely identical 
to Lucretius's, but nevertheless it seems natural and appropriate to supply Lucretius with (6) 
from Epicurus.
6 Julia Annas HPM  155-156 & 155 n.93.
7 For more on this argument, see Appendix 3: The two thought experiments in HI 843-
861.
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criticizes Lucretius because he employs a prem ise -  that the soul is 
destroyed at death8 -  which his argument does not strictly require.
But this criticism is not fatal, since the premise is surely sufficient 
for his conclusion and Lucretius never claims that death is nothing to us 
only i f  our soul perishes upon separation from our bodies.9 Lucretius 
argues that something cannot harm a person unless the person exists at the 
time the harm occurs. Thus, he must show that a person does not exist 
when dead. The first premise has it that a person is a compound of a soul 
and a body. Hence, Lucretius can show that a person does not exist after 
death in a number of ways. Any of the following would do: he can show 
either (a) that the soul and body are separated at death, or ((3) that the soul 
is destroyed at death, or (y) both (a) and (P), that is that the soul and body 
are separated and the soul is destroyed at death.10 Lucretius believes that 
both (a )  and (p) are true, and so he offers both, as (2)[a] and (2)[b] 
respectively. Thus, pace Annas, it is not 'surprising that Lucretius prefaces 
his great declaration that death is nothing to us w ith nearly thirty 
arguments to prove that the soul is m ortal' (155). These arguments 
support a premise which is sufficient to prove that death is nothing to us, 
and Lucretius believes that they are true.
We should not misunderstand the force of Lucretius's additional 
argument that death is nothing to us even if the soul survives its 
separation from the body. This hypothetical argument does not indicate 
that Lucretius is actually unconcerned with the soul's mortality. It simply
8 In my schema this is (2)[b].
9 That is, he never claims that the premise is necessary -  only that it is sufficient.
10 Another potential avenue is (8) that the body is destroyed by death. The problem, 
however, is that -  at least for a time -  the body often survives death.
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shows that Lucretius believes that even if some critic, say Plato, were right 
and a soul could survive without a body, death would still be nothing to us 
because a soul alone is not us. Nevertheless, Lucretius is still convinced 
that Plato, or whoever, is wrong to believe that the soul survives its 
separation from the body.11 He merely makes the additional point that 
even this false belief would not demonstrate that being dead does matter to 
us.
Although Lucretius can answer Annas's worry, there is still a major puzzle 
concerning the interpretation of the argument. As I present it, the 
argument turns on an intuition about harm and existence -  only people 
who exist can suffer harm. This view of the argument is not unique to 
m e,12 but it is contentious. Some interpreters believe that sensation rather 
than existence provides the foundation for the Epicurean argum ent.13 In 
this alternative version, the key idea is that only sensations — in particular 
those of pleasure and pain -  are good and bad. Since the dead have no 
sensations, nothing is good or bad for them, not even their being dead. 
Ultim ately, it seems to me that there is som ething to be said for both 
interpretations, and at best the evidence allow s only for qualified 
conclusions. All I will maintain is that Lucretius (even if not Epicurus) at 
least focuses on existence (even if he also mentions sensation).
11 Remember of course that this claim, that the soul does not survive, is crucial to his 
larger case, since it supports his entire argument about the fear of Hades.
12 See M. Nussbaum  ToD 200-201, S. Rosenbaum MoD 121-122, H. Silverstein MoD  95- 
96, J. McMahan MoD  233-234.
13 D. Furley 'Nothing to us?' 76, P. Mitsis 'Epicurus on Death and the Duration of Life' 
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1988) 303-304, W . 
Glannon 'Epicureanism  and Death' M onist 76 (1993) 223, O. H. Green 'Fear of Death' 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1982), 99-100.
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T his puzzle, for better or worse, contains a number of complicating 
w rinkles, and interpreters on both sides have oversim plified the issue. 
First, there are two authors involved, and it is not obvious that they must 
use the same argument. Although they share a conclusion, they may use 
different arguments in support of the same thesis. In addition, although 
Lucretius is an ardent disciple of Epicurus, that shows (at most) that he 
should not (knowingly) contradict Epicurus, but it does not indicate that 
Lucretius will parrot Epicurus's every word. If the two arguments are 
compatible, Lucretius can use either one without contradicting his master. 
Another complication arises from this last point. If the two arguments are 
compatible, there is nothing to say that even one author may not use both. 
The path of greatest simplicity -  one argument for both authors -  may 
merely simplify matters. The truth may be more complex.14
The two arguments are quite distinct. The argument from sensation 
runs, in outline, thus: only pleasure and pain matter, and the dead feel no 
pleasure or pain; so nothing matters to the dead. The argument from 
existence, however, runs thus: harm requires an existent subject, and the 
dead don't exist; so the dead suffer no harm. Neither argument entails nor 
requires the other, and moreover they take off from different concerns. On 
the one hand, the argument from sensation starts from a very specific 
ethical position, namely hedonism. If hedonism is true, and only pleasure
14 It is often thought that considerations of econom y or sim plicity should, by 
themselves, drive us to hypothesize the minimum, but this is too crude. Bernard Williams, 
in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cam bridge, MA: H arvard  U niversity Press, 1986), 
offers an useful rem inder that w hat considerations of sim plicity dem and, on any sane 
interpretation, is not 'Hypothesize the absolute m inim um ', but rather 'H ypothesize the 
m inim um  that is sufficient to explain the phenomenon at hand.' In some cases the sufficient 
minimum m ay be quite large (105-106). In the case we are considering, an assumption of only 
one argum ent is indeed the minimal assum ption, but it does not provide a satisfactory  
explanation of the evidence.
84
and pain m atter, then being dead does not matter since it involves no 
pleasure or pain. The argument from existence, on the other hand, is 
more metaphysical than ethical. Quite generally, only what exists can do 
anything or have anything done to it. If harm is something a person has 
done to him, then the non-existent dead cannot suffer harm because they 
cannot do or suffer anything at all. So the two arguments are logically 
distinct, and they appeal to different kinds of intuitions, ethical in one case 
but metaphysical in the other.15
These distinct arguments, however, remain compatible, and they 
can, in a way, support one another. They don't conflict — that is a person 
could reasonably believe both that hedonism is true and that only existents 
can do or suffer anything. The argument from existence can also support 
the hedonist position, if a hedonist thought that the dead don't feel 
pleasure and pain precisely because the dead don't exist. Alternatively, the 
existence argument can use pleasure and pain as clear examples of good 
and evil which require existence: one obvious way that the non-existent 
dead cannot be harmed is that they cannot feel pain. So far as logic goes, 
then, the arguments can come apart, but they do not have to; they are 
distinct but perfectly compatible. There are even ways in which the 
arguments naturally work together.
Once these logical points are clear, the obvious thing to do is to look 
at the texts and see who said what. Unfortunately, neither of the two most 
relevant texts (DRN  III 830-969, EpM  125-126) is entirely univocal. It is best
15 It seems unlikely that a person could accept the sensation argum ent but reject the 
existence argum ent. To do so would require the person to think that pain could somehow  
affect a non-existent person, and I don't see how anyone could believe such a thing. But 
nevertheless, the sensation argum ent does not, directly, require or entail the existence  
argum ent. They remain logically distinct.
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to admit at the start that both texts mention both considerations, sensation 
and existence, even if it is unclear exactly how the varied considerations 
are intended. At most, it seems, I can claim that Lucretius and Epicurus 
differ in focus; it would be too much to claim that either author has only 
one argument in view. But I begin with what is clear in the texts, before I 
turn to complications.
Lucretius states the central premise from the existence argument in 
lines 862-864:
debet enim, misere si forte aegreque futurumst, 
ipse quoque esse in eo turn tempore, cui male possit 
accidere
For it is necessary, if by chance the future is going to be 
miserable and painful, that the person himself, whom the evil 
could befall, exist at that very time.
This seems as clear as anyone could want: a person cannot be harmed
unless the person exists at the time of the (putative) harm. I take 'debet' to
indicate that this is a necessary condition,, and what depends on 'debet' is
the phrase 'ipse quoque esse'. The verb here is 'esse', and it is clearly being
used existentially; that is, to say it again, the requirement is existence.
When Lucretius restates the principle again, immediately following this
passage, he says that death prevents the existence of the person whom the
disadvantages could befall.16 Again the focus is entirely on existence.
When we turn to Epicurus, we find something very different, at 
least initially. He argues against the fear of being dead in the following 
m anner.
16 id quoniam m ors eximit esseque probet/illum  cui possint incommoda conciliari (864- 
865). (Note that 'probet' here is syncopated for 'prohibet'; see Kenney ad loc.).
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EuveGi^e 8e ev tcp vopi^eiv (iriSev 7ipo<; "np.(xq eivai tov 
BavaTov etcei rcav ayaBov Kai kcxkov ev a ig B f ig e i - 
gTEpTjgi^ 8e Egtiv aigflrigEtoc o Bavatoq
Grow accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us 
since all good and evil consist in sensation , and death is the 
removal of sensation.
We can reformulate this as (1) all good and evil consist in sensation, (2) the
dead have no sensation, and (3) therefore, nothing, not even being dead, is
good or bad for the dead. The first premise is a principle of hedonism, and
it obviously centers on sensation rather than existence. No m ention is
even made of the fact that we do not exist once dead. This is a perfectly
clear argument from sensation.
So far everything is straightforward, but there are complications. 
Obviously Lucretius offers the existence argument and Epicurus offers the 
hedonist argument: that much is clear. Moreover, neither author ever 
states the other's basic premise. That is, Epicurus does not say that all harm 
requires existence, nor does Lucretius say that good and evil consist in 
pleasure and pain. If this was all, there would be no problem. But this is 
not all. Although neither Lucretius nor Epicurus states the other's basic  
prem ise, nevertheless Lucretius does mention sensation and Epicurus 
alludes to existence. We need to consider more of the texts.
Early in his argument Lucretius refers to sensation. The relevant 
lines are these:
832 et, velut anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri...
838 sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai 
discidium fuerit quibus e sumus uniter apti, 
scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus turn, 
accidere omnino poterit sensum que m overe
[A]nd just as we fe l t  no pain  in the time before we w ere 
bom ...thus, once we don't exist, when there has been a separation
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of soul and body from which we were joined into one thing, 
clearly nothing whatsoever will be able to befall us or stir our 
sensation  -  we who will not exist then.
In this analogy, Lucretius points out twice that lack of life involves a lack
of sensation, in particular the absence of pain. Before our lives began, we
experienced no pain, and after we die, we will feel nothing. It is hard to
deny that sensation plays some role in these lines.
On the other side, Epicurus at least hints at non-existence in the
Letter to Menoeceus. After the sensation argument which I offered above,
Epicurus turns to consider rationality and fear. But when he goes on to
restate his conclusion, that death is nothing to us, we find something odd:
to <pptKG)8eaTaTOv ouv xa>v jcockcov o Odvarcx; ot>8ev 
7tpo<; Rpaq, e7t£i5f|7tep otccv gev ripei<; copev, o Gavaxoc; 
ot> TE&peaxiv, oxav 8e o Gavaxoq rcapfj, xoG’ Rpeic; ouk 
eapev
Therefore, the most horrifying of evils, death, is nothing to us 
since when we exist, death is not present, but when death is 
present, then we do not exist (EpM 125).
The conclusion is the same as the previous one -  death is nothing to us -
but the supporting argument looks very different. There is no mention of
sensation, and although it is oddly allusive, this appears to be a highly
compressed argum ent from existence. W hen we exist, death doesn 't
matter because we are not dead. But when we are dead, we don't exist -
and, I take it, this shows that death doesn't concern us because if we don't
exist death cannot harm us.
Although m atters are very com plicated, we can clarify  them
somewhat. Each author makes some reference both to sensation and to
existence, but their primary arguments are still distinct. Lucretius never
states the principle of hedonism, and Epicurus never states the principle
88
about existence. Without these key premises, the focus stays on their 
explicit argum ents, that is, existence for Lucretius and hedonism for 
Epicurus. There is additional support for this point. Even when Lucretius 
mentions sensation, he mentions existence at the same time; sensation is 
never the sole center of his attention. In this way sensation remains 
subordinate to existence.17 On the other side, although Epicurus alludes to 
existence in the Letter to M enoeceus, nevertheless he mentions only 
sensation when he offers his canonical short argum ent that death is 
nothing to us.18 So I think that it is fair to say that Lucretius focuses on 
existence and Epicurus focuses on sensation, even if they both mention the 
other consideration.
A distinction in focus rather than a more absolute difference is 
reasonable given the school's overall doctrines. Testimony from Sextus 
Empiricus indicates that the Epicureans employed both the argument from 
existence and the hedonist argument.19 Obviously their ethics would 
make the hedonist argument appealing to them, but it also makes sense 
that they would connect death with non-existence. They were, of course, 
very concerned to show that the soul is mortal, and thus that death 
amounted to our utter annihilation. They argued that Hades would not 
harm us, since there would be no us in Hades, and this would naturally 
suggest the more general point that nothing would harm us because once
17 In the lines which mention sensation which I quoted above, we also find 'ubi erimus' 
838, and 'qui non erimus turn' 840.
18 KD  2, VS 2, and cf. De Fin R 100.
19 Sextus attributes the hedonist argument to Epicurus, and then he shifts to the vague 
plural, 'they say'. This could indicate that the existence argum ent was a later development 
of the Epicureans as opposed to Epicurus. But VS 14 and U 204 show that Epicurus could 
make unequivocal reference to existence when he felt like it, and so I doubt that the plural is 
particularly significant. It is perfectly natural to start out speaking about Epicurus and then 
shift to talk of 'them ', i.e. the Epicureans.
we are dead, there will simply be no us. Thus it is not surprising that the 
Epicureans cared about sensation and existence.
But given the character of the two works, it is also reasonable that 
the De Rerum Natura has a different focus than the Letter to Menoeceus. 
Since the letter is a brief treatment of ethics, it makes sense that Epicurus 
focuses there on the hedonist argument. Pleasure and pain are much 
more relevant to that context than non-existence, since a proper discussion 
of existence would require a detailed treatment of the physics and 
physiology of death. The De Rerum Natura, however, is notoriously more 
concerned with physics than ethics (Kenney 9-12), and in book HI, Lucretius 
offers precisely the details of physics and physiology that the Letter to 
M enoeceus lacks. Hence it is appropriate that his main argument concerns 
existence and not ethics, since he does not offer arguments in support of 
hedonism, but he does explain the physics of the soul. Each author 
properly shows greater concern for the argum ent w hich is more 
appropriate to his current work.
Finally it is worthwhile to speculate as to why, given their primary 
in terests , L u cretiu s and Epicurus n everth eless m en tion  both  
considerations. It may seem odd that Lucretius speaks of sensation at all 
and similarly for Epicurus and existence. In each case, however, the other 
consideration supports the author's main argument. Lucretius wants to 
show that when we are dead and don't exist, nothing can harm us. Since 
he is a hedonist, it is natural that his example of a harm which cannot 
occur is pain -  his point is that non-existence cannot harm us at all, and in
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particular it does not hurt us.20 In Epicurus's case, one sign that the dead 
feel no pleasure or pain is that they do not even exist — surely someone 
who does not exist has no sensation. Given their specific aims in these 
works, it makes sense for Epicurus to focus on hedonism and Lucretius to 
focus on existence. But given their larger commitments, it also makes 
sense for them to mention the other consideration as well.
Finally, although detailed objections will wait until the next chapter, 
what can we say about the strength of this argument? Predictably, I find it 
very compelling. First, it is valid. This leaves only the truth of the 
premises to consider. We can simplify matters since premises (4), (5), and 
(7) are legitimate deductions. So the only questions that remain concern 
the premises (1), (2), (3) and (6).
The first and second prem ises rely on the book 's previous 
arguments as well as some general agreement. It was generally held, from 
Homer onwards, that death was the separation of the soul from the body.21 
And it also seems intuitive that a person's identity is bound up with his 
body and his soul. I don't mean to prejudge anything here. Lucretius's 
account in the first premise is somewhat contentious, but at the very least a 
reasonable account of what a person is must refer either to body or to the 
mind or to both.22 As I tried to show in the last chapter, Lucretius offers 
ample argument in defense of his position, first, that we cannot make 
sense of people except as a conjunction of soul and body, and, second, that
20 Cf. 'scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tu m ,/accid ere omnino poterit 
sensumque m overe' (840-841). Ttie logic, as 'om nino' shows, is that when we don't exist 
nothing whatsoever can happen to us, and a fortiori we will feel nothing.
21 See David Claus Toiuard the soul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) and R. 
Hackforth's note on Phaedo 64c.
22 So, for example, in the First Alcibiades, Socrates remarks that no one could deny  
that a person is one of three things, the soul, the body, or the two together (130a).
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the soul's fragile nature does not survive death. So far, then, I would say 
that the first two premises rely on some basic assumptions and that they 
receive very full defense and explication from Lucretius.
The third and sixth premise are also highly intuitive principles. It 
does not require a big-brained metaphysician to see that the statem ent 'I 
ju st h it som ebody who does not exist' makes no sense at all.23 In a 
standard context, it is uncontroversial that only what exists does or suffers 
anything. Next, the principle about fear must be understood as a claim 
about rationality. It puts a limit on what it is reasonable to fear, not what 
people can or do fear. As such, it too is reasonable. Again, in standard 
contexts, no one would deny that it is unreasonable to fear what does not 
seem bad. So both of these premises seem unproblematic.
W hat seems obviously wrong with the argument is its conclusion -  
not its logic or the truth of the premises. If we reject this piece of 
reasoning, as so many of us surely do, it is probably not because we find it 
flawed or false. We reject it because, as we say in such cases, it just cannot 
be right. The conclusion serves, in effect, as a reductio  of the argum ent 
itself. Death is terrifying, if anything is, and we recoil almost automatically 
from any argument that says otherwise. In this sense, it is a prototypical 
philosophical argument: it seems innocuous all the way through, but the 
upshot is intolerable.
This leads, finally, to a dialectical point. If I am right, then the 
vehem ence with which people reject this argument springs from their 
prior committment to the falsity of its conclusion. This is not necessarily a
23 Big-brained metaphysicians, how ever, do agree with the principle that only w hat 
exists can do or experience anything. See Sophist 247d8-e4, Topica 139a4 and 146a23.
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disreputable way of going about things. There are some things that we just 
know, and we will, and should, reject any argument which leads to their 
denial. In this case, however, there seem to be such items on both sides. 
The third and sixth premises, I subm it, are at least as strong as the 
conclusion is weak. In another situation, we would surely reject any 
argument which led to the conclusion that anything could happen to a 
non-existent person. So, at the very least, we should not presume that the 
dialectical scale is tipped wholly against Lucretius. He has the weight of 
some strong intuitions on his side as well. With this in mind, we can 
begin to consider how Lucretius uses this argument against the four fears 
that I laid out above.
m
The first two fears are opposite sides of the same coin. When we die, our 
souls separate from our bodies; our souls are destroyed in the process, and 
our bodies begin to decay. Left with nothing but a lifeless body, two 
thoughts may arise. On the one hand, a person might think that since the 
lifeless body is certainly not him, he will simply cease to exist. On the 
other hand, he might think that the dead body is all that is left of him, and 
this will lead him to identify with the corpse. The first thought can lead to 
the fear of non-existence, and the second thought can lead to fear about the 
fate of one's body after death. But both fears result from the more general 
notion that death is the separation of the soul and body and the destruction 
of the soul.
Although the first fear seems quite natural, it is surprisingly hard to 
characterize. If at death we cease to exist and non-existence is nothing,
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then what are people so afraid of? The intuitive response is that people 
fear nothingness itself. A speaker in the Tusculan D isputations takes this 
line (I 11-12), and Plutarch makes the same point when he speaks of 'the 
longing for existence, the oldest and greatest of all passions' (Non posse 
1104c). But even if it is true that what is horrible about non-existence is 
precisely not to exist, this is entirely uninformative. Harry Silverstein 
offers a richer explanation: he explains that this fear involves 'the mistake 
of confusing the permanent annihilation of consciousness -  i.e. death -  
with the perm anent consciousness of nothingness, perm anent solitary 
confinement in total darkness, as it were' (MoD 98). Plutarch testifies to 
this view of non-existence: 'the face of death that all men fear as terrifying, 
gloomy, and dark is lack of sensation, oblivion, and ignorance' (1104e). His 
language suggests that Plutarch takes death to be exactly what Silverstein 
describes, a kind of eternal darkness which envelops the dead and which 
the dead somehow experience or undergo. If death were like this, it would 
indeed be awful.
In the main argument, Lucretius goes right at this fear. He shows 
that non-existence, contrary to Plutarch's confused image, is not some 
awful and eternal state that we undergo. Once a person dies, that person 
ceases to exist. But non-existence is not some nothingness that the dead 
undergo: it is just nothing. And as Lucretius argues, nothing can befall a 
person who no longer exists. So if death is non-existence for the person 
who dies, as Lucretius and the fearful masses agree, then nothing can harm 
that person any more. And if there is no longer any possible harm, then a 
fortiori nothingness itself is not a possible harm.
The effect of this argument is more radical than in the case of 
Lucretius's argument about Hades. Lucretius does not merely challenge 
the fear of non-existence, he supplants an entire way of looking at things.
If his argument is successful, we gain an entirely new conception of non­
existence. In the case of Hades, our knowledge is expanded — we come to 
know more about our souls and their natures -  and we come to see that 
what we fear will not come to pass — our souls will not journey to Hades. 
But our conception of Hades stays the same. This is not so with non­
existence. Lucretius forces us to see that non-existence is not a state or 
condition which we experience or undergo: it really is nothing to us, 
precisely because we disappear from the scene. We do not stay on as 
spectators of our own absence. The previous way of viewing non-existence 
mistakenly adds another 'us' into the picture, and thus it conceives of non­
existence as a darkness or some such that we are in. Lucretius abolishes 
this conception altogether.
With the second fear, we shift focus to the body, although the soul's 
destruction is still the impetus for the anxiety. A person who has this fear 
meets Lucretius halfway: he agrees, apparently, that the soul is destroyed at 
death and 'he himself denies that he believes that he will have any 
sensation in death' (874-875).24 But instead of dwelling on his soul, this 
person worries over the fate of his corpse: he fears that it may be burned or 
eaten by animals. According to Lucretius, the conjunction of these views 
amounts to a contradiction.
Lucretius's case against this worry also runs through his main 
argument. A person is a conjunction of a body and a soul, and death is the
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24 neget ipse/credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum.
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breakup of that union. Although this causes the complete destruction of 
the soul, the body can survive the process of death -  even if it too begins its 
inevitable decay. We should infer that death is the destruction of the 
person who dies: once a person dies, the person no longer exists. Although 
the body persists for a time, it is not me, and so whatever happens to it 
does not thereby happen to me.25 Again since I do not exist, nothing can 
happen to me. In this way, the main argument also works against fears 
over the fate of a person's dead body.
In the course of treating this fear, Lucretius also explains a confusion 
that underlies it (870-893). The mistake involves the im agination and 
personal identity. The fearful person agrees that he will not survive death; 
death is his end. But when he imagines burial or cremation, he treats the 
corpse as if it were himself. He imagines that something of himself does 
survive and that this something is harmed by post-mortem events. The 
person believes that he will not exist after death, but he persistently fails to 
make use of this knowledge when he imagines the world after his death.
The mistake that Lucretius describes is a specific example of a more 
general problem about imagination and the self.26 The broader issue is
25 Compare Thomas Nagel, 'W hen a man dies we are left with his corpse, and while a 
corpse can suffer the kind of mishap that m ay occur to an article of furniture, it is not a 
suitable object for pity' (7) 'D eath' in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cam bridge University  
Press, 1979).
26 The most im portant discussion of these issues is Bernard Williams 'Imagination and 
the Self' in Problems of the Self (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1973), 26-45. 
There is also a useful chapter in A nthony Flew The Logic of Mortality (O xford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987), 'P erso n al Identity: (i) Conceivable D ifferences?', 107-125 . Peter 
Carruthers makes good use of sim ilar argum ents in Introducing Persons (Albany: State 
University of New  York Press, 1986), 95-96, 154, 180, and 183. Even m ore general, but still 
very enlightening, are P.F. Strawson 'Self, Mind and Body' in Freedom and Resentment and 
other essays (London: M ethuen & Co. Ltd., 1974), 169-177 and Mark Johnston 'H um an Beings' 
Journal of Philosophy 84  (1987), 59-83 & 'Reasons and Reductionism ' Philosophical Review 
101 (1992), 592-597.
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large, diffuse, and complicated. A proper discussion of it would take us too 
far from the subject at hand, but it will still be profitable at least to indicate 
how Lucretius's explanation is related to this topic. In order to do so, I will 
use an analysis of imagination that Bernard Williams offers.
Williams distinguishes between three ways in which a person might 
imagine something to herself (38). In the first case, the person imagines 
som ething or some scenario, and she, the imaginer, plays no role in the 
imagined scene. For example, she might imagine Socrates's trial without 
in any way placing herself in that imagined scenario. In the second case, 
the person imagines some scenario, and here she is an actor in the 
im agined scene. She could, say, imagine herself responding well to 
difficult questions after giving a lecture. Finally, in the third case, a person 
m ight imagine doing or undergoing something as someone else. She 
could picture herself playing basketball at the Olympics; but in the 
imagined scene she is Cheryl Miller rather than herself.
W illiam s does not claim  that there are clear, hard and fast 
boundaries between these three types of imagination -  just the opposite.27 
The three forms of imagination glide all too easily one into another. So, if 
a person sets herself the task of imagining, as fully as possible, a house, she 
m ight start by simply visualizing a house without placing herself in the 
scene. But this could easily and naturally shift into a visualization of 
h erself going through the house. In such a case, the first type of 
im agination shifts into the second. Similarly, a case of the second type 
could easily shift into the third. A person begins to imagine herself playing 
basketball on the Olympic team, but she needs to make adjustments in her
27 In fact he describes the third type as, in effect, a special class of the first type (38).
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height, leaping ability, etc. It would be so natural to do this by giving 
oneself the attributes of some real player. Eventually the scenario would 
be that of the imaginer playing basketball, but now she is that other player.
C ru cially , these sh ifts can take p lace in volu ntarily  and 
imperceptibly. The imaginer need not, and often will not, deliberately shift 
from one type of imagination to another. In addition, the imaginer may 
very well not be aware that such a shift has occurred. It is not that we don't 
know what we are imagining, but rather that we are not always conscious 
of the precise nature of the imagined scenario. This is easy to confirm by 
introspection. We do not standardly think in terms of explicit distinctions 
between types of imagining; a fortiori a person can imagine things in one 
way rather than another without consciously choosing to do so. And if the 
person shifts between types of imagined scenarios, this too will often occur 
without conscious deliberation or decision.28 In the same way, when such 
a shift does occur, not only can it occur without the imaginer explicitly 
deciding to cause it, but its occurrence will often escape notice. Insofar as 
we do not, normally, make such distinctions between imaginary scenarios, 
we will not, normally, be aware of what is happening when our own 
imaginations shift from one type to another.
The case that Lucretius describes is a shift from the first type of 
scenario to the second. The person agrees that he won't exist or feel 
anything when he is dead. He begins to think about this state of affairs: 
here is his body being buried or burned or eaten by animals. So far, he
28 This is not to say that one can never explicitly attem pt to imagine in one way rather 
than another. Even if one does not have any explicit theory such as Williams, it seems that 
one could set oneself the task of imagining something in som e specific manner. My claim is 
merely that one need not do so and often one does not do so.
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imagines a scene entirely without his presence. But as he imagines these 
events, he adds himself back into the scenario. He takes the misfortunes of 
the body to be his misfortunes even though he asserts that the body is not 
him. The imaginer does not notice the shift, but because of it, his views 
wobble incoherently.
In this situation, the shift is especially quick and automatic because 
of the common association of a person and that person's body. In the 
normal course of events, we identify and reidentify other people by their 
bodies. And surely many, many people also identify them selves, at least 
partially, with their bodies. This natural assimilation of 'm e' to 'm y body' 
facilitates the transition from 'my body will be burned' to 'I will be burned'. 
The latter is obviously a reasonable cause of anxiety, but cremation is not 
such a case. My body will bum. I will not.
Lucretius can thus offer a powerful and satisfying explanation of 
why people wrongly fear for their corpses. When a person imagines being 
dead, it is extremely easy for him to become confused. The person is likely 
to project himself back into the imagined world where he no longer exists. 
He thinks of the fate that his body will suffer, and he wrongly imagines 
that these misfortunes are his misfortunes. Since the identification of 
oneself with one's body rarely becomes explicit, it is often the case that this 
entire process escapes awareness. Lucretius is therefore in a good position 
to explain both the error and why it so often goes unnoticed.
Lastly, Lucretius's explanation of this error is geared towards worries 
about one's body, but it has a more general scope. The same explanation 
can illuminate the fear of non-existence as well. I agreed above with Harry 
Silverstein that such a fear is 'a mistake.' Lucretius can explain the causes
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of the mistake. The person who fears for his body agrees that he perishes, 
but in confusion he projects him self back into the world by indentifying 
with his corpse. In the same way, a person who fears non-existence shifts 
from the thought 'I will be dead and not exist' to the thought 'I am doomed 
to non-existence.' The second phrase suggests that the person smuggles 
himself, all unawares, back into the imagined future after his death. Cicero 
and Plutarch suggest precisely this slide, as does Aristotle when he writes, 
'Death is the most terrifying thing. For it is a limit, and there seems to be 
nothing further for the dead person -  neither good nor evil' (NE 1115a26- 
27). Lucretius would agree with the description of death as a limit and the 
end of good and evil, but he believes that this will only appear terrifying if 
we mistakenly add ourselves back into a picture where we no longer 
belong.
IV
Unfortunately, the fear of being dead is not only the fear that being dead is 
itself intrinsically, or positively, awful. People also dread being dead 
because it appears to involve extrinsic, or negative, harms; such harms 
involve the absence or deprivation of goods rather than the presence of 
evils. The non-existent dead manifestly have nothing, and so it is easy 
enough to infer the converse: they lack everything. If this is so, then they 
lack all the goods of life. Thomas Nagel describes this as 'the natural view 
that death is an evil because it brings to an end all the goods that life 
contains' (2-3). We can take this, however, in one of two ways. If we focus 
on the present, then death will seem like the loss of all our current goods.
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Alternatively, if we look to the future then death becomes the loss of all 
our potential goods.
The first fear shows up frequently in both ancient and modern 
authors. Aristotle explains that the virtuous person has more to fear in 
death than other people, Tor life is most valuable to this sort of person, and 
this man is knowingly deprived (a7toatepeitai) of the greatest goods, and 
this is painful' (N E  1117bll-13). Plutarch also describes death as a 
deprivation of goods (q xa>v ayccGcov atepRaiq Non posse 1106a, see also 
1106b-c). And the title character of the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus grieves 
over 'the deprivation of the goods of life' (fi cxepTiaiq xcov dyctGaiv xou Cftv: 
369d4, cf. 365c5 ei axepfiaopai xouSe xou cpcoxoq xai xcov ayaGcbv).29 Among 
modems, Thomas Nagel writes, 'If we are to make sense of the view that to 
die is bad, it m ust be on the ground that life is a good and death is 
corresponding deprivation or loss' (4). Garett Thomson, who argues for a 
deprivational account of harm in general, also claims, 'Death deprives us 
of all the goods of life.'30
Lucretius clearly acknowledges this potential fear, and he treats it 
after he deals with the previous two fears (894-911). In brief he argues that 
it makes no sense to speak of a deprivation without a subject. But since the 
dead don't exist, they can't be the subject of anything, and so it is senseless 
to claim that death deprives the dead of anything. This argument relies on 
his earlier argument, in particular on premise three. Lucretius also makes 
use of his theory of imaginative error against the fear of deprivation: to
29 See also Cicero, 'Illud angit vel potius excruciat, discessus ab omnibus is quae sunt 
bona invita' (TD I 34.82), and 'Sed hoc ipsum condedatur, bonis rebus homines morte privari' 
(I 36.87).
30 Needs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 38.
fear deprivation after death, one needs to reinsert oneself, when one does 
not exist, as the subject of the deprivation.
It is worth mentioning one route for addressing this fear that 
Lucretius avoids entirely. It might seem tempting to respond to the claim 
'death deprives us of the goods of life' by arguing that life has few or no 
goods. Indeed, to take this idea even further, one could argue that life is so 
filled with miseries that death -  so far from depriving us of goods -  
actually saves us from evils. This idea seems to have had some popularity 
in antiquity: it shows up in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (I 83-86) and in 
the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus (366a-369b).
In general, Epicureans appear to have no patience for this line of 
thought. Epicurus severely rebukes the chic nihilist who proclaims, 'Best 
is never to have been bom , second best to die quickly' (EpM  126-127). To 
paraphrase Epicurus: If this person means it, he should die, and if he is 
joking, then he is wasting our time. Either way, such radical chic makes no 
real contribution to the debate at issue. Lucretius, as I have said, never 
even considers the idea that death is good because life is bad. But he does 
heap abuse on people who come to hate life as a result of the fear of death 
and then commit suicide -  all unaware of the paradoxical nature of their 
actions (III 79-84). Neither thinker has any sympathy for the attempt to 
remove the fear of death by removing the love of life.
This sort of argument, which we find in Cicero and elsewhere, is 
self-defeating, and so Lucretius and Epicurus are right to avoid such a 
method. Remember that the general point of ancient ethical inquiry is, 
first, to discover the nature of the good life or happiness and, second, to 
reveal how to achieve this good, happy life. The putative harm of death
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and the fear of this harm pose a great obstacle to happiness. But we cannot 
save the endeavor by denying that life is good, for that simply means that 
our search is doomed to frustration. We can't be happy; better to die 
quickly. Cicero himself sees the problem:
quid ego nunc lugeam vitam hominum? vere et iure 
possum; sed quid necesse est, cum id agam ne post 
mortem miseros nos putemus fore, etiam vitam efficere 
deplorando miseriorem?
Why should I now grieve over the life of mankind? I can do so 
truly and justly, but what need is there also to make life more 
miserable by lamenting when I am arguing so that we may not 
think that we will be miserable after death (TD I 83)?
But he cannot leave well enough alone. He goes on to do just what he
disavows here -  reducing his own insight to nothing in the process.
Lucretius, however, opens his case against the deprivation of goods 
argument by agreeing with his opponents on two key points. First, he 
believes that life contains many real goods. He himself draws a compelling 
picture of a valuable life ended by death (894-898).31 Secondly, Lucretius 
does not deny that when a person is dead and does not exist, that person 
will not have these goods. Everyone agrees, at this point, that life contains 
significant goods and that the dead no longer possess those goods.
31 For the reasons I have been discussing, Kenney simplifies matters by claiming that 
Lucretius is being satirical here (203). It would do Lucretius no good to mock or parody the 
life he describes, since he wishes to show that people can and do lead happy lives even  
though they die. He has no reason to claim that the life he represents is not a happy one, 
and he has every reason not to do so. He has not proven much if all he can show is that 
miserable people lose nothing in death. Instead of this lame approach, Lucretius faces the 
issue squarely: he presents a touching and pathetic image of a happy life cut short, but he 
attempts to show that the reaction of pity and sadness is misplaced. The dead person has 
lost nothing. Lucretius m ay mock his opponents insofar as they mistake death for a real 
loss, but he does not deny that life is good. The satire is not global.
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Nevertheless, Lucretius vehem ently denies that it follow s from 
these two claims that being dead is a deprivation of goods. He takes 'X  is 
harmed because he is deprived of Y ' to have as a necessary precondition 
that X needs Y (900-901, 916-918). If, say, a person is harmed by a lack or 
deprivation of food, then that person is without the food that he needs. A 
dead person fails to meet this requirement: he has no needs. Thus, a dead 
person may lack food, in some sense, but he does not need  food. This is 
what stops the move from (a) life contains real goods and (b) the dead don't 
have these goods to (c) the dead are deprived of these goods.
Lucretius seems to be on strong ground here. In general, X does not 
have Y is not equivalent to X needs Y. I don't have five cars, but I also 
don't need them, and I am certainly not harmed by any lack or deprivation 
of five cars. The problem is that a need indicates a lack, but a lack does not 
necessarily indicate a need. Thus, Lucretius is right: we cannot infer a 
deprivation for every lack.
The dead do not need anything because they do not even exist. 
What does not exist is in no condition, and thus it has no needs. While it 
is true, in a sense, that the dead do not have the goods of life, this does not 
really mean what it sounds like. Normally, if we say that someone does 
not have some good, we mean that he is undergoing a lack of that good. 
So, for example, a person's life may be miserable because of a lack of 
friends, and someone may say, 'He has no friends, so he is miserable.' This 
is more than the merely negative claim  that, say, Santa Claus has no 
friends. Even if we agree that friends are a necessary part of a happy life, 
Santa Claus is not somehow deprived by his lack of friends. Santa Claus
does not exist, and thus his not having friends is not some harm  he 
experiences. He doesn't have friends because he is not.
One feature of Lucretius's argument is potentially misleading. The 
word which Lucretius uses that I have been translating as 'need ' is 
'desiderium'. This word would more naturally be translated as 'desire'. If 
we take the word this way, however, then Lucretius's argument appears to 
collapse into a much weaker idea about desire. He would then be saying 
that the dead don't want anything or long for anything. But wants are 
generally less significant than needs. After all, someone might not w ant 
something good for her -  as a result of false beliefs -  but this person could 
still need this item. Does Lucretius conflate needs and desires? I think that 
he does not, but in order to show this, I need first to consider the Epicurean 
attitude towards desires and needs and second to consider the Latin that 
Lucretius uses.
Epicurus does not make a clear verbal distinction between desire and 
n e e d .32 For example in the Letter to M enoeceus 127-128, he gives his 
famous classification of desires (£7ti0u|i{ai), but he quickly shifts to the 
language of need (evSeov, 8£6|i.£0oc). There is, however, no indication that 
Epicurus intends any distinction; to all appearances, he simply uses these 
words as synonyms, i.e. he equates need and desire. This would set a 
precedent for Lucretius, but it would by no means justify the conflation: 
Lucretius would simply be guilty of the same error as his master. The 
distinction between need and desire is absolutely essential, and Epicurus 
appears to ignore it.
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32 My initial sense of this problem comes from the discussion of Phillip Mitsis EET  36  
ff.
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But this conclusion is too quick. Epicurus and Lucretius can make 
the distinction that we want even if their use of words is not identical to 
ours. I take it that the most important feature of the distinction between 
need and desire is to separate what an agent may happen to long for from 
what is really good for the agent. It seems obvious enough that people 
often want things that are not beneficial for them, and this is the most 
immediate case in which we say, 'He wants this or that, but he doesn't need 
it .'33 Since they divide desires into three classes — first, natural and 
necessary, second, natural and unnecessary, and, third, unnatural and 
unnecessary, Epicurus and Lucretius can make just such a separation. So, 
for example, Lucretius points out that we don't n eed  an elaborately 
decorated house in order to be happy (II 24 ff.), however much people may
want such things.34
In addition to this philosophical argument, there is reason to believe 
that 'desiderium' is not necessarily inappropriate Latin to express 'need'. In 
the De Finibus (II 26-27), Cicero discusses Epicurus's division of desires 
(erciGuiiiai) -  which word Cicero translates as 'cupiditates'. He has a 
number of complaints about the division, but in particular Cicero demands 
that Epicurus clarify his position by distinguishing between 'desideria 
naturae' and 'cupiditas'. Since Cicero has been translating 'erciGu^ua' 
(desire) as 'cupiditas', it seems clear that 'desiderium' must do duty for
33 Of course, this can go the other way as well: a person m ay need something that he 
does not want.
34 It is difficult to be certain, but I suspect that Epicurus blithely joins words for desire 
and words for need because of his theory as a whole: in the case of the sage, the ideal agent, 
desire and need are identical. The connection here between knowledge and the identity of 
desire and need should be drawn out.
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'need'.35 Now surely Cicero, if anyone, was in a position to understand the 
potential nuances of Latin vocabulary. Therefore, if he suggests, as he does, 
the word 'desiderium' as the Latin to signify 'need', then I take it that the 
word can do this work. Thus, although the w ord's m ore standard 
signification is 'desire', it need not always mean this. In the proper 
circumstances 'desiderium' can mean 'need'.
Moreover, Cicero's criticism supports my earlier claim about the 
Epicurean division of desires. What Cicero says is, 'quam quam  in hac 
divisione rem ipsam prorsus probo, elegantiam desidero' [although I 
entirely approve of the substance of this division, I need36 clarity] (II 27). I 
take it that Cicero and I are largely in agreement here. He sees that 
Epicurus can distinguish between need and desire ('rem  ipsam prorsus 
probo'), but he wishes that Epicurus had made his language clearer 
('elegantiam  desidero'). Thus, when he criticizes Epicurus, Cicero 
simultaneously indicates that the Epicurean position was flawed only in 
presentation and that 'desiderium ' was, in fact, a proper way to express 
'need' in Latin.
It would be wrong, then, to condemn Lucretius for confusing what 
we want with what we need. First of all, even if they don't always make 
the verbal divisions clear, Epicurean philosophers can and do make the 
conceptual distinction between the two. Secondly, the word 'desiderium '
35 Lewis and Short, s.v. 'desiderium ' IE  A, offer 'W ant, need, neccesity' (556-557). 
This is already troubling, since it appears to misunderstand the English distinction. In any  
event, the point appears to be that they recognize a use of 'desiderium ' that covers what I 
am calling 'needs'. They write, however, that this usage is rare and not ante-Augustan. The 
Cicero passage that I am  discussing belies the latter claim. The Oxford Latin Dictionary 
also lumps together want and need in its entry on 'desiderium'.
36 This is surely C icero's little joke: he is about to suggest that Epicurus use 
'desiderium' to express the concept of need, and so he says that clarity is w hat he needs, 
desires, wants ('desidero').
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can be used in Latin for 'need', and indeed Cicero him self suggests this 
word for exactly this purpose in his critique of Epicurean ethics. For both 
reasons, Lucretius's wording should not mislead us: he cares about needs 
rather than mere desires.
Once we clear away this potential confusion, Lucretius's argument is 
quite strong. He argues that the harm of a deprivation consists in the 
occurrent lack of what one needs. There has to be a subject of this need, 
and this subject must exist. As the main argument shows, the dead don't 
exist, and thus they cannot need anything. There is no subject for the 
deprivation or harm. Lucretius's explanation of harm  is compelling as 
well. It appears uncontroversial, except in the putative case of death, that 
needs have subjects and that these subjects must exist.
Moreover, Lucretius is in a good position to explain why the fear of 
deprivation is so compelling to people. In the first place, he can appeal to 
his previous explanation concerning im agination and the self. In the 
second place, there is a common way of speaking that encourages 
confusion. I will briefly touch on each of these explanations.
This fear of post-mortem deprivation partly stems from the same 
sort of error which underlies the fears concerning one's body after death. 
In the latter case, we add another us to the time that we don't exist, and we 
attach the physical suffering to this illusory after-image of ourselves. So 
also in the case of deprivation, it seems that one imagines death as a time 
when one is deprived of this or that good. But to think this is simply to 
project oneself beyond death. Since death really is the absolute end, 
however, this projection is wrong and extremely misleading. It fosters the 
fear that after death we will not have this, that, or the other thing. But of
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course there will not be some us after death with no goods. There will just 
be no us.
Second, a very ordinary and natural way of speaking may foster the 
confusion. It is true to say of a dead person, 'He doesn't have x or y.' This 
is obviously something that we might also say of a living person who 
lacked and needed x or y. But the meaning and significance of the phrase 
'H e doesn't have x or y' differs greatly in the two cases. For the living 
person, the phrase describes an occurrent lack and very likely a need as 
well. But for the dead person, the phrase merely expresses one specific 
example of the general fact that the dead person has nothing. And this 
more general fact is perfectly trivial; it does not express an occurrent lack or 
need. It is analogous to the statement that the (imaginary) continent 
Atlantis has no latitude or longitude: it's true, but not especially significant. 
It certainly does not mean that there is some m agical continent that sits 
somewhere on the globe at no precise latitude or longitude.37
Lucretius provides examples of this linguistic confusion. He 
displays people telling someone, 'Soon, soon now your prosperous home 
w ill not receive you nor w ill your excellent w ife, nor will your sweet 
children run up to get the first kiss' (894-896). The speaker means these 
statements to be pathetic and expressive of great loss.38 But for Lucretius 
such declarations are true but trivial. It is not that the person will go 
home, but his wife and children won't be there. The family man will not 
see his family any more, and although that statem ent can describe a real
37 The author, w hoever it w as, of the pseudo-Platonic A xio ch u s  makes use of 
imaginary characters from m ythology to make the same point as I do here (369c).
38 This is where irony does enter the picture: Lucretius doesn't doubt that such a life is 
good, but he does scom  the idea that the dead person somehow suffers from the lack of this 
life .
misery, in this case it is just an example of the general point that he will 
not do anything.
Once these two explanations are laid out, a deprivational account of 
the harm of death loses much of its intuitive force. It sounds so reasonable 
-  so right -  to say that the dead lose, lack, or are deprived of all the goods of 
life. But we must avoid the two errors. First, we must not project another 
self beyond death who would be harmed by such a lack. Secondly, we must 
not assume that every negative statement of the form 'X does not have (or, 
soon will not have) this or that' expresses a genuine harm. It may be true 
that the person does not have the item, and the item may be a real good, 
but the negative statement is, in the case of a dead person, not significant. 
O f course the dead person does not have the item: he doesn't have 
anything. But unless we have already made the first error, this general 
statement will not trouble us. Thus, if we avoid the two errors the 
deprivation account will become less compelling.
There is, however, another way of viewing being dead as a deprivation, 
not of present goods but rather of future, possible or potential goods. 
Obviously this view of being dead is structurally similar to the last: in both 
cases being dead is taken to be a deprivation or a loss of some kind. And in 
both cases, being dead is allegedly bad or harmful because it is such a 
deprivation or loss. But just as obviously the two views are importantly 
different; they offer quite distinct accounts of the content of the deprivation 
or loss. In the one case, we lose or are deprived of what we have now, but
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in the other we lose or are deprived of goods that we may have achieved.39 
My response to this second type of deprivation will be parallel to my 
previous response.
Thomas Nagel provides a good introduction to this fear. He 
suggests that death be taken as 'an evil that depends on a contrast between 
the reality and the possible alternatives' (6), and he continues:
A man is the subject of good and evil as much because he 
has hopes which may or may not be realized, or possibilities 
which may or may not be realized, as because of his capacity 
to suffer and enjoy. If death is an evil, it must be accounted 
for in these terms (6-7).
Even more strongly, he writes:
Given an identifiable individual, countless possibilities for 
his continued existence are imaginable, and we can clearly 
conceive of what it would be for him to go on existing 
indefinitely. However inevitable it is that this will not come 
about, its possibility is still that of the continuation of a good 
for him, if life is the good that we take it to be (8).
The idea here is not hard to understand. When a person is alive, she
appears to have many potential goods before her in addition to whatever
goods she actually possesses. She might advance in her career, meet new
friends, watch her children grow up, and so forth. When she dies, her life
ends and all of these possibilities go unfulfilled. What Nagel and others
claim is that death harms us insofar as it robs or deprives us of these
possible goods.
39 P h i l l ip  Mitsis has suggested to me that there m ay be some things, e.g. long term  
projects, that straddle this divide. I do not wish to deny that there m ay be such things, but I 
will focus on the cases that fall more clearly on one side or the other.
I l l
A num ber of contemporary authors have explained this claim  in 
terms of possible worlds.40 Roughly put, these authors argue that when we 
say, 'Death deprives us of possible goods' we mean that for some person P, 
there is some possible world W, such that P lives longer in W than he does 
in the actual world and P has more goods in that world than he does in the 
actual world. Since contemporary philosophers can provide a very rich 
account of potentials in terms of possible worlds, this way of setting up the 
problem  is attractive. Using possible worlds these philosophers can 
formalize and perhaps even quantify how death harms us by depriving us 
of future goods.
I believe, however, that the problem is better studied without the 
apparatus of possible worlds. First of all, the possible worlds theory, in its 
contem porary form, is utterly alien to Epicurean philosophy. Thus, it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to apply Epicurean arguments to the 
deprivation thesis in this form. Secondly, the possible worlds machinery 
adds nothing essential to the original, informal complaint. The core of the 
complaint is well-represented by Thomas Nagel's comm on-sense version 
which I offered above. Since the Epicureans have arguments that apply 
directly to the Nagel-style complaint, it seems best to treat the problem in 
this version and to leave aside the possible worlds formulations.
Lucretius considers this fear by reflecting on the life of symposiasts. 
Such people pass their lives drinking and feasting, and they make many 
heart-felt proclamations about the brevity of it all: 'brevis hie est fructus 
hom ullis;/iam  fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit' [brief is this
40 See Jeff M cM ahan and Fred Feldman in M oD. Also see W alter Glannon 'Epicurus 
and Death' Monist 76 (1993), 222-234.
enjoyment for (we) poor men -  soon it will be gone nor will it ever be 
possible to call it backj (914-915). Apparently, these men justify their 
current excesses by reference to their future death. Life is short, but death is 
eternal. Since we will forever be without the goods that we might have 
had, we should grab as much as we can get now. These symposiasts are 
like people in a panic before a hurricane: when the storm hits, they will be 
unable to acquire food and other necessities, so they scramble to stockpile 
now .41
By this point Lucretius can be brief and so can I. He simply repeats 
his previous claim that once the revelers are dead, they will be entirely 
gone (919). If they grasped this, they would also see that they will not suffer 
from hunger or thirst when they are dead. They will not miss out on an 
infinite number of feasts that they could have enjoyed. They will not miss 
out on anything since that would require that they exist, and they will not 
exist.
This argument is obviously parallel to the previous one, and it relies 
on a similar paradox. In both cases, Lucretius suggests that there is no time 
at which the loss occurs. We cannot say that the loss takes place when we 
are alive, because death causes the loss and death has yet to happen. But 
neither can we say that the loss takes place once we are dead since once we 
have died, we cease to exist and there can be no loss without an existent 
subject. The paradox is that we either have a subject with no loss (yet), or 
we have a loss with no subject (anym ore). Since either option is 
intolerable, we are forced to admit that there is no such loss. Whether we 
worry about the loss of what we have or the loss of what we might have,
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41 Cf. Philodemus EF XVII.
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the fear is misplaced. The destruction of our souls amounts to our non­
existence, but non-existence does not harm us. It makes harm impossible.
V
In addition to his main argument, Lucretius offers two analogies in 
support of his case. Lucretius compares being dead to sleep and to the time 
before we existed. Since the comparison of death to sleep is common and 
straightforward, I will address it first and more briefly. The analogy of 
being dead to past non-existence is, although not unique to Lucretius,42 
especially associated with him, and its significance is less clear than that of 
the sleep analogy. After giving an interpretation of this second 
comparison, I will try to show why a recent interpretation of it fails both as 
exegesis of Lucretius and on philosophical grounds.
The purpose of both analogies is to cure a peculiar anxiety. I have 
already discussed the common imaginative error that leads people to fear 
for themselves, notwithstanding that they think that they will no longer 
exist in the fearful scenario. But even if people overcome this problem, 
there is another psychological hurdle to consider. In one sense, the very 
thought of one's death seems paradoxical or incoherent. Grant that the 
soul and the person perish at death: when a person dies that person ceases 
to exist. We want to evaluate what this means for us, whether it will be 
good or bad for us, whether the fear that is so common is reasonable. But 
the most obvious way to pose the question appears to be a contradiction:
42 See, e.g. Cicero TD  1 13, 'ita, qui nondum nati sunt, miseri iam sunt, quia non sunt, et 
nos, si post mortem miseri futuri sumus, miseri fuimus ante quam nati.' Stephen Rosenbaum  
offers a list of parallels in "The Symmetry Argument: Lucretius A gainst the Fear of Death' 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989), 354 n. 5.
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How will it be for me, when there is no me? The very question seems 
incoherent, and this incoherence produces a kind of intellectual vertigo, a 
feeling which is itself troubling. Hence the difficulty in examining one's 
own demise can produce anxiety. Lucretius introduces the two analogies 
in order to ease this difficulty and to remove the attendant anxiety. The 
analogies are meant to help us into the thought of our non-existence.43
This psychological hurdle is at least partly responsible, I believe, for 
the com m on assertion that death is inescapably m ysterious or 
unknowable. I say 'in part' because this assertion is ambiguous and, 
perhaps, overdetermined. On the one hand, it often merely means that no 
one can really know whether death leads to non-existence or to post­
mortem survival of some sort. And often, no doubt, the ground for this 
belief is the facile and uninteresting idea that only direct experience can 
produce knowledge: none of us has, yet, experienced death, and thus, the 
argument goes, knowledge of death is out of our reach. But there is 
another, more serious, idea that 'death is mysterious' can express. The idea 
is that death, qua non-existence, is something we cannot get at because we 
cannot make sense of what it is fo r  us not to exist. This is the problem that 
we started with. On this interpretation, there is at least something to be 
said for the claim that death is mysterious -  although it is still necessary to 
consider the issue carefully before deciding whether death is hopelessly 
mysterious. What I am claiming is that, in part, the sense of mystery that 
attaches to death just is the intellectual vertigo which I mentioned above.
43 Two good, brief considerations of the problems associated with imagining one's own  
death are Paul Edw ards 'My Death' The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (N ew  York: The 
M acmillian Com pany, 1967), 416-419 and Roger Scruton M odem Philosophy (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1994), 310-316.
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It is im portant that Lucretius deal with the claim  that death is 
simply mysterious or unknowable since the claim can cause anxiety and 
lead to confusion. Remember that the question that apparently cannot be 
answered is, 'How will it be for me, when there is no m e?' This question 
matters in a way that, say, 'W hat is the square circle like?' does not. The 
idea of a square circle is, apparently, one we cannot entertain insofar as it is 
a flat and obvious contradiction. But nothing hangs on our having such 
an idea. The case of death, however, is not like this. We will all die, and 
that's a fact. And if Lucretius is correct and death am ounts to non­
existence, then we need an answer to the question of how non-existence 
will be for us. Our happiness seems to hang in the balance.
As a result, the intellectual vertigo is both intrinsically unsettling 
and persistent. The mind seems to recoil from the thought of non­
existence or to push the idea away; combine this with the urgency of the 
question, and the result can be serious anxiety. By an easy confusion this 
anxiety shifts from the question concerning our non-existence to what the 
question is about, namely non-existence itself. The psychological hurdle 
itself produces anxiety about being dead. Lucretius thus has overabundant 
reason to treat the psychological obstacle. His goal is to help us achieve 
lack of anxiety as far as possible, so he would automatically be concerned 
with the intellectual vertigo. Moreover, since the vertigo spreads anxiety 
over onto our idea of death, it only reinforces the common anxiety about 
death. Again, Lucretius obviously wants to treat that anxiety, so he will 
want to help us through the aporia.
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The connection of death and sleep is quite natural and, historically, quite 
common. In poetry, Homer immortalizes the connection in the famous 
description of the twins, Sleep and Death, taking away the body of 
Sarpedon for burial (Iliad  16.677 ff., esp. 681-683). In philosophy, Socrates 
uses the analogy when he argues against a negative view of death (A pology  
40d -e4 ).44 The naturalness of the analogy is very likely a result of two 
ideas: first, death is often taken as a (final) rest from the toils of life,45 and, 
second, deep, dreamless sleep is for us an experiential blank, and this is 
similar to the conception of death as non-existence. Lucretius uses both of 
these ideas in his argument, although his primary focus is the second.
The first analogy appears in the two arguments about deprivation 
(904-911, 919-930). In the first case, Lucretius puts the analogy in the mouth 
of an im agined mourner. Wracked with misery, a mourner complains 
that he is left to eternal grief, but that the deceased is asleep in death and 
free from all cares -  tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aev i/quod  
superest cunctis privatu' doloribus aegris (904-905).46 Lucretius pointedly 
asks why eternal grief is called for if the deceased is at rest and free from 
troubles. The rhetorical effect of putting the analogy in the mouth of the 
m ourner is to rem ind readers that they already have a w ay of 
understanding death -  it is like sleep -  and, moreover, that on this picture 
death is essentially innocuous. In the second case, Lucretius uses the 
analogy in propria persona. He chastises symposiasts and he reminds
44 Fo r inscriptional evidence, see Richm ond Lattim ore Themes in Creek and Latin
Epitaphs (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 82-83 & 164-165.
4 5 It m ay be that in this case I have got cause and effect backwards. That is, w e m ay
take death to be a rest from toils because we antecedently take it to be like sleep. I don't 
have particularly strong intuitions one way or the other, and I wouldn't press the point.
46 There is a sharp insight here: when we m ourn, we are often bitter and resentful of
the person whose loss we lament.
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them that death will not leave them hungry and thirsty (919-930). Instead 
it will be like a deep, dreamless sleep. Since we already know that such a 
sleep is untroubled and without needs, the image should help us to 
conceive of death without anxiety.
I have mentioned twice that Lucretius compares death specifically to 
deep or dreamless sleep, and the qualification is not idle. Lucretius wants 
us to think of sleep, insofar as it is an experiential blank. But when a 
person is just dozing, or when a person is dreaming, he can go through all 
sorts of emotional and psychological states. In addition, during dreams the 
mind is aware of and responsive to certain bodily needs. In book IV, 
Lucretius explicitly discusses such phenomena as a thirsty man dreaming 
of water (IV 962-1036, esp. 1024-1036). Lucretius does not mean, however, 
to compare sleep and death indiscriminately. In his second use of the 
analogy, he explicitly says, 'cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt', 
and this reference to the equal calm of mind and  body makes it clear that 
Lucretius is thinking of deep, dreamless sleep. The qualification is crucial 
since without it the force of the analogy is blunted. Socrates makes this 
same qualification in his use of the analogy.47
There is another aspect of Socrates's use of the sleep analogy, 
however, that is importantly different from Lucretius's. Socrates not only 
uses the analogy to argue that death is not bad, he actually urges his 
audience to compare the value of a night of dreamless sleep with that of 
other days and nights. He claims that even the King of Persia would find 
few days or nights preferable to a peaceful night of deep sleep (40d-e).
47 He refers to urcvcx; erceiSdv tiq k <x0 e -65(dv  |ir|8’ ovap pnSev opa (40d l), and he repeats 
the qualification at 40d3-4.
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Lucretius, on the other hand, does not suggest that the state of sleep is an 
actual good. He only points out that it is not bad.
Socrates's additional claim might be a development of the picture of 
sleep, and by analogy death, as a refuge from troubles. If life is inherently 
troublesome, then sleep will always be a relief. Such a claim, however, 
strikes me as gilding the lily, and Lucretius is wise to avoid it. Critics often 
say that if one does not hate death, then it is impossible to love life. I doubt 
that this is true, but Socrates plays into this objection by claiming that sleep, 
and by analogy death, is better than most of life. It is natural for Lucretius 
to steer clear of such a claim since Epicurus explicitly rebukes those who 
praise death no less than those who fear it (EpM  126-127). For the 
Epicurean, being dead, and by a reverse analogy being asleep, is not bad or 
good: it is nothing to us.
It should be clear how the analogy of sleep can help Lucretius 
address the psychological hurdle that his readers may face. The problem 
was to come up with a way to answer the question, 'How would non­
existence be for us?' Although sleep, even quite deep, dreamless sleep, is 
not quite non-existence, it is a state which seems to have no positive 
features or character; it is difficult to say anything positive about it.48 But 
what we can say, and this is where the analogy serves Lucretius's needs, is 
that it does not appear bad or harmful or disturbing to us. We willingly 
undergo it every night, and nothing about sleep gives any reason for worry
48 Throughout this section when I talk of 'positive' vs. 'negative' features or character 
or descriptions, I do not mean 'good' vs. 'bad.' The distinction I mean to draw  is that 
between, e.g., saying of someone, 'He's 6 feet,' and saying, 'He's certainly not short.' In the 
first case, the description is positive, but in the second it is merely negative.
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or fear. If non-existence is like this, then it seems that it too will not be bad 
or harmful or disturbing for us.
One potential objection to the comparison is that in the case of sleep, 
unlike the case of death, we wake up. This is indeed a difference between 
sleep and non-existence, but it is not a relevant one. Lucretius points out 
that the state of deep sleep is like that of non-existence. This objection does 
not show that being dead and being asleep differ as states, but only that they 
have different lengths and positions in relation to a person's life.
The objection would count against Lucretius if people normally 
found deep sleep to be a harm or evil, but they took comfort in the thought 
that they would wake up in the morning. But that is clearly not the case. 
Most people find the state of deep sleep to be essentially neutral and 
sometimes even beneficial. If people fear sleep, it is often because they fear 
not waking up, i.e. death. But what they fear then is precisely not the state 
of being asleep, but the state of being dead. Thus, Lucretius does make a 
fair comparison, even if being awake (normally) follows being asleep.
Lucretius also invites his readers to reflect on being dead by 
considering the time before they were bom .49 He refers to the Punic wars, 
before any of his readers were alive, and he argues that they felt no pain, 
and in general suffered no harm, during these wars.50 And since the time 
after they die is, in all relevant aspects, the same for them as their previous 
non-existence, that time too will not be bad for them (832-842). In the same
49 Although I have avoided the com m on locution 'pre-natal non-existence', I have  
allowed myself occasionally to refer to 'the time before birth'. It is an easy way of talking, 
but I do not m ean to imply any position, for myself or for the Epicureans, concerning the 
personhood of unborn fetuses. I have more than enough to deal with, and I will entirely  
avoid the questions of abortion, miscarriage, etc.
50 For a similar use of historical examples, cf. Axiochus 365d7-365e2.
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vein, he later (972-977) describes the time before life as a mirror image of 
the time after death, and he concludes (976-977):
numquid ibi horribile apparet, num triste videtur 
quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat?
Surely nothing awful appears there? Nothing seems miserable, 
does it? Doesn't it emerge (as something) more peaceful than 
any sleep?51
The comparison should help readers to see that there is nothing awful 
about non-existence after death, since there was nothing awful about past 
non-existence.
The claim that death is like a mirror-image of the time before life 
may be a problem. Lucretius can use the word 'mirror-image' because the 
comparison is so close, but this extreme similarity may actually work 
against him. The two terms of the comparison -  past non-existence and 
future non-existence -  are so similar that it is not clear that the former can 
shed any light on the latter. After all, if someone tries to conjure up how it 
was for him before he was bom , no real picture seems to come forth.52 
This suggests that a person's past non-existence creates the same, or a 
similar, psychic hurdle as the time after death. But if this is the case, then
how can the analogy help?
First, there is one important difference between the two cases: their 
temporal location. For a living person, one case is obviously in the past 
and one in the future. A nd  this fact is not insignificant. Since past non­
existence is already behind us, so to speak, we can make som e evaluation
51 Note that in this last question, Lucretius actually combines the two analogies.
52 As Kenney points out (221) this is the paradox of calling past non-existence a 
'speculum' of our deaths. The image in the face of the mirror is nothing, and w e see a blank, 
which is what past and future non-existence really are.
of it, even if we can't give it a positive description. A living person has 
reason to suppose that past non-existence was not bad since he presumably 
has no memories of it being bad nor any psychic or physical effects from 
that time.53 Thus, the temporal location of past non-existence makes it 
possible to get at least some handle on it.
Secondly, the negative quality of the analogy is not accidental nor 
contrary to Lucretius's purpose. I described the original problem as an 
inability to answer the question, 'How will being dead be for us?'; but it is 
now possible to distinguish two ways that the question could be meant.
(a) What positive elaboration or description is 
there for our being dead?
(b) What can we say about our being dead?
It turns out that the answer to (a) is 'Nothing.' Death is not anyway for us, 
and thus there is no positive description to give it. But in answer to (b), 
Lucretius argues that the answer is, 'It won't be bad for us. And ultimately, 
this is his goal. He wants to show that non-existence is not bad in order to 
rid us of a fear that is, in his opinion, baseless. He uses the analogy to show 
that this is so.
The com parison of being dead and past non-existence does, 
therefore, add to Lucretius's case, even if its contribution is primarily 
negative. Just as the sleep analogy, past non-existence suggests that there is 
nothing intrinsically bad about non-existence. Being dead has no positive 
features, and, as I pointed out, this makes it difficult to evaluate. This 
difficulty may even cause anxiety. But the comparison to past non­
existence can help to overcome the difficulty and relieve the anxiety. It
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53 Cicero makes this same point, 'ego autem  non com m em ini, ante sum natus, me 
miserum; tu si meliore memoria es, velim scire, ecquid de te recordere' (TD 1 13).
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reveals that non-existence is not intrinsically bad; and this is a relief, even 
if it is not the fuller answer that we may have wanted.
Up to this point, I have taken this second analogy as part of Lucretius's case 
that being dead is not bad; but other scholars have construed the analogy in 
a very different way. They believe that Lucretius argues directly against the 
fear of being dead by means of the analogy. The argument is supposed to 
be that we do not fear past non-existence and thus by parity we should not 
fear our future non-existence, since they are alike in all relevant aspects. I 
believe, however, that Lucretius does not use the analogy in this manner 
and, moreover, that this interpretation of the analogy produces an
exceedingly poor argument.
First of all, then, Lucretius does not make such an argum ent 
unam biguously. This is generally agreed, but the point is w orth 
demonstrating briefly. As David Furley argues, the first example of the 
analogy (832-842) never refers to our current attitudes; these lines refer to 
our past experiences, and they claim that during our past non-existence we 
suffered no harm s.54 This is consistent with the interpretation that 
Lucretius uses the analogy to argue that death is not bad, but it does not fit 
the other interpretation. On the other view, the main point of the analogy 
is to show that we do not now fear past non-existence, and thus (sic) we 
should not now fear fu tu re  non-existence. If Lucretius did mean to argue 
in this manner, then he would obviously want to mention our present
54 David Furley 'Nothing to us?', in The Norms of Nature (Cam bridge: Cam bridge  
U niversity Press, 1986, pages 75-91) at pages 76-78. See also Richard Sorabji T im e, 
Creation, and the Continuum  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 177 and Stephen  
Rosenbaum 'The Symmetry Argument: Lucretius Against the Fear of Death' 358-359.
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emotional attitude towards past non-existence. In the first use of the 
analogy, at least, he simply does not do so.
The best hope, therefore, for the view under consideration, is to 
focus on the second use of the analogy. Phillip Mitsis takes this line, as 
does Richard Sorabji (although Sorabji is more hesitant on the matter).55 I 
think that they are wrong to take these lines this way, but at least in this 
case the matter is ambiguous. Lucretius writes,
respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas 
temporis aetem i fuerit quam nascimur ante: 
hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri 
temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram; 
numquid ibi horribile apparet, num. triste videtur 
quicquam, non omni somno securius exstat? (972-977).56
Neither Mitsis nor Sorabji explains why these lines seem different than the
earlier ones, but two points seem most salient to me: the use of the perfect
tense, 'fuerit', in line 972, and the rhetorical questions in the last two lines.
The way one takes the perfect 'fuerit' is closely connected to how one 
understands the passage's force. Mitsis, e.g., takes the perfect as a present 
perfect, and he translates, 'the immense expanse of past time... lias been 
nothing to us' (305). This translation brings the matter forward in time; it 
suggests that up until now we have had no negative feelings about past 
non-existence. But the perfect in Latin also serves as the simple past, and I 
would translate the lines, 'the immense expanse of past time was nothing 
to us.' On this translation, the point of the lines is identical to that of lines 
832, where Lucretius also uses the perfect but obviously for the simple past,
55 P hill ip  Mitsis 'Death and the Duration of L ife/ in Proceedings of The Boston Area 
In Ancient Philosophy (Volume IV, 1988), 303-322, at pages 307-307, and Sorabji page 176.
56 I do not translate these lines since I don't want to prejudice the issue under discussion.
'e t velut anteacto n il tem pore sen s im u s  aegri.'57 I don't see how 
'sensim us' could be taken as a present perfect in this line.58 This is not, of 
course, conclusive proof of my interpretation. For all I have said, Lucretius 
could use the same tense differently in the two analogies. But without 
some further reason to take 'fuerit' as a present perfect, I believe that the 
best Mitsis can do here is achieve a draw. The verb tense is ambiguous, 
and it cannot decide the matter.
The last two lines may seem to be better evidence, but they too are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, they may mean something like, 'Surely you 
don't (now) fear past non-existence?' But they could also mean, 'Surely 
you don't find past non-existence fearful?' These questions are obviously 
related, but they are not identical. The reason is that someone might take, 
say, torture to be fearful, but still not be (currently) afraid of torture, since 
he does not believe that he faces torture. The question of whether or not 
something is fearful is thus not identical to the question of whether or not 
someone has an occurrent fear. Normally, someone has an occurent fear if 
he or she (1) takes something to be bad, and (2) believes that the something 
in question is going to happen. But to find something fearful, only the first 
condition is necessary. The lines may refer to fear, but they may also only 
refer to fearfulness.
In fact, in this case I am inclined to think that the second reading is 
more natural to the Latin. The use of 'horribile' and the verbs of appearing 
suggest to me that Lucretius invites us to consider whether a reaction of
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57 The Cicero passage that I quoted earlier also contains a perfect in a passage that 
clearly does not refer to present attitudes, 'miseri fuimus ante quam nati' (1 13).
58 The tense of the verb is the foundation of Furley's case that the reference is solely to 
the past (76), and Mitsis appears to agree about these lines (306).
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fear is appropriate rather than the brute fact of what attitude we happen to 
have. I recognize, however, that such considerations may be subjective. It 
is sufficient for my purposes to say that these lines do not make an 
unambiguous reference to current attitudes.
There are also two features of the lines that are troublesome for the 
interpretation that I am challenging. First of all, if Mitsis is right, then 
Lucretius switches from one use of the analogy to another without any 
indication that he is doing so. Even worse, after he switches without 
warning, Lucretius expresses himself ambiguously. I find this hard to 
accep t.59 Secondly, the common interpretation makes for a very odd 
reading of the mirror metaphor. Lucretius says that when we look in the 
mirror, we see 'hoc...speculum ' (974), and the demonstrative appears to 
point backwards to lines 972-973.60 If the symmetry view is correct, those 
lines refer to our current attitudes, and thus what we see in the mirror are 
those, our current feelings. But this seems odd; surely it is more natural to 
take the image in the mirror to be our past non-existence itself and not our 
current attitudes towards it.
In sum, I would say that the texts are slightly tilted towards my 
interpretation. The first use of the analogy clearly refers to whether past 
non-existence harmed us, not whether we fear it now, and the second use 
does not clearly shift focus to our current attitudes, although it may 
contain ambiguous references to such attitudes. Even though the textual
59 I suppose that some would say that he does not switch at all. He means to use the 
analogy directly to remove fear in both cases. If that were so, his first pass at the argument 
would be a glaring exam ple of a poorly expressed argument. I find this consideration a 
powerful reason to deny the claim that the first analogy also goes directly at fear.
60 j take 'speculum ', with Kenney, to mean 'm irror-im age.' This meaning is rare, but 
appropriate to the context.
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evidence is thus on my side, it is nevertheless worth considering the 
philosophical merits of the so-called symmetry argument, since it has been 
very influential.
In order to demonstrate what is wrong with such an argument, I 
will use Stephen Rosenbaum 's version.61 His formulation is the most 
explicit and clearly stated that I know, and thus it is likely to make the 
virtues and vices of the argument most obvious. He writes (359-360):
(1) No one fears the time before one existed.
(2) The time before one existed is relevantly like one's 
future non-existence (in that one cannot be affected 
negatively in either period). (This is 'the symmetry 
thesis').
(3) It is reasonable for one to fear something relevantly 
like what one does not fear only if one justifiably 
believes that the two things are relevantly different.
(4) No one justifiably believes that one's future 
nonexistence is relevantly different from one's past 
nonexistence.
THEREFORE, it is not reasonable now for one to fear 
one's future nonexistence, one's being dead, one's 
death.62
I believe that the first and third premises are seriously flaw ed.63 The 
problems are related, and these premises not only weaken the argument, 
but they are also inappropriate to an Epicurean treatment of emotions.
The first premise is ambiguous between a strong and a weak reading. 
The ambiguity lies in the use of the indicative claim that people do not fear 
their past non-existence. On the weak reading no one fears the time before 
one existed either because they never consider the matter or because they 
don't think that the question arises, even if they do consider it. So I might
61 "The Symmetry Argument: Lucretius Against the Fear of Death' (359-360).
62 All emphases and parentheses are Rosenbaum's.
63 Rosenbaum also makes a heroic understatement when he writes, of premise four, 
'This premise would obviously be difficult to justify' (360).
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not fear torture either because I never consider it or because I consider it, 
but I don't think that torture is a real issue for me. In the latter case, we 
would often find it appropriate to say, 'I don't fear torture (right now), but I 
find it fearful.' On the strong reading, no one fears the time before one 
existed in spite of the fact that they do consider the matter and do think the 
question arises for them. So for example, I m ight not fear the long term 
effects of coffee in spite of the fact that I have considered the matter and I 
do think that the question arises for me since I drink lots of coffee.
The 'question of whether som ething arises' is vague, perhaps 
necessarily so, but its general force should be clear enough. There are two 
basic ways that the question of something can fail to arise. First, an agent 
may simply never think of the matter; this may happen for different 
reasons -  sometim es a person's failure to think of a matter will seem 
reasonable and other times not. For example, it would be odd, and perhaps 
actually troubling, if a pilot literally never considered the chance of a crash. 
On the other hand, it seems perfectly appropriate that, as I assume, most 
New Yorkers never consider the idea that a tank might run them over at 
the com er of W est 4th Street and 6th Avenue. Secondly, a person might 
think of something, but not find it to be a real or significant possibility. 
Again, even after I suggest the tank example, few, if any, New Yorkers are 
going to consider this a real or significant issue for them. So, in general, 
for a question of something's fearfulness to arise, a person must consider 
the matter and take it to be a real or significant possibility.64
64 This paragraph is an adaptation of a point from  A ristotle's analysis of fear, Rhet 
1382a20-1383al2. He suggests that a person who is afraid m usttajse'the object of fear to be 
'near', and when he spells this out, it is clear that he uses near' to refer both to spatial and 
to temporal features. I have obviously expanded the point som ewhat, and I do not mean to 
imply that I have Aristotle on my side in this matter.
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The weak reading o f the first prem ise is more plausible and 
intuitive. Probably most people never consider their past non-existence. 
Rosenbaum hints at this him self by dwelling on the novelty of the 
symmetry argument.65 Even after a person does take thought of past non­
existence, he is unlikely to consider it a real or significant possibility.66 
Thus it seems that when we say that no one fears past non-existence, we 
mean merely that no one fears it because no one considers it or takes it 
seriously.
But the argument needs the strong version of the premise in order 
to be compelling. If I don't fear something only because I never think 
about it or because I don't think that it is a real possibility, then it seems 
unreasonable to argue that I should consider this lack of fear to be 
especially significant. Imagine a person in Germany who faces the prospect 
of torture. It would be strange to argue that (1) the person does not fear the 
same torture in France, (2) the difference in place is not a relevant 
difference, and so forth. Even if the person agrees that the difference in 
place is not relevant to the evaluation of the two tortures, it is nevertheless 
the case that the only reason the person does not fear the French torture is 
that he does not think of it or take it as a real possibility. It would be silly to 
let a lack of fear in the weak sense affect a fear which is present in the 
strong sense.
65 He calls the argument 'a  novel contribution' (359), 'the ingenious, novel contribution 
to Epicurean thanatology' (371), and 'a  uniquely im portant argum ent against the 
reasonability of fearing death' (371 n.47). He also argues, in an odd circle, that we should 
not take the symmetry argument to rely on claims that death isn't bad, precisely because we 
would rob ourselves of this unique and novel argument. The point is that if the sym m etry  
argum ent needs the other claim, it would not be novel, but it is (or should be?) novel, and 
thus it does not need the other claim (371).
66 The reason for this, I believe, is that whatever our previous non-existence was like, 
it is in the past. Thus, it is not an appropriate object of fear.
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The third premise is essentially a principle of rationality concerning 
fears, but it is not well formed. In order to get a handle on what is wrong 
with the principle, I suggest a better principle is this:
For any two closely similar67 situations x and y, it is 
reasonable to fear x but not y, or to fear y but not x, 
only if one justifiably believes that there is a relevant 
difference between x and y.
What Rosenbaum's principle suggests, but mine does not, is that if (a) you
have two situations, (b) you fear one but not the other, (c) you can't find a
relevant difference between them, then (d) you should eo ipso know
which emotional attitude to change. Indeed, Rosenbaum's form ulation
seems to imply that in all such cases one should bring the conflict into line
by giving up the fear which is present. This, however, is a very
implausible idea. Why should we assume that in all such cases the
presence of fear is wrong rather than the absence of fear?
My premise makes the move to (d) a straight non-sequitur, which 
seems more reasonable. After all, the mere presence of a conflict in 
attitudes should not without further ado impel a person to resolve the 
conflict one way rather than another. We need to bring in considerations 
of which attitude is better justified or more reasonable or what have you. 
This is the basic procedure for conflicts of belief, and nothing suggests that 
it should be otherwise in the case of emotional attitudes, such as fear.68
67 It would no doubt take an enormous amount of work to specify adequately how close 
is close enough. But since I am not going to actually use this principle, I will forego this 
difficulty.
68 Both Rosenbaum and Mistis appear to recognize this problem after a fashion, since 
they both worry that the sym m etry argument m ight backfire and cause people to fear past 
non-existence rather than cure them of the fear of death. But neither seems to recognize the 
severity of the issue.
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The general problem with the symmetry argument is that it makes 
too much out of what people happen not to fear. In the case of the first 
premise, Rosenbaum assumes that it is significant that we do not fear 
previous non-existence. It seems more likely, however, that this lack of 
fear does not show very much about our attitudes. The reason for this is 
precisely that we have no attitude to past non-existence. This is of course 
consistent with the claim that we don't fear past non-existence, but the 
claim is no longer worth much. The weakness of the third premise is 
similar, but on a larger scale. This premise also assumes that the fears 
which we do not have are greatly significant. But the premise suggests, in 
addition, that if a person fears only one of two relevantly sim ilar 
situations, it is always correct to correct the conflict by losing the fear that is 
present. To do so, however, would be to give much too much weight to 
the fears we do not have.
To put the problem another way, Rosenbaum's argument does not 
pay enough attention to the fact that people can fear or not fear things for 
no good reason, or for all the wrong reasons. There is no easy move from 
what we do fear, or what we don't fear, to what we should fear, or what we 
should not fear. It seems safest to admit that the mere fact that someone 
does or does not have a fear cannot show that he should or should not 
have that fear. In order to determine whether a person should have a fear, 
we need to determine a number of things. First and forem ost, it is 
necessary to determine whether the evaluation that the fear represents is 
true. A person who is reasonably afraid of x takes x to be bad or harmful 
for him. So one good way to determine whether we should fear 
something is to determine whether it is bad for us.
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This is in fact exactly what Epicurus suggests. During his treatment 
of death, in the Letter to M enoeceus, he claims that a fear of what will not 
be harmful is an empty fear (125). Now obviously sometimes a person 
fears something that will not harm him because he believes that it will 
harm him. And such a belief can be, depending on the circumstances, 
justified. There are many ways that a person could be w rong, but 
understandably and reasonably wrong; prominent among such reasons is 
that a person might have too much faith in the attitudes of those around 
him. It is for this reason that Epicurus believes that it is so important to 
discover the truth about what is good and bad for us, so that we do not 
make such mistakes -  justifiable or otherwise. We cannot take for granted 
that the attitudes that we start with, when we begin to consider them, are 
correct. The same goes for the attitudes that we don't have.69
But this means that there is a natural order to a course of Epicurean 
emotional therapy. The Epicureans believed that they had discovered 
what was truly good and bad for humans. On the basis of these discoveries 
they were in a position to judge what emotional attitudes were appropriate 
to their objects and what attitudes were wrong about their objects. 
Consider the fear of death: this emotion relies on a negative evaluation of 
death. But the Epicureans believed that death was not bad. Thus the fear is 
empty, and it should be given up. But note, and this is the crucial point, 
when they set out to convince people of this, the therapy naturally starts 
from the claim that death is not bad. Even if some people did not fear 
death, this would not be enough to show that others should not. The
69 Think of, e .g ., pleasure. A ccording to Epicurus m any people are m issing the 
appropriate positive attitudes towards pleasure, but this does not indicate to Epicurus that 
pleasure is not good.
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Epicureans need to show first of all why it is correct not to fear death. For 
this reason, the evaluative claim, that death is not bad, is necessarily prior 
to the therapeutic suggestion, that we should not fear death. This order of 
operations shows that the symmetry argument, as Rosenbaum presents it, 
is alien to the spirit of Epicurean emotional treatment.
Rosenbaum's symmetry argument attempts to move directly from 
the attitudes that people have to the attitudes that they should have, but 
this is not Epicurean practice and it is an unsound method. The 
Epicureans believed that there was no such high road since they were all 
too aware of just how corrupt and wrong common attitudes might be. The 
fear of death is itself an obvious example: almost everyone has the fear, but 
they should not since death is not bad for them. Moreover, the Epicureans 
were right to avoid such a high road. People can have or not have an 
emotion for all the wrong reasons, or for no reason at all. If we want to 
determine what attitudes we should have, we cannot blindly rely on the 
attitudes that we do have -  nor on the attitudes that we do not have.
One final way that Rosenbaum might try to block my conclusion is 
the following. The ethical goal of the Epicureans included d x a p a ^ ia ,  or 
freedom from mental anxiety. Fear is a form of xapa%fi, or mental anxiety. 
Therefore, the Epicureans do have a reason always to correct conflicts by 
removing the fears that are present, namely they think that we should 
always, in whatever circumstances, abolish our fears. If this argument is 
correct, then we need never consider the merits of a fear: fear is painful, we 
don't want pain, so we should always give up fears. This strikes me as a 
case where the conclusion is a reductio of the very argument that produces 
it. Thankfully, neither the reasoning nor the conclusion is Epicurean.
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First of all, there is good reason to believe that the conclusion is not 
Epicurean in spirit. The Epicureans are always concerned to show that our 
fears are  false. This would be irrelevant, however, if they thought that the 
mere fact that fear was painful was sufficient to show that we should never 
be afraid. There would be no reason to challenge the correctness of a fear, if 
its painfulness damned it automatically. Instead of saying that we should 
not fear, e.g. Hades, because the fear is false, they would simply point out 
that the fear is distressing. Obviously, however, the Epicureans take great 
pains to show that this fear and others like it are w rong  and not merely 
painful. Already we have a reason to doubt that they would eliminate a 
fear simply because it was disturbing, without any consideration for the 
truth of the matter.
Moreover, we have two cases where Epicureans clearly say that a 
thing is not to be avoided automatically, just because it is painful. In the 
first case, Epicurus goes out of his way to distinguish between, first, 
whether something is pleasurable or painful and, second, whether it 
should be chosen or avoided (EpM  129-130).70 He explains that since 
overall pleasure is our goal, we sometimes should choose a pain in order 
to avoid greater pain or to acquire greater pleasure on the whole.71 Second, 
and even closer to our case, Philodemus makes a similar point about 
anger. He argues that even though anger is intrinsically painful, it is not, 
therefore, always to be avoided (De Ira XXXVII). Since what Philodemus 
calls 'natural anger' is commensurate with its object and beneficial overall,
70 Cf. TD  V 95, De Fin 1 33.
71 A standard example of this sort of thing is undergoing painful medical treatment in 
order to avoid a long, debilitating illness. Cf. Philodemus EF  XVII (the fool) vs. XXIII (the 
Epicurean sage).
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it is, in a sense, a good, even if, taken alone, it is painful.72 A similar case 
could be made for what we can call, following Philodemus, 'natural fear/ 
A natural fear, that is, a fear of a truly impending harm, may be somewhat 
disturbing, but it is beneficial overall since it leads to the proper avoidance 
of a genuine threat.
To sum up, two of the prem ises of Rosenbaum 's symmetry 
argument are deeply flawed, and the argument as a whole is in conflict 
with other Epicurean convictions. Thus, the argument is not very cogent 
in its own right, and it does not make sense in an Epicurean context. Since 
Lucretius does not clearly commit himself to the argument and, moreover, 
it is a bad argument, there is no reason to give it to him. It seems safest to 
stick to the standard interpretation, according to which Lucretius uses the 
symmetry argument to show that death is not bad rather than that we 
should not fear it. He did not make the second style of argument, and he is 
better off without it.
VI
The four fears that I have considered may not appear very unified at first, 
but Lucretius has good reason to treat them together. First, although they 
have disparate objects, they all rely, to some extent, on the thought that 
death is the destruction of our souls. If the soul is the seat of our mental
72 A wrinkle here: since Philodemus is defending natural anger against another 
Epicurean, Nicasicrates, we might think that some Epicureans did think that an emotion 
was to be avoided just because it was painful. The inference does not follow. Nicasicrates 
rejects anger because he believes that it is painful and disturbing overall (XXXVIII 36- 
XXXIX 7); he thinks that it makes us blind and unreasonable. He and Philodemus agree 
that the question is not m erely whether an em otion is painful but rather whether the 
em otion is harm ful to our lives as a whole. This does not am ount to the claim  that 
something is bad and avoidable if it is painful at all.
life, then its destruction appears to cast us into some form of shadowy 
oblivion. Alternatively, if the soul is destroyed, then the body is all that is 
left, and concern naturally shifts there. Finally, if the soul's dissolution 
amounts to the person's end, then fear may arise over the loss of current or 
future goods. Even if this connection, however, appears too tenuous to 
unify the fears, Lucretius has another reason to group them together. They 
belong together because he can treat them all by means of the same 
argument. In this second sense, what unites these fears is not their origin, 
but rather their cure. Once a person sees that harm requires an existent 
subject, then each of these fears should fade away since in each case death 
removes the subject of the putative harm.
It also makes sense that he deals with the problem of conceiving 
one's own death here. The problem arises in relation to the thought that 
death is non-existence, and it is a kissing-cousin to the confusion that 
causes people to fear for their corpse. His treatment of the anxiety 
concerning the soul's destruction would be incomplete if he did nothing to 
help us overcom e the vertigo produced by the paradox about non­
existence. Hence, in the course of his arguments he offers the analogies of 
sleep and past non-existence as ways for his readers to get a better 
conception of what non-existence will mean for them.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL AND NON-EXISTENCE:
OBJECTIONS
I
Obviously, there is more to say. In the first place, Lucretius's entire case 
rests on one main argument. Since this argument has been the target of 
countless attacks, we need to consider at least some of these objections. 
Even if these objections are met, however, there remain criticisms which 
are fundamental, but somewhat distinct. Instead of arguing directly against 
the m ain argum ent, som e critics have attem pted to show that the 
Epicureans can only succeed by undermining their own goal. They offer us 
an invulnerable life, but only by emptying out of it much of what was 
worthwhile. In addition, others simply dig in their heels and insist on the 
m ost basic objection of all: death does harm us, and we know that so 
securely that no argument to the contrary will shake us of the conviction. 
In effect they argue that the conclusion of the Epicurean project is a 
reductio  of the position as a whole, since any argument which proves that 
death is no harm must be wrong.
n
This section takes up four especially interesting or important objections to 
the m ain argum ent.1 The first two, which are ancient, are fairly direct 
misunderstandings of the argument; I discuss them because I feel that the
1 Strictly speaking, the Aristotle bit is not a response to an Epicurean argument, since
he predates Epicurus. Nevertheless, it addresses relevant issues, and other, later, authors 
often use Aristotle's considerations against Epicurean arguments.
136
137
mistakes that they make are easy to make and often repeated. The third 
response is a more complex and less obvious misunderstanding; again I 
discuss it because the mistake is common, but also because Epicurus 
anticipated this error and made a direct counter-response. Finally the 
fourth response attacks the correct target, but it can make headway only by 
revising or ignoring very basic beliefs about causality or by advancing a 
controversial deterministic thesis.
The first argument appears in Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics 
(I 10-11), he considers Solon's dictum concerning happiness, namely that 
we must Took to the end'. Aristotle suggests that Solon may have meant 
that one could safely call someone happy only after that person's death, 
since only then is the person beyond reach of harm. Aristotle tentatively 
proposes, however, that this may be wrong; perhaps there is good and evil 
for the dead. If this is correct, then Lucretius is wrong to think that 
nothing can harm the dead and his main argument is fatally flawed.
In order to explain his puzzling thought, Aristotle suggests an 
analogy. Perhaps the dead person can be harmed just as a person who 
doesn't perceive can suffer harm .2 The idea is that a person can suffer 
harm without being aware of it, as, e.g., when a friend secretly betrays him 
or when a person dies without their loved ones' knowledge. In such cases, 
the people who are harmed, the person betrayed and the loved ones, are 
not aware of the harm, but many of us would still believe that they suffer 
harm -  aware or not. If the analogy between these unperceived harms and 
harms after death can be made out, then premise three of Lucretius's
2 Sokei yap eivai xi xw xeGvecoxi ica! kcxkov Kai ayaGov, EutEp Kai xw £cbvxi nh
aiaGavop.£vcp 8e (1100al8-20).
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argument appears to be false, and one can suffer harm when one does not 
exist. Before I answer this argument, I should discuss two reasons not to 
take this Aristotelian point as a criticism of the Epicurean position.
First, more obviously but less interestingly, Aristotle predates both 
Epicurus and Lucretius. Thus, this argument in the NE  is not really a 
response to the Epicurean case at all. This is, strictly speaking, true, but on 
the other hand, later philosophers, e.g. Thomas Nagel and George Pitcher, 
have used the same analogy to attack the Epicurean position. Whatever its 
provenance, the analogy poses a threat to premise three; if it is necessary to 
be absolutely precise, we can call the Aristotelian discussion an anticipation 
rather than a response to the Epicurean argument. But this does not affect 
the philosophical question at issue.
The second point, however, is more serious: Aristotle's use of the 
analogy with unperceived harms is strongly qualified. Aristotle does not 
immediately assert that the dead can be harmed; he introduces this as a 
puzzle that faces his second interpretation of Solon's dictum. W hen he 
finally resolves the question of post-mortem harms and benefits, he asserts 
that they can occur, but that they have such a trivial effect that they do not 
alter happiness or unhappiness.^ If you die happy, then you remain so, 
and if you die unhappy, you remain so. Aristotle preserves the intuition 
that it makes quite a difference whether harms occur before or after a 
person dies.
But if this is so, then Aristotle and Lucretius have no serious 
disagreement. Lucretius's ultimate goal is to show that being dead cannot
3 The good and evils are xoaovxov ye Kai xoiouxov coaxe |in Jtoielv etiSatpovaq xouq [in
ovzaq |it|5e xoix; ovxac; atpaipetaQai xo jiaicdpiov (1101b3-5, and cf. 1101b5-9).
affect your happiness. Although he would disagree with Aristotle and 
deny that post-mortem events can affect a person at all, nevertheless 
Lucretius could be content with the admission that after death nothing will 
make a person who was happy unhappy. On this matter, Aristotle and 
Lucretius are, surprisingly, in agreement. Since this is the real, underlying 
issue, the rem aining disagreem ent may appear to be unw orthy of 
consideration.
But in fact it is still necessary to deal with A ristotle's limited 
objection and not to rest content with the larger harmony. A ristotle's 
claim that people can undergo harm or benefit after death, even if only to 
an infinitesimal degree, is a denial of premise three. As such, it can serve 
as an Archimedian point on which other critics could m ount a more 
serious objection against Lucretius. One author has explicitly done just 
this. George Pitcher notices that Aristotle limits his claim, and so Pitcher 
argues that we should take Aristotle's idea and push it further -  we should 
say that a happy person can become unhappy because of events which take 
place after his death.4 Once we have admitted that the dead can be harmed, 
it becomes difficult to maintain that they cannot be harmed enough to 
affect their happiness. Therefore, it is important to respond to Aristotle's 
claim, even if he makes only limited use of it.
We can reveal the weakness in Aristotle's case if we focus on his 
analogy. Aristotle likens the post-mortem harms of non-existent subjects 
to the unperceived harms of existent subjects. In a sense, his argument is
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4 'The M isfortunes of the D ead' M oD  168, and cf. 163-164. I consider Pitcher s
argument below.
aimed at the claim that what you don't know can,t hurt you.^ But his 
analogy loses its sting if we recall the distinction between hedonist and 
existence arguments. The hedonist argument claims that the dead cannot 
be harmed because only felt sensations can be bad and the dead feel 
nothing. But the argument from existence says, rather, that nothing can 
harm the dead because they do not exist and existence is a necessary
condition of harm.
A ristotle's analogy w ith unperceived harm s does w eaken the 
sensation argum ent, but it does not touch the existence argument. 
Aristotle can point to cases where a person appears to be harmed even 
though he does not perceive the harm -  either at all or as such. This 
makes trouble for the argum ent which stresses that there is no evil 
without perception. But Lucretius does without this claim , and he can 
respond to A ristotle's exam ples thus: Suppose I grant that those 
inexperienced events are real harms. Surely you must grant that those 
people exist at the time of the harm. Therefore the analogy does not clash 
with my claim that harm requires an existent subject.6 Aristotle challenges 
the argum ent from sensation, but he gives us no reason to doubt the
argument from existence.
The second objection comes from Plutarch, who attacks the first two 
premises of the main argument, namely that a person is a soul and body 
compound and that at death the soul, and thus the person, are destroyed. 
His complaint is not that these premises are false, although he does believe
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5 Both N agel MoD 64 and Pitcher MoD 165 believe that this claim  underlies the 
belief that being dead is not harmful.
6 See Nussbaum , ToD 'M ortal Immortals' 205 ff., for a sim ilar criticism  of Nagel's 
version of this argument.
that they are false, but rather that if they are true, they actually reinforce the 
fear of being dead. He argues that people will take no comfort in the 
knowledge that death is the physical breakdown of the person and the end 
of thought and sensation. In fact, says Plutarch, this is exactly what people 
fear.7 Thus the Epicurean case, so far from being a relief from fear, actually 
amounts to a proof that the common anxiety is correct.8 When put this 
way, Plutarch's objection has a superficial appeal. If someone says, 'I am 
afraid that being dead is non-existence,' and I respond, 'D on't be afraid; 
death is non-existence,' then I have done nothing to treat this person's fear.
Nevertheless, Plutarch's argument is a gross and uncharitable 
confusion. Lucretius does not merely inform us that death is non­
existence; he also explains that non-existence is not the sort of thing that 
could be bad for us. Premise three, the existence requirement, claims that 
nothing can harm a person unless the person exists at the time of the 
harm. Thus, once a person is dead and does not exist, nothing can harm 
him -  least of all non-existence itself. To revert to the imagined dialogue 
from above, Lucretius does not merely parrot the original fear; instead he 
offers a reason to give up the fear. After the person states his fear of death, 
Lucretius replies, 'Existence is a precondition of harm. Therefore, if you 
believe that death is non-existence, you should not fear death since it 
cannot harm you.' P lutarch 's objection has no force since he has 
tendentiously underdescribed the Epicurean argument.
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7 Non posse 1104c.
8 Non posse 1105a 'to  yap "dvaioSirtelv to  5iaXu0ev ical jitiSev e ivai 7tpo<; ripaq to
dvaiaBtiToov" ouk avaipei to too 0avaTOt> 8 eo<; aXA.’ okntsp drcoSei^iv aoTou 7tpocm0r|cn.v.'
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A more interesting challenge is that of Harry Silverstein. In a 
com plex and wide-ranging paper,9 Silverstein attempts to defend the 
position that death has a negative value for us, even though he agrees that 
it does not actually cause us any harm (109-110). He believes that death can 
have negative value for us, even without being a cause of harm, because 
'A 's death can be the object of his grief' (110). In order to defend this claim, 
Silverstein recom mends a complex and controversial change in our 
attitudes to time and space.10 Ultimately, however, these metaphysical 
considerations are not crucial to his argument. At rock bottom, he argues 
that being dead is of negative value for us insofar as being dead is an object 
of negative feelings for us. In a nutshell, death is bad because we feel bad 
about it or have negative feelings about it.
Silverstein does not quite understand the Epicurean position. He 
appears to think that Epicurus denies that we could have negative feelings 
about death. But this is not what Epicurus or Lucretius argues; they know 
perfectly well that many people have negative feelings about death. This 
is, after all, the impetus for the Epicurean therapy. What the Epicureans 
argue is that these negative feelings are unreasonable because death does 
not cause us any harm, and it is unreasonable to fear or grieve over what 
does not cause one harm. Nevertheless, a consideration of Silverstein's 
case and the Epicurean response will reveal much about the connection 
between values and feelings.
9 'The Evil of Death', in MoD  95-116.
10 W e should, according to Silverstein, view temporally distant events just as we do 
spatially distant ones; i.e. we should believe that both exist. W e should not discriminate 
between events that exist now, i.e. present ones, and those that did or will exist, i.e. past or 
future ones respectively. This is a hard theory to wrap one's brain around, but Silverstein 
does a good job of laying it out as clearly as possible.
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It turns out that Epicurus had already anticipated and denied an 
argum ent very much like Silverstein 's. In the Letter to M enoeceus, 
Epicurus argues that death is not bad, and then he considers someone who 
responds as follows:
Aiycov SeSievai xov Qavaxov ox>x o n  A/uicfiaei Ttapcov, a  A. A,’ on  
A.o7tei |ieA.A,q)v
saying that he fears death not because it will pain him when 
it is present, but because it pains him in anticipation (125).
Like Silverstein, this objector claims that death is troubling because it
upsets him now rather than because it will harm him when he is dead.
Death is the object not the cause of his anxiety. Epicurus displays little
patience: he describes such a person as inxtaioq (stupid), and he defends his
original argument by pointing out that it is empty or idle (icevajq) to be
distressed now at what will not harm one when it occurs.
H owever hostile his response, Epicurus relies on a reasonable 
principle about fear. The principle is that if a person believes that some 
future event w on't harm him, then any fear he has is, to that extent, 
unreasonable. This seems quite intuitive. It appears hard to understand a 
person who says, 'I don't think x is bad; x terrifies me.' Such a statement 
begs for one of two responses. Either the person does (really) think that x is 
bad, and his denial is hypocritical or self-deceptive. Or, if the person really 
has no thought that x is bad, then the fear is not properly connected to his 
beliefs. We would likely call such a gap between belief and emotion 
'irrational'; Epicurus calls it 'empty'. This terminological point, however, 
should not mislead us. Epicurus simply makes the intuitive claim that a
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reasonable fear requires, at the very least, a belief that the object of the fear 
is bad.11
One feature of Epicurus's presentation is imprecise, and it might 
leave room for a serious confusion. Epicurus says, o yap  rcapov otnc 
evoxA.ei, rcpoaBoiaopevov Kevcdq tamei.12 The imprecision is his omission, in 
the first clause, of any mention of belief. What Epicurus appears to say is 
that is it idle to fear anything that is, in fact, not harmful; but this principle 
is too strong to be plausible. Without a reference to belief, the principle 
turns every case of error into a case of irrationality. But there are many 
cases in which a person appears to have a reasonable fear because of 
justifiable, but false, beliefs. Imagine that a person walking through an 
alley late at night is approached by a man with a gun. It turns out that the 
man is a plainclothes policeman. But in the circumstances, an initial fear -  
before the police officer identifies him self -  appears reasonable, even 
though the belief that the man was dangerous turns out to be false. Not 
every mistake is a case of irrationality.
The context of Epicurus's comment, however, makes it clear that he 
does not mean to lump all errors together with irrationality. The objector 
to whom Epicurus replies, says that death will not harm him when it 
occurs, but that he fears it anyhow. This is an avowal of belief, sincere or 
otherwise. Thus, the argument between Epicurus and this hypothetical 
objector revolves around what the objector believes, or at least what he 
claims to believe; belief is clearly at issue. In view of this it seems
11 Obviously it would be sheer bootstrapping to claim that x is bad because w e fear it 
and fear is bad. The badness needs to be prior to the fear.
12 'W hatever gives no disturbance when present, produces only em pty pain when  
an ticip ated .'
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reasonable to construe Epicurus's principle as a principle about belief and 
fear. Thus, I have taken it to mean 'it is irrational to fear what you believe 
w on't harm you' rather than 'it is irrational to fear what won't harm you.'
The principle points towards a weakness in Silverstein's argument. 
Silverstein claims, reasonably enough, that 'values connect with feelings', 
but he confuses the direction of the connection. He goes on the 
assum ption that, at least sometimes, feelings should lead and values 
should follow. If we have negative feelings about something, then this 
shows that the thing in question is bad for us — that it has negative value 
for us. But this gets matters back to front since the negative feeling is only 
reasonable if we already have a justifiable belief that the thing is bad.
Our evaluations should precede our feelings and not the other way 
about. It is no good to say, 'It's bad because I fear it.' This sort of statement 
is unhelpful for one of two reasons. On the one hand, if the fear is 
reasonable, then the belief that the thing is bad is already in place. In that 
case we should explain the fear by the belief not the other way around. On 
the other hand, a fear w ithout such a prior evaluative b elief is 
unreasonable, and thus it gives no good reason to form an evaluative 
belief. I may be afraid for bad reasons, or I may just be afraid for no reason. 
But why should I base other judgm ents on a fear that I adm it is 
unreasonable? Insofar as the fear is reasonable, it relies on a prior 
evaluative belief. Without such a prior belief, the fear is not something 
that we should base other beliefs on since it is irrational. Evaluative beliefs 
precede reasonable fears.
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Silverstein may be relying on a commonsense view of emotions or 
fee lin g s.13 One aspect of common opinion about emotions appears to 
imply that emotions are sub-rational feelings or affects. So, for example, a 
person in the midst of an argument about his feelings of love might say, 
'It's not about what I think; I just feel this w ay/ The implication appears to 
be that one simply has the feeling or not; there is no sense in trying to 
rationalize or argue over one's emotional state. One does not initially 
have these feelings for reasons, and reasons cannot, once one has the 
feelings, alter one's emotional state. This is the sense in which an emotion 
would be 'sub-rational', and such thoughts have suggested to some that the 
emotions are sub-rational in this manner.
If Silverstein does hold such a theory, he could cut off my previous 
criticism. He could argue that feelings, such as fear, are not amenable to 
analysis as 'reasonable' or otherwise. And he could argue that beliefs are 
not prior to feelings in the way that I sketched out above. Since one simply 
has feelings or not, values could follow feelings. This feelings theory of 
emotion suggests that I am wrong to think that feelings should follow 
evaluations, and it also suggests that we should not describe emotions as 
'rational' or 'irrational'.
But this response won't do. Even if the feelings theory of emotions 
were a good theory,14 it would not give Silverstein the kind of support that 
he needs. Suppose that feelings were simply brute, sub-rational affects -
13 In the literature, this theory is often called the 'feelings theory' of emotion. Thus, 
Silverstein's use of the w ord 'feeling' m ay be revealing. In and of itself, how ever, 
terminology is not enough to show that he adopts the theory that I outline here.
14 In fact, I think that it is a hopelessly inadequate theory, but I waive this objection 
in order to give Silverstein the strongest possible case. For criticism of the feelings theory, 
see William Lyons Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2-16.
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neither rational nor otherwise. If this were so, it would be entirely unclear 
why we should let such feelings determine our evaluations. Surely we 
want to hold values that are reasonable, i.e. based on reasons and alterable 
on the basis of reasons. Our values, one would think, ought to be 
rationally connected to our beliefs and life plan. If this is correct, and it 
seems to be a pretty minimal assumption, then we should bar feelings, 
understood as sub-rational affects, from the council cham ber of value. 
Thus, even if Silverstein does hold a feeling theory of emotions and such a 
theory is correct, we still should not guide values by feelings since we want 
to keep our values reasonable. The feelings theory, if true, actually severs 
the connection between value and feeling that Silverstein posits.
The final objection to Lucretius's argum ent about non-existence also 
attacks the third premise, and it is a greater threat than the three previous 
arguments since it properly understands the challenge that premise three 
poses. George Pitcher, in 'The Misfortunes of the D ead', attempts to 
'defend the thesis that the dead can be harmed' and 'to explain how this 
can be, and is, so' (159). Pitcher realizes that in order to make his case, he 
needs to show how something that happens after a person ceases to exist 
can nevertheless harm that person. Although I ultimately find his case 
uncompelling, he does at least face the problem squarely.
Pitcher opens his argument with a distinction (161). He separates 
two ways in which one could discuss a person after that person's death. In 
the first case, one could talk about the dead person as he was at some time 
during his life, i.e. as a living person. In the second case, one could discuss 
the dead person as he is now, i.e. as a dead person; one might, for example,
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say where the corpse is buried. Pitcher calls the first case a description of an 
'ante-m ortem  person after his death' and the second a description of a 
'post-m ortem  person after his death'. So far, this distinction is intuitive 
and non-controversial, but Pitcher goes on to make surprising use of it.
He argues that the ante-mortem person can be harmed after his 
death, although the post-mortem person cannot. As Pitcher says, the post­
mortem person is 'so much dust' (161), and he finds it absurd to claim that 
'so much dust' could be harmed. Nevertheless, he does not find it absurd 
to argue that an ante-mortem person can be harmed after his death. This 
is, in fact, exactly what he sets out to demonstrate and explain. It is crucial 
to make clear what this claim involves: it requires that something which 
happens after  a person dies can harm that person before he dies.
The obvious difficulty is that this appears to violate the order of 
cause and effect: causes precede their effects. Some philosophers have 
doubted that this order is always or necessarily so; they have argued for 
what is know n as 'backward causation'.15 Pitcher, however, explicitly 
denies that his thesis requires backward causation (164-165). He is agnostic 
on the larger issue of whether backward causes are possible, and he claims 
that this problem is irrelevant to his case.
But this puts Pitcher in a tight fix. If he does not wish to invoke 
backward causation, then he needs some other way of explaining what he 
means by 'an ante-mortem person can be harmed after his death' (162, his 
emphasis). The obvious interpretation of this sort of claim runs through 
backward causation, and Pitcher him self acknowledges that this is the
15 See the debate between Michael Dummett and Anthony Flew 'Can an Effect Precede 
its C ause?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XXVIII (1954), 27-62.
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natural reading of the words (168). But Pitcher has another way of taking 
these words and explaining his thesis. It is less obvious, and rather subtle. 
In order to unpack it, I need to introduce one of his examples and give a
second distinction that he makes.
Bishop Berkeley and the death of his son William provide Pitcher 
w ith an example to discuss (165 ff.). As Pitcher puts it, W illiam was 
Berkeley's 'treasure' (165), and Berkeley took it hard when William died at 
the young age of fourteen. In the actual case, Berkeley was still alive when 
W illiam died, and Pitcher pretty much takes it for granted that the loss of 
his son harmed Berkeley. But Pitcher also wants to claim that this 
intuition would (correctly) carry over into a slightly altered version of the 
case. He claims that Berkeley would be harmed even if William died after 
Berkeley himself did. This is obviously a specific case of the general claim
that Pitcher advances.
Pitcher also distinguishes between 'William's dying young' and 'that 
William is going to die young' (167). Pitcher does not use this terminology, 
but it will clarify matters to call 'W illiam 's dying', as well as other items 
like it, 'states of affairs' and to call 'that William is going to die', and similar 
items, 'facts' or 'truths'. Obviously these two types of items are related: facts 
describe states of affairs; they are representations, descriptions, or, more 
generally, the linguistic counterparts to states of affairs.
Although Pitcher does not give much explicit discussion of these 
two items, it is clear that he makes a few basic assumptions about them. 
First, he makes the assumption, sensibly, that states of affairs occur at some 
time. That is, William's dying young happens or occurs at some specific, 
particular time. He also assumes that facts are the case, or are true, always,
even before the events they describe occur. Thus, even before he dies 
young, it is the case that W illiam  is going to die young. This latter 
assumption will turn out to be more controversial.
The temporal difference between states of affairs and facts gives 
Pitcher the leverage he needs. He wants to claim that W illiam 's death 
harms Berkeley, even if Berkeley dies first, and he does not want to invoke 
backward causation. Since the state of affairs, William s dying young, 
occurs after the putative harm, it cannot cause the harm without backward 
causation. But the fact, that William is going to die young, obtains, or is 
the case, or is true,16 before Berkeley dies. Thus, it can  cause the harm 
w ithout running up against backward causation. Pitcher takes this 
position. As he puts it, 'the misfortune was that William was going to die 
young, not that William died young' (166). This is a subtle and interesting 
claim, but nevertheless I don't think that it can carry Pitcher's case.
The first problem is that this solution appears to rely on a form of 
logical determinism. As Pitcher says repeatedly, it was a fact that William 
was going to die young even before he did so. Actually Pitcher implies that 
this fact was the case when Berkeley himself was a child, long, long before 
W illiam died -  or even was bom , for that matter. Such a claim, however, 
is highly controversial; it invokes what is commonly know n as the 
problem of future contingents. Future contingents are indicative, future 
tensed statements like, say, that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow. The 
problem is that it is unclear whether these statements can be true or false. 
And if they can be assessed for truth value, it is unclear what this means
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16 Nothing hangs on what form of words we choose here.
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about pre-determination and the future.17 To many it has appeared to 
im ply that the future is already determined in advance. P itcher 
unfortunately never acknowledges this problem, and thus he does not 
explain nor defend his position.
To make matters worse, Epicurus did explicitly discuss and deny the 
claim  that future contingents are eternally fixed as true or false. In a 
nutshell, he argues (1) that if future contingents are already true or false, 
then determinism  holds and there is no free will, (2) but we know, 
incorrigibly, that there is free will due to our prolepsis of responsibility, (3) 
therefore, future contingents are neither true nor false.18 Now there are 
m any problem s and d ifficu lties surrounding this argum ent, but 
nevertheless it is an argument -  and a pretty forceful one at that. If Pitcher 
means to reject such a position about future contingents, then he owes 
Epicurus, and the rest of us, an argument.
Secondly, even if we waive the problem of future contingents, 
Pitcher's thesis produces odd, and intolerable, consequences for cause and 
effect. To show that this is so, I need to introduce another example. 
Imagine a tremendous rainstorm. If we apply the state of affairs and fact 
analysis, we get, say, 'abundant raining' and 'that it rains abundantly'. If we 
accept Pitcher's point about future contingents, we also get a fact, before it 
actually rains, 'that it will rain abundantly'. Now say that this garden 
floods and is destroyed as a result of this storm. That is, more precisely, the
17 For a start cf. Aristotle's De Interpretatione 9 with John Ackrill's com m entary and  
D oroth ea F red e 's  'The Sea-B attle R econsidered: A D efence of the T rad ition al 
Interpretation' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985), 31-87.
18 Cf. Cicero De Fato 21-25, EpM  133-134, VS 40, DRN  II 251-293 and the sym pathetic 
com m ents of R. T. Long Free Choice and Indeterminism in Aristotle and Later Antiquity 
(Dissertation: Cornell University, 1992), 417-427.
flooding and destruction of the garden is an effect, but an effect of what? 
This is the question that Pitcher's analysis cannot make sense of.
It seems clear that the flooding is caused by the state of affairs not the 
fact, and certainly not the future contingent fact. We can see this if we 
consider the temporal relations. It is a fact, on Pitcher's theory, that long, 
long before it rains, it is going to rain abundantly. But surely the garden is 
not flooded and destroyed all this time? On Pitcher's analysis it was 
probably a fact that it is going to rain even before there was a garden. If this 
is correct, it seems absurd to say that the flooding is an effect of the fact or 
that the fact causes the flooding and destruction. The flooding and 
destruction follow after the state of affairs, and only  after the state of affairs 
occurs.
Even if we agree with Pitcher's controversial claim that future 
tensed facts have truth values, this second result of his analysis seems hard 
to swallow. If the rain comes on March 23, we may agree that, already on 
M arch 14, it is a fact that it will rain and destroy the garden on the 23rd. 
But obviously, we can still go to the garden on the 14th: its destruction does 
not occur until it actually rains. W hatever we may say about future 
contingents, they cannot produce effects before the state of affairs comes to 
pass.
We can now return to the harm of death and the Berkeley example. 
Pitcher argues that what causes the harm is the fact, that William is going 
to die young, and since this fact obtains before Berkeley dies, the order of 
cause and effect is preserved. But as the garden example indicates, this 
analysis must be wrong. Until William actually dies, whenever that is, his 
death cannot cause anything. Since he does not die until after Berkeley
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does, his death cannot harm Berkeley without violating the (assumed) 
order of cause and effect. Pitcher's case has not escaped the puzzle of 
backward causation after all. And since he himself does not wish to 
maintain the possibility of backward causation, his argument collapses.
Even though it fails, Pitcher's case is very revealing. It demonstrates 
just how far one must go in order to assert that the non-existent dead can 
be harmed. The route runs afoul of the Scylla and Charybdis of backward 
causation and determinism. Even if one accepts determinism, one must 
still argue in a way that leads to backward causation. Thus Pitcher's case 
can only advance by proving both the controversial thesis about future 
contingents and the controversial thesis about the order of cause and effect. 
It seems reasonable to wonder whether the intuition that death harms us 
is really so strong. If the intuition requires this defense, then perhaps we 
are better off without it.
m
The next objection that I consider comes from a different angle. All the 
previous criticism s attem pted to show that the central argum ent was 
flawed, or in Plutarch's case, pointless. But this objection does not quarrel 
with Lucretius's argum ent as such. Instead, it claims that the entire 
Epicurean position is self-defeating. Even if the Epicureans can prove that 
some form of life is not harmed by death, it is not a life that anyone would 
want. The only life that could be invulnerable to death is a life so 
impoverished that it is preferable to give up such grand ambitions and just 
admit that death may harm us. At best, we may hope that it does not do so.
154
M ore specifically, the objection is that the Epicurean good life is 
barren and intolerant of very basic human activities. On this view, the 
only desires and projects that an Epicurean can have are ones that an 
unexpected death cannot frustrate. But since we can die at anytime -  as 
Epicurus puts it, 'In  the case of death all men inhabit a city without walls' 
(U 339) -  we cannot engage in any long term projects or activities. If we do, 
we open ourselves up to their frustration by a too early death. But much of 
what seems valuable about life resides in such long-term projects and 
activities. If the Epicureans tell us that we can be secure, but only by cutting 
out such interests, they they may have left us with barely a life at all. 
Hence, the objection concludes, we should reject the Epicurean therapy 
because it can only secure happiness by destroying it.19
I take this argument to be about time, especially the future. The 
Epicureans can guarantee us some form of happiness, but it is merely a 
happiness of the present moment. A life that is entirely secure from death 
cannot tolerate the kinds of investment in the future that we normally 
take a happy life to require. The Epicureans, it is said, have a blinkered 
attitude towards time, and they only concern themselves with the present 
since only the present is safe and secure. After all, it is, in a certain sense, 
im possible to lose the present. This is a surprising attack on the 
Epicureans, however, since they themselves criticized others for having 
such an attitude. But perhaps the Epicureans are unknowingly committed 
to the very view which they rebuked others for; if this is so, then their 
overall position is incoherent. As a way into the problem, therefore, I will
19 This criticism  comes in a number of versions, each of which is slightly different in 
focus. Two of the m ore powerful are Martha Nussbaum, ToD 212-238 and Steven Luper Foy, 
'Annihilation' MoD 269-290.
first consider the explicit versions of this attitude towards time and the 
Epicurean critique of it. After this, we can see whether their position is 
coherent.
The advice to look to the present and to be unconcerned for the 
future is prominent in the Cyrenaic philosophy associated with Aristippus, 
and it also appears in sympotic literature. Aristippus, the father of the 
Cyrenaic sect, was perfectly clear in his advice: our goal is pleasure, and 
specifically the pleasure of the moment; we should concern ourselves only 
with the present and not give effort or thought to the past, which is gone 
forever, or to the future, which is uncertain.20 Athenaeus, who provides 
one of the main doxographical reports for this aspect of Aristippus's 
thought, explicitly connects the doctrine to licentious people (rcapaTtA/ncncoq 
xoiq aacbtoiq G 174.5-6) and luxuriants (orcoiov Kai oi xp-utpcovTec; jtaaxo-uai to 
icapov eu tcoieiv a^iouvxec; G 174.9-10). So it is no surprise that we find the 
same sentim ent in sym potic verse, most fam ously in a num ber of 
Horatian odes. Best known is probably the closing injunction of Odes 1 11, 
'carpe diem quam minimum credula postero,' but the idea is common 
elsewhere in Horace and in other poets.21
Straightaw ay, we have two reasons to think that this w as  an 
Epicurean attitude. First, there are doxographical reports that connect 
Epicurus to Aristippus. In particular, Aristocles says that Epicurus took the
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20 Cf. G 174. Their position is very hard to reconstruct, but for a brilliant piece of 
intellectual detective work, see T.H. Irwin 'Aristippus against Happiness' Monist 74 (1991), 
55-82.
21 Cf. Odes I 9.13, 'quid sit futurum eras, fuge quaerere,' II 16.25-26, 'laetus in praesens 
animus quod ultra est/od erit curare,' and EH 29.41-43, 'ille potens sui/laetusque deget, cui 
licet diem dixisse 'vixi" And also see Nisbet and Hubbard on 1 11 and I I 16 for further Greek 
and Roman parallels.
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starting points o f his ethics from the Cyrenaic sect.22 Second, the 
exhortation to eat, drink, and be merry, has always reminded both lay- 
people and scholars alike of Epicurean ethics. Commentators both of 
sympotic poetry and of Epicurus testify to the common connection: Nisbet 
and Hubbard quote Epicurus on Odes 1 11, and Usener quotes a number of 
Horatian passages on Epicurea  491. This suggests the following picture. 
Epicurus, like h is ethical forerunner Aristippus and also like less 
theoretical poets and prodigals, believed that we should only care for the 
present moment because the future was insecure.
This entire picture, however, is a house of cards. In the first place, 
the doxographical record shows that the Epicureans and Cyrenaics were 
actually in bitter disagreement. Although both groups thought that the 
goal of life was pleasure, their accounts of pleasure were entirely distinct 
and utterly opposed. M ost relevant to our inquiry, they fought over 
pleasure and time. The Epicureans felt that pleasures of the past and of the 
future made a great contribution to happiness, but the Cyrenaics denied 
that anything but present pleasures mattered (U 452-453, De Fin I 55). As 
for the second connection, we have abundant and clear evidence that the 
Epicureans rejected the prodigal lifestyle. As Epicurus says,
When we say that pleasure is the goal, we do not mean 
those pleasures of prodigals nor the pleasures of 
enjoym ent, as some think who do not understand and 
who disagree or interpret uncharitably, but to lack pain 
in body and not to be disturbed in soul (EpM  131).23
2 2  ZcoKpdtouq 5 ’ exaipoq o ’ApiaTinnoq f)v, o ttiv tcaA.oupevTiv Kuprivaucnv auaxTiadpevoq 
aipeaiv, dtp’ n q  ta<; dcpopiiaq 'EjuKoupoq repo*; rqv t o u  te X o x x ; e k G e ctiv  eiX.T|<p£v (U  449 = G  1 7 3 ) .
23 This text can help clear up the previous problem as well. The doxographical reports 
that link Aristippus and Epicurus seem to me to have no historical merit. W e already have 
a philosophical lineage for Epicurus, and it runs from Democritus through N ausiphanes
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The Epicureans frequently criticize the intemperate lifestyle, and they are at 
pains to distinguish themselves from it, unfortunately to little avail.24
It is, in fact, undeniable that Epicurus and his disciples advocate a 
much more inclusive attitude towards time than the Cyrenaics or 
prodigals. They believed that the past and the future made a great 
difference in our lives. But since the current question is death, which is for 
all of us in the future, I will set aside their ideas about the past. The most 
important text on the future, comes from Epicurus's Letter to M enoeceus:
Mvruiovemeov 8 e  one, to piAAov (ovxe redvtcoq -niietepov) ctu x e  
rcdvxcix; ox>% RiiExepov, iva |iT|X£ rcdvxtoq Jtpoap.evco(iev wq 
eaopevov |if|X£ d7teA.7u^ cofi£V <b<; jiavxax; ouk eao(i£vov (127).
It m ust be rem em bered that the future is neither 
unconditionally ours nor unconditionally not ours, so that 
we neither expect unconditionally that it will come to be 
nor mistrust that it unconditionally won't come to be.
I will unpack this in a moment, but two quick points. First this is clearly
aimed directly at the position of the Cyrenaics and their ilk. Aristippus
'said that only the present was ours (tipixEpov),'25 and Epicurus replies that
the future may not be unconditionally ours (f||i£xepov) but neither is it
unconditionally not ours (7tdvxox; ox>x Tipixepov). Second, if the objection I
(with a smidge of Pyrrho). This lineage makes it reasonable that Epicurean pleasure is 
essentially negative, since this was the character of Democritean euGupia (DL IX 45). If 
Epicurus had started from Aristippean pleasure, it becomes entirely unclear how he ever 
ended up where he did. The reason that some doxographers connect Epicurus with  
Aristippus is sim ply that they are both, nominally, hedonists, and hostile interpreters 
thought that all hedonism  m ust be like that of Aristippus. The essentially tendentious 
nature of such reports emerges when we look at the context of one such com m ent in Diogenes 
Laertius (X 4). He reports that some say that Epicurus plagiarized from Democritus and 
Aristippus, and this gem  of information comes in between a comment that Epicurus's brother 
was a pimp and that Epicurus was not a real Athenian citizen.
24 cf. EpM  132, KD  10, EF XVII-XX, DRN U 1-61, HI 912-951, 1003-1010, VI 1-41, D e 
Fin I 37-39.
25 (iovov yap ecpaaxev f|p.erepov eivai to  rcapov, ixhte 8e to cpGavov pf|TE to  npoaSoKcopevov 
(G 174).
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am considering were correct, then Epicurus should never have said this. 
He should have thought, like Aristippus, that the future did not matter at 
all to us. So even after we review Epicurus's avowed position, we will 
need to test its coherence with his views about death.
Epicurus and Aristippus disagree over whether the future is ours, 
but what does it mean to say that a period of time is 'ours'? The leading 
idea in the adjective Tuiexepov is obviously possession, but this does not 
help since it is unclear how to apply the idea of ownership to a period of 
time. If we look at the debate, however, three ideas seem to be uppermost. 
First, to describe the future as 'ours' indicates that our current actions have 
some effect on the future; what we do now plays a role in what will be. 
Second, the description suggests that the future matters to us, more 
specifically that the future is relevant to our well-being; what will be makes 
a difference to our happiness. Third, the description encourages us to 
invest present efforts and resources in the future; we should work towards 
what lies ahead.
Although these three points are distinct, they nevertheless display 
some unity. In particular, the strength of belief in these three claims will 
probably vary together. So, for example, the greater the effect a person 
thinks that she can have on the future, the more likely she is to care about 
it and to devote effort to it. On the other hand, if a person is already 
inclined -  for whatever reason -  to take few pains over the future, then he 
may support this inclination by denying that we can affect the future or 
that it will matter to us anyhow. Such co-variations can be more or less 
rational. Most people would probably take my second example to be a clear 
case of self-deception or bad faith. In general, it seems that the first two
beliefs should lead and the third should follow. This probably has 
something to do with the character of the third thought. The first two 
points are descriptive, but the third is a form of practical injunction, or, at 
least, a strong normative belief.
Aristippus recommends that we be unconcerned with the future 
because 'it is unclear whether it will come to be' (G 174). Insofar as this is a 
justification at all, it seems to run the wrong way. If a person cannot be 
sure that what he works toward will succeed, that seems clearly insufficient 
to show that he has no idea whether it will succeed. Our knowledge of the 
future is never absolute, but we can have some idea of what w ill happen, 
and our ideas can be more or less reasonable. Moreover, no matter how 
global our ignorance of the future is, it still needs to be shown that the 
future does not contribute to a person's happiness. Even if I do not know, 
at a given time, what will happen in the future, it still seems quite likely 
that what will happen can affect my well-being one way or the other. If the 
first point is correct, then it can be more or less reasonable to invest in the 
future. If the second point is correct, it may be smarter to invest, at least 
somewhat, rather than to risk utter disaster. In either case, Aristippus is 
overhasty if he infers that we should ignore the future altogether just
because it is uncertain.
Epicurus's position is much more reasonable. He urges us to avoid 
A ristippus's m istake. We should not assume that the future is 
unconditionally not ours. Nor should we make the contrary mistake and 
assume that the future unconditionally is ours. I take this to recommend a 
healthy mean. First, our current actions can have some affect on future 
events, even if we cannot entirely determine their outcome. Second, our
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happiness does not entirely depend on the future, but the future does 
matter to our well-being. And so, third, we should devote some effort to 
future projects and concerns, even if we should not do so to the exclusion 
of the present -  or the past, for that matter. This seems perfectly sane and 
healthy. All of our planning takes place under at least partial ignorance. 
We can never be entirely certain of the outcome of our actions and plans. 
But it would be bizarre if we let this universal uncertainty force us to 
abandon all hope or interest in the future.26
A lthough this shows that the Epicureans did not advocate a 
truncated life of the moment, perhaps they are not entitled to the richer 
view, no matter what they say. In a way we are back where we started. The 
original criticism was that Epicurus could only offer us a life that no sane 
person would accept. I showed that he did not offer this paltry life but a 
much richer one. Not only did he recommend the proper sort of life, he 
criticized those who did not. But perhaps this just shows that his doctrines 
are incoherent: he says we should care about the future, but if he does so, 
then he overturns his own claim  that death is nothing to us. There is 
precedence for such an argument. Lactantius says that Epicurus urged the 
life of the moment, the life that I have shown that he actually rejected. At 
the end, Lactantius says, 'Although he doesn't say this in so many words, 
he teaches it nevertheless in actual fact.'27 If this is right, then Epicurus's 
position is verbally appealing, but substantially unsound.
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26 In these sections, I have barely scratched the surface of this question. The Epicurean  
attitude tow ards time is a large subject, and it would repay extensive study. For other 
relevant texts, see U  204, 490, 491, KD  19, 20, De Fin 1 19, E F  XVII-XX, and D RN  HI 912-977, 
1003-1010, 1080-1094.
27 divin instit m  17.38 (U 491), 'hoc ille etiamsi non dicit verbo, re tamen ipsa docet.'
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This criticism, however, seems to me to miss its mark entirely. The 
whole objection relies on the claim that if we invest in the future and then 
our investments are frustrated by our death (i.e. we don't get to reap what 
we have sown), then death harms us. Hence, Epicurus must, on pain of 
inconsistency, not invest in the future if he wishes to be invulnerable to 
death. But the argument is a blatant petitio principii. It assumes that we 
are harmed if we die and don't reap what we have sown. But the whole 
point of Lucretius's main argument was to show that no such harm was 
possible. Although in the normal case, if we invest in the future and 
things don't work out, we think that we are worse off, death is not a 
normal case. Normally, the person is harmed because he has expended 
effort, but he gets no payoff: he lacks what he spent effort to get. But in the 
case of death, the person is no longer on the scene, so to speak, and so there 
is no way to speak of a lack at all. This puts us right back into the main 
argum ent.28 Unless we have an antecedent demonstration that we can be 
harmed when we are dead, then this criticism of the Epicurean position 
makes no headway at all.
IV
There is a final objection which is the most primitive of all. The first four 
objections straightforwardly attack the main argument. The immediately 
preceding objection is more roundabout; it grants that the Epicurean 
argument is fine, as far as it goes, but it claimed that we want more out of
28 We could put this point another way: since it is only death that makes certain that 
the effort does not pay off, when the person is alive w e cannot say that the effort has not 
paid off (because the future is still open); but once the effort has not paid off, there is no 
person (and so there is no harm).
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life than the Epicureans can offer. But there is a much more direct way to 
deny the existence argument. A person could simply dig in her heels and 
refuse the conclusion that non-existence is not a harm. She might say that 
the existence argument cannot make us give up the fear of death because 
we just know that non-existence harms us, and that is that.
This criticism  is more complex and substantial than it appears. 
What we get here does not seem like argument but rather the end of 
argument. There are no reasons on offer; there are only convictions. But 
this is not quite right. There is a principled way to justify such an 
objection. W hat is less sure cannot refute w hat is more sure; the 
conclusion of such an argument amounts to a reductio  of its premises. 
This is a semi-formal complaint against the existence argument; it is no 
good to argue against what is overwhelmingly obvious with what is only 
dubiously true. The Epicureans cannot simply ignore this consideration, 
since they make similar noises when it suits their purposes. So however 
rude and unpolished the objection may seem, it merits some response.
The semi-formal complaint relies on a reasonable rule of thumb. In 
general, what is more sure should trump what is less sure. In this case, 
apparently, what is abundantly certain is that death does harm us. There 
are few things that will appear so sure, and, more importantly, at least 
some of the premises of the existence argument may be far less certain. In 
particular, the third premise, that harm requires an existent subject, may 
seem less secure than that death harms us. Hence, we should abandon this 
premise rather than the more secure conviction that death does harm us. 
If this is right, then the red u ctio  shows that we need to rethink the 
plausibility of the principle about harm and existence.
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Some philosophers, and some laypeople, might reject this objection 
out of hand,29 but the Epicureans cannot do so. The Epicureans 
themselves made conspicuous use of very similar reasoning. They argued 
against scepticism and determinism by claiming that these two doctrines 
undid beliefs w hich w ere absolutely basic and certain . W ithout 
considering the details, we can discern a structure parallel to the present 
objection. There are som e things that we ju st know , that are 
overwhelmingly certain and secure, things perhaps w hich we cannot 
rationally doubt. One such fact is that we are responsible for our actions.30 
Determinism denies this,31 and so determinism must be false. We can 
know this, in a sense, even w ithout considering the argum ent for 
determ inism . W hatever the argum ent, it leads to an im possible 
conclusion, and so we have reason to deny it.
More famously, the Epicureans founded their ethics on a simple 
and, in their eyes, undeniable truth, and they said that this truth did not 
require, or even admit, argument. As Torquatus, C icero 's Epicurean 
spokesman, puts it,
itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob 
rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentire haec 
putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam , dulce mel. 
quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirm are, 
tantum satis esse admonere
Thus, he denies that there is a need for reason and 
argument as to why pleasure should be pursued, pain
29 Perhaps because they have little faith in the notion that ideas can be m ore or less 
sure or that ideas wear their relative certainty on their faces. As we will see below, there 
may be good reason for worries about these claims, especially the latter one.
30 Cf. L & S 20, especially 20c4, 8.
31 There m ay be forms of determinism that don't deny our responsiblity, in which case 
this argument leaves them untouched.
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should be avoided. He thinks that these things are 
perceived, as that fire is hot, that snow is white, honey 
sweet; and that it is not appropriate to prove any of these 
things by subtle reasons: it is enough merely to suggest them 
(De Fin 1 30).
It is so obvious that pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided that it 
requires no argument to prove the point; all that is necessary is to point 
people to the truth. Even more strongly, argument would be out of place, 
or, as Torquatus says, it would actually be innapropriate.32 I take this to 
mean that argument would be pointless since any premise that one could 
use would be less sure than the conclusion, and one cannot prove what is 
more sure by what is less sure.
We need to consider what we are being told here.33 There are more 
and less certain ideas, and the surer ideas are, in some sense, superior and 
prior to the less sure ones. Moreover at least some ideas are so basic that 
they can neither be proven nor refuted by argument; these fundamental 
ideas form a small, but very privileged class. It also seems that one merely 
has to have such an idea to know it; the idea is, as some would say, self- 
revealing. Torquatus's use of 'sentire' (to feel, to experience) suggests this. 
He echoes one thing that people sometimes say about an utterly sure 
conviction: they say that they can feel it in their bones. Since the 
Epicureans have a faith in such basic ideas, they cannot ignore the 
objection that we just know that death harms us.
Nevertheless, the Epicureans are not entirely defenseless against this 
form of objection. They can deny that a given claim actually belongs to the
32 quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare.
33 For useful discussion, see Elizabeth Asm is Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 35-39, 220-224.
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privileged set of certain, unarguable convictions. What this would require 
is a wrinkle in the previous description of the special set of basic ideas. We 
need to distinguish the subjective sense of certainty about an idea from the 
fact of the idea's being certain. These can come apart in an crucial way. A 
person may feel just as certain of an idea that does not belong to the 
privileged set as she is certain of those that do belong to the set. A  person 
will not fail to have the subjective feeling of an idea that is basic,34 but it is 
possible to have the same sense of certainty in a case where such a feeling 
is not appropriate.35
A good example here is Epicurean theology. The Epicureans 
believed that certain beliefs about the gods were absolutely secure, but 
other beliefs, even if they felt equally sure, were false. There is no doubt 
that the gods exist and that they are entirely blessed, but they are not 
concerned with humans and they did not create the universe and all its 
inhabitants. Although many people are equally sure of both sets of theses, 
the Epicureans attempted to take them apart. The first set is entirely 
secure, but the second set is the result of persistent and hard to see errors -  
errors about the nature of well-being and the universe.36 Psychological 
certainty, whether of one person or of many people, does not guarantee 
real or objective certainty.
34 But is even this correct? One thing is that a person may not have the right feeling 
because she has neven noticed the point, e.g. she is not sure that she has responsibility  
because she never thinks about it. But isn't it also possible to become so confused that you  
don't have the right reaction even when you do think of the idea?
35 Or perhaps we could say that the innapropriate feeling of certainty is not identical 
to the correct feeling but only so close that people often become confused. It is hard to know  
w hat to say here.
36 See EpM  123-124, KD 1.
This helps to reveal another important point about the basic ideas. 
Even if we have a basic idea, and it is properly self-intimating, it does not 
seem to reveal its entire importance all by itself. That is, a person may 
have one correct idea about the gods, but still be very confused about how 
this one idea fits in with the rest of her beliefs and convictions. In a way, it 
seems that even the most basic ideas need to be clarified, not in terms of 
their specific content, which is already clear, but in terms of their overall 
significance, which requires a larger and more general understanding of 
one's beliefs as a whole. Clearly, the initial, very robust claim that some 
ideas could beat all challengers is taking on so many qualifications that it 
may become useless. I will take this up after dealing with the initial 
objection.
It should be easy to predict by now how the Epicureans will respond 
to this objection. Most people start with the absolute conviction that non­
existence does harm us, but that is because most people are massively 
confused. The feeling of certainty is misleading, in this case, since it stems 
from misunderstanding and error. We think of non-existence as a terrible 
harm because we are in the grip of widespread illusions. First, we often 
unconsciously conceive of non-existence as if it were a state that we 
experience or undergo — some kind of endless darkness that we are 
doomed to inhabit forever. Second, we misunderstand statements like, 
'The dead lack everything.' We take such statements to signify, as they 
ordinarily do, an occurent (and harmful) lack that a person undergoes. But 
in the case of death, there is no person who lacks; the person has nothing 
because there is no such person anymore. These Epicurean arguments put 
a serious dent in the sense of utter certainty that death is a harm.
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Because of such arguments, it is far from clear that the harm  of 
death is more secure than the premise about harm and existence. W e 
rarely have reason to reflect on the metaphysics of existence and action, 
and so the principle may not have an immediate psychological pull. On 
the other side, cultural forces constantly reinforce the notion that non­
existence is the worst harm we face, and so this claim is extrem ely 
compelling. Nevertheless, the Epicureans can explain why the intuitive 
appeal is false, and these arguments should give us pause. In addition, 
once we reflect on the principle that only what exists does or suffers 
anything, it is likely to appear undeniable although we may never have 
thought of it earlier. All of this suggests a dialectical draw rather than a 
clear victory for either side. If this is so, then no initial conviction can 
settle matters.
This analysis shows how dangerous it can be to claim certainty for 
any conviction. What feels absolutely secure may turn out to be wrong. 
The psychological feeling of absolute conviction can be a m isleading 
accident, and it is a slippery business to disentangle the more from the less 
sure. This suggests that the rule of thumb, that the more sure should 
trump the less sure, is subject to quite a bit of qualification. We should 
reflect very carefully before claiming such certainty. And even where we 
find it, perhaps it should not be the last word no matter what. Even if we 
are already sure that something is the case, we should still be willing to 
argue for the point -  and at least to consider argument against it. Any 
reasonable humility shows that we have been wrong in the past, even 
where we were absolutely sure, and so although it may be reasonable to
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consider some ideas more secure than others, we should always be willing 
to consider matters further.
Apparently, the Epicureans came to the same conclusion. After 
Torquatus makes his case that our convictions about pleasure and pain are 
certain, he adds that different groups of Epicureans m ade room  for 
additional considerations. First, even if we have a feeling of certainty 
about a matter, it remains possible to clarify the same point by reason and 
argument. The additional support helps us to have a more global sense of 
the initial idea, and we come to understand it better. Second, as some 
Epicureans pointed out, it is often useful and practical to muster argument 
in defense of one's convictions. In the face of opposed argum ents, it is 
useful to be able to defend one's views by force of reason. Such reasoned 
defense will reinforce and justify our initial convictions. In both ways, we 
can avoid errors and confusions. So although they remained certain that 
there were some things which we just knew, the Epicureans did not rely 
unconditionally on these brute convictions.
V
There is something deeply confusing about the Epicureans. They often 
give off the appearance of being plain-speaking, straight-shooting  
defenders of what we all believe, but the appearance is at best only half of 
the picture. Yes, pleasure is the good, but it is a pleasure unlike any we 
would have expected. Yes, scepticism is blatantly false, but the truth of our 
senses is guaranteed by a theory of perception that was freakish even by the
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standards of antiquity — and that is saying something. Their harmony with 
common notions should not blind us to their underlying complexities.-*7
Lucretius's main argument against the fear of non-existence is of a 
piece with this characteristic of Epicureanism. On the one side, he suggests 
that only what exists can be harmed and that it is unreasonable to fear what 
does not harm us, and this seems surely right. On the other side, he 
suggests that he can use these obvious points to demonstrate that non­
existence does not harm us and thus that we should not fear it, and this 
seems surely wrong. At the very least, this chapter should have shown 
two things. First, even if he is wrong, he is not obviously wrong. Second, 
there is nothing at all simple about the question.
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37 Julia Annas usefully makes a lot of this point; cf. M oH  190, 339-340, 350 and H PM  
199.
CONCLUSION
Death is nothing to us, or so Lucretius would have us believe. Many 
readers have taken this injunction in its strongest possible sense.1 On such 
an interpretation, Lucretius means to purge his readers absolutely of every 
conceivable fear of death; his arguments should bring total peace of mind 
as far as death is concerned. On the other side, some recent readers have 
construed the claim that death is nothing to us in an extremely narrow 
m anner.2 According to this view, the claim applies only to one specific 
fear, the fear of being dead, and it is only that fear which Lucretius should 
remove. This thesis has aimed at a middle ground, somewhere between 
these two extremes — although Lucretius may not address every possible 
anxiety about death, he does scrutinize a number of central worries. After 
a brief summary of findings, I will conclude by looking at an important fear 
that Lucretius recognizes but leaves unanswered.
Initially, Lucretius must find some way to organize the jumble of 
worries about death. His solution has precedents in Epicurus and in the 
Platonic Apology o f  Socrates. Lucretius makes use of a dichotomy about 
the soul: at death, the soul of the person who dies either survives, or it 
perishes. Although it may seem paradoxical, many people will be afraid no 
matter which option they believe. Lucretius takes the possibilities in turn: 
first, he considers whether the soul survives death, and, second, he 
considers the soul's non-survival.
1 For an exam ple of this approach, see Gisela Striker 'Com m entary on M itsis' in
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 4  (1988), 323-328.
2 An especially obvious and im portant exam ple of this approach is Stephen  
Rosenbaum 'How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus' in MoD, 119-134.
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On the one side, if the soul does survive death, many people fear an 
eternity of torture in Hades. Lucretius's first line of attack here is an 
argument that the soul does not, in fact, survive death, and thus there is 
no reason to be concerned for an afterlife of any sort. Using Epicurean 
atomic principles, Lucretius sets forth a theory of the soul according to 
which the soul is a composite, material body that is bom  with and dies 
with a body. The conjunction of a body and a soul makes up a person, and 
the soul and body separate at death. At that time the soul is utterly 
destroyed, and the body begins to decay. Since the soul does not survive 
death, there is no possibility of any eternal afterlife. Hence, we should not 
fear Hades.
This first line of argument brings Lucretius to the second half of the 
dichotomy, namely that the soul does not survive death. The soul's 
annihilation produces worries of its own; these worries start from the 
thought that at death a person ceases to exist, and only a corpse remains. 
Lucretius treats four such fears: first, he answers the fear that non-existence 
is itself awful, second, he considers fears about the dead body's fate, third, 
he tackles the thought that non-existence robs the dead of all of life's goods, 
and, fourth, he addresses the worry that non-existence cuts off all of a 
person's future potentials. Lucretius challenges all these anxieties with 
variations on one argument. He starts from the claim that harm requires 
an existent subject: a person cannot be harmed unless that person exists at 
the time of the harm. It is agreed, at this point, that a person no longer 
exists once dead. Therefore, argues Lucretius, nothing can harm a dead 
person, and thus, none of these fears is reasonable, since in each case death 
removes the (putative) subject of harm from the scene.
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One feature that all of these fears share, on both sides of the 
dilemma, is that they are first-personal. That is, they are fears that people 
have for themselves rather than for others. Lucretius limits him self, 
alm ost entirely, to such fears. This is not especially unusual. M ost 
philosophers who consider death only take up the question of whether 
death is bad for the person who dies.3 Nor is the practice pointless. 
Thomas Nagel may very well be correct to say that the first-person question 
is 'the primary case' ('D eath' 62). Nevertheless, Lucretius does open 
himself up to serious criticism in this regard, and by way of conclusion I 
will take aim at one major weakness in his case.4
Lucretius trips himself up. His mistake is not that he limits his case 
to the first person, but that he does not limit his case to the first person 
thoroughly enough. As I said, Lucretius mainly targets fears about death 
being bad for the person who dies. If he kept strictly to such fears, then his 
case might be incomplete, but at least it could be sound so far as it goes. 
Unfortunately, Lucretius is not as careful as he might be: when he takes up 
the fear that death is the loss of life's goods, he opens the door to worries 
concerning the welfare of others. An imaginary speaker laments that 
when someone dies, that peson loses all of life's rew ards (894-911). 
Lucretius can handle this complaint with his argument about harm and
3 Although nearly everyone takes this limitation for granted, Thomas Nages m akes 
explicit mention of it ('D eath' in MoD, 62).
4 The only objection I consider is one that Lucretius explicitly asks for, and I have  
ignored other, perhaps equally serious, complaints. The two m ost popular criticism s of 
Lucretius are, first, that he does not answer the person who fears painful dying, and, second, 
he does not answer the person who fears a prem ature death. I have said something about 
the later criticism in Chapter 4. I agree that Lucretius never speaks to the fear of painful 
dying, but I have not taken that problem up here. For a brief, but interesting argum ent 
concerning this, see Fred Miller, Jr. 'Epicurus on the A rt of Dying' Southern Journal o f 
Philosophy 14 (1976), 170-171.
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existence, but in addition the speaker alludes to a different kind of anxiety, 
an anxiety which Lucretius never sufficiently answers. The m ourner 
complains:
non poteris factis florentibus esse tuisque 
praesidium  (897-898).
You will be unable to be a protection to your affairs and your 
loved ones.
If Lucretius had left well enough alone, he would have been secure, but 
with these verses, he sets himself a challenge which he never meets.
Consider the case of Hector. After Hector dies, the victorious Greeks 
will rape and enslave his wife, and he will be gone and unable to protect 
her. These are very real harm s, and it is perfectly reasonable that 
Andromache fear them for herself. But it seems just as reasonable that 
Hector fear these events on his w ife's behalf. In his case, the fear is not 
first-personal, but the worry seems no less reasonable for that. It is just 
such a case that Lucretius alludes to, when his speaker points out that the 
dead person can no longer be a protection (praesidium) to the people he 
loves.
The only response that Lucretius offers to this fear is entirely lame. 
He argues that since death is non-existence, and harm requires an existent 
subject, the dead person cannot be harmed. This argument does a good job 
if it is aimed at first-personal fears, but it does nothing for fears about other 
people. When Hector is dead, nothing can harm him. Fine. But the 
Greeks certainly can, and unfortunately will, harm his wife. And there is 
no lack of an existent subject for this harm -  the subject is Andromache. 
Hence, Lucretius's central argument about existence and harm does no
good when it comes to fears for others. Lucretius moves on, however, and 
he seems entirely unaware of the problem.
Nor does there seem to be any good argument available to Lucretius. 
He cannot reply that it w on't harm Hector that Andromache is harmed 
because Hector w on't exist when she suffers. Lucretius relies on the 
principle that a reasonable fear requires a real harm, and the Hector case 
fits this principle. Again, Andromache will suffer a very real harm. 
Lucretius m ight block this by qualifying the principle as follows: a 
reasonable fear requires a real harm to the person who has the fear. This 
principle, however, limits all reasonable fears to the first person, and there 
seems little or no justification for any such limitation. Concerns about the 
well being of other people appear perfectly justified, and Lucretius does 
nothing to suggest otherwise. Quite the contrary, Lucretius himself opens 
the door to concerns about one's family, and any attempt to shut out such 
concerns now will surely seem viciously ad hoc.
Very likely, this problem reflects a larger problem with Epicurean 
ethics. In general the Epicureans were hard pressed to accomodate concern 
for other people into their account of the happy life. On the one hand, they 
stress the self-sufficiency of the sage, the person who can be happy in 
almost any circumstances. On the other hand, they also strive to recognize 
that friendship and altruism are necessary parts of a truly happy life. If my 
happiness depends in part on the well being of another person, however, 
then it seems that I cannot be quite so self-sufficient as the Epicureans 
want.
This is precisely the case with Hector. He may have no reason to 
fear his death for himself, but he has ample reason to fear its effect on his
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wife. If he genuinely cares about her, then he should  fear his death insofar 
as it w ill cause her harm. Lucretius acknowledges such a concern for 
another person's suffering, and thus he opens up the potential for a fear 
about death: one person may fear his or her death because of its effects on 
other people. Lucretius seems to deny that this fear is valid, but he fails to 
justify the denial. His failure mirrors the larger tension in Epicurean 
ethics: he makes a place for concern over other people's well being, but by 
doing so, he weakens his own case against the fears of death. He cannot 
have it both ways. Either other people don't really matter, or there may be 
a reason to fear death. Even if we restrict ourselves to an internal 
evaluation of Lucretius's success, he does not answer even every fear about 
death which he himself acknowledges.
APPENDIX ONE 
MATERIALISM AND THE EMOTIONS
In the first chapter, I outline the psychology of the emotions according to 
Lucretius and the Epicureans, but there is another side to their 
understanding of the emotions. Over and above the psychological 
conception, according to which an emotion is a feeling which mediates 
between thought and action, Lucretius offers an atomic explanation of 
emotions. The passage (m  288-322) is brief and, in many ways, allusive, but 
it merits consideration.
Lucretius picks out three emotions for physical analysis. After he 
shows how four elements -  fire, air, wind, and a fourth, nameless element 
-  compose the soul, he digresses and discusses the importance of the basic 
elements for our emotional makeup. Each of the three named elements is 
connected with a specific emotion. Lucretius associates anger with fire 
(288-289), fear with cold, moving wind (290-291), and an unnamed emotion 
with stable air (292-293).
It is odd that Lucretius does not name the third emotion, and it is 
not immediately clear what emotion he has in mind. He says, 'there is also 
that state of placid air which comes about with a tranquil heart and a 
cheerful countenance' (292-293), and he associates this emotion with the 
disposition of cattle, who are not quick to rage or fear (302-306). One 
thought is that Lucretius is thinking of axapcx^ia (tranquillity), the most 
characteristic Epicurean state of mind.1 I wonder, however, if axap a^ia  is
I presume that this is Heinze's thought, since he speaks of 'Seelenruhe'.
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really on a par with anger and fear; it seems more like a global emotional 
trend than a specific emotion. axapa^ia is the state of a person who is 
undisturbed with regard to emotions, but it is not itself any single emotion.
Another possibility is 7tpa6rn<;, which would mean 'equanimity' or, 
quite generally, 'calm ', but this suggestion has its own problem. The 
standard m eaning of rcpaotTiq is simply 'gentleness' as opposed to 
irascibility. So, for example, Aristotle contrasts 7tpaoTn<; specifically with 
anger. In the passage from Lucretius, however, the meaning must be 
broader, since the context requires something contrary to anger and  fear. 
W hat we need is something more like calm or peace of ming in general, 
but it needs to be shown that Jtpaornq is used in this broader meaning.
W e do have some evidence of such a use of the word. A first 
example comes from Plato. In the dialogue that bears his name, Crito says 
to Socrates:
Kai TEoAAaKK; pgv 5f| ae Kai rcpoxepov ev rcavxi tcd Pud 
Tlt)8ai|i6viaa xov xpoTcou, koXv 8e paA-iaxa ev -cfj vuv 
7capeaxcoaTi ■^up.cpopa, ox; pqSicoq avrnv Kai rcpacoq 
tpepeiq (Crito 43bl9-22).
W hat Crito m arvels at here is the overall equanim ity that Socrates
exhibits, not merely his lack of anger.2 Plutarch provides an even better
example for what Lucretius may have had in mind. According to Plutarch,
Epicurus said that it is not money or power that encompasses happiness
but rather dA/UTcia Kai rcpaoTnq naQcov Kai 5ia0eai<; \j/'oxf|q to Kara (poaiv
opi^ouaa (U 548).3 Ttpaornq here certainly means something more general
than 'gentleness', the contrary to anger. Epicurus must have in mind
2 Cf. the psedo-Platonic "Opoi s.v. rcpaoTTiq for a similarly broad definition: tcpaau; 
yuXTk cr6(ipe'cpoq (412d6-7).
3 '[P]ainlessness and mildness of emotions and a disposition of soul which sets natural 
limits (sc. on desires).'
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something like equanimity or calm. I am tentatively inclined, on this 
evidence, to think that Lucretius has jtpccornq in mind, but it is hard to feel 
much conviction.
Whatever the third emotion may be, Lucretius moves rapidly from 
specific occurences of the emotions to emotional dispositions. Some 
animal types are physically predisposed towards certain emotions. If one of 
the three elements predominates, then the animal species will tend to the 
emotion linked with that element. Lions have a great deal of the element 
of fire, and so they are especially given to anger (294-298). Deer have a 
preponderance of cold wind, which causes them to be extremely timid (299- 
301). Cattle, which have a large amount of stable air, are naturally 
moderate, neither especially irascible nor especially fearful (302-306). In a 
similar manner human beings are predisposed to one or another emotion 
by their physical makeup, but there is a subtle shift between animals and. 
humans. Humans vary individually, while animals differ by species. One 
person will be more given to anger than another because the first has more 
fire than the second, in the same way that lions are more irascible than 
deer since they have more fire than deer do.4
More importantly, humans can control their natural tendencies. 
The faculty of reason endows humans with the ability to resist their innate 
dispositions and 'lead a life worthy of the gods' (322). This is no small 
claim , since for the Epicureans the gods exemplify freedom from the 
weakness that leads to harmful emotions (KD 1, DRN  III 18-24). Individual 
humans are bom  with atomic natures of various types, and these types
4 For the importance of hum an physiology to character and thought, cf. Epicurus on 
happiness and the origin of language DL X 117, EpH 75.
incline them to one or another emotion -  so a person with a lot of fire will 
tend to be irascible. Up to a point, reason can prevent, or even remove, 
such natural inclination. As she becomes more reasonable, the irascible 
person w ill not become angry without sufficient cause. Reason cannot 
entirely remove the tendency, but it can control it to a vast extent.
There is nothing peculiarly Epicurean in this theory of elem ental 
emotions; such a theory had a broad and diverse following in antiquity. 
Aristotle describes the physical aspect of anger as 'boiling of blood around 
the heart and warmth' (De An 403a31-bl), and on the other side 'fear is a 
certain type of cooling' (R het 1389b32). This last is in a section of the 
Rhetoric where Aristotle contrasts the characters of young and old: it seems 
that the old are timorous since they are cooler than the young, while the 
young are more given to anger as a result of their hot natures (1389b31). 
Just like Lucretius, Aristotle associates speficic emotions with particular 
physical components and specific characters with particular physical types. 
The Stoics were famously hostile to A ristotle's theory of em otional 
m oderation, but Seneca the Stoic has extremely similar comments about 
elements and character. Hot natures incline people to anger, and cold ones 
to fear (De Ira II 19). These associations are a shared heritage, probably of 
the medical tradition.5
Very likely, the real impetus for such connections is not theoretical 
at all but rather the result of crude connections. A rage is often 
accompanied by a flush of color, a reddening of the face, which is felt as
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5 See Helmut Flashar T)ie medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der W irkung der
Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik' Hermes 84 (1956), 12-48.
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warmth. It is an easy, if somewhat simplistic, transition to think of fire 
here. Similarly, fear often causes pallor and trembling, both of which 
naturally lead to thoughts of cold. The theories of Aristotle, the Stoics, and 
the Epicureans incorporate these somewhat simpleminded associations
without significant change.
None of this is to say, however, that any of this is positively un- 
Epicurean. The Epicurean theory of atomism was strongly taken with such 
crude associations. We can, for example, infer that pleasant foods are made 
of smooth atoms, but bitter ones are composed of rough and jagged atoms. 
The reason? Well, of course, the smooth atoms stroke our palates in a 
pleasing manner, but the hooked atoms cut and dig as they go down (DRN  
II 398-409). So there is nothing heretical in Lucretius's adoption of the 
element theory of emotional composition, but neither is there anything 
especially groundbreaking.
APPENDIX TWO 
LETTER TO HERODOTUS 81
Unsurprisingly, one of the more important texts for my interpretation of 
the Epicureans is maddeningly difficult. There are textual problems galore, 
and even where the text is sound, it is often near-im possible to 
comprehend. In this appendix, I offer a full text1 and translation followed 
by a discussion of certain especially troubling issues.
Near the end of the Letter to H erodotus, Epicurus takes up the 
relationship of physics and happiness. He argues that people fall into 
anxiety and worries because of false beliefs about the heavens and death; 
and he also claims that people's attitudes are often massively irrational, 
and that this irrationality is itself a source of disturbance. Thus, the 
knowledge of physics that he has been propounding is necessary for 
happiness, as is greater self-aw areness. Here are his w ords and a 
translation:
£7ti 8e xouxoiq oA.coq2 obtacnv eiceivo Set m xavoeiv, o n  xapaxoq o 
KupnoTccToq xaiq dv0pco7uvaiq y u xaiq  yivexai ev xqj xau x a3 
p a m p ia  xe So^a^eiv <e iv a i>4 m l  acpGapxa, m l  u jtevayxiaq 
exeiv xcvoxoiq PouA.riaeiq a p a  Kal rcpa^eiq m l  aixiaq , m l  ev xcp 
aicoviov xi Seivov r [ 5  rcpoaSom v f \  urccmxexjeiv m x a  xobq 
puGouq elxe m x a  xauxriv6 xriv avaiaG-naiav xhv ev xa> xeGvavai
1 In the following, I have consulted the editions of Huebner, Usener, H.S. Long,
Bailey, Von der Muehll, Arrighetti, and that of Bollack Bollack and W ism ann. I follow
standard practice in representing the three m ain m anuscripts as F, B, and P, and the 
consensus of these as Q. For details on the m anuscripts, see any of the editions mentioned 
above.
2 oAxnq -  F; oXoaq -  BP
3 tonka -  Q; but Von der Muehll conjectures ta u ta , and Arrighetti follows him.
4 Usener suggested this supplement, and everyone since -  save Bollack, Bollack, and
W ismann -  has accepted it.
5 Kai -  Q; Usener conjectures del, and Von der Muehll conjectures rj.
6 Kara taijTTiv -1 2 ; but Causabon conjectures icai avrnv.
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tpoPoujievoix; cocTcep oucrav Kai auxoui;,7 Kai ev xcp p.R 
§o£ai<; xauxa rcaaxeiv a  A. A,’ aA,oycp ye xivi 7tap aaxdaei, o0ev 
PR opi^ovxaq xo 8eivov xrv  io rv  r  Kai E7uxexa|ievRy 
xapaxR v A,ap.paveiv xcp8 ei Kai e8o^a^ov xauxa- r  8 k  
a x a p a ^ ia  xo xouxcdv 7kxvxcdv ajtoA.eA/o<j0ai Kai cuvexR  
Pvrprv e%eiv xcov oA,cov Kai lcupioxaxcov.
And in addition to all of these matters generally, it is necessary 
to understand the following. The greatest disturbance befalls 
human souls, first, in believing that the heavens9 are blessed 
and immortal and yet that they have at the same time wishes 
and activities and responsibilities which are contrary to these 
things [i.e. blessedness and im m ortalityl, and, second, in 
fearfully either expecting or suspecting some eternal terror 
because of the myths or because of that lack of sensation in death 
-  as if that and they existed at the same time -  and, third, in 
suffering these things not because of beliefs but because of some 
irrational state of mind as a result of which they set no limit on 
what is fearful and they experience disturbance which is equal to 
or greater than they would experience if they actually believed 
these things. But tranquillity is to be freed from all of this and to 
hold a continuous recollection of the general and m ost 
important truths.
My text, like that of Bollack, Bollack, and W ismann (la lettre 
d'epicure), returns to the manuscript readings in a number of key places 
where most other scholars emend. The two key changes which I reject go 
back to Issac Causabon (1829). Where my text reads eixe Kaxa xauxRV x r v  
dvaic0R<nav x r v  ev xcp xe0vavai tpoPouiievoi)^ cocncep ouoav Kai auxou^, 
Causabon emends to eixe Kai auxRv x r v  avaia0R<nav x r v  ev xcp xe0vavai 
cpoPouiievouq o5a7tep ouaav Kax’ auxouc. In essence, Causabon exhanges 
Kaxa for Kai and Kai for Kaxa. His changes are accepted by Usener, Bailey, 
Von der Muehll, H.S. Long, Hicks, and Arrighetti. It is fair to say that 
Causabon formed the modem vulgate.
7 Kai auxovq -  £2; but Causabon conjectures Kax’ avxouq.
8 xdi -  B; xo -  FP; Usener conjectures xcp, and Bailey emends to wq.
9 xavxa refers to what immediately precedes, nam ely a discussion of the celestial
bodies.
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Before I defend my text, I want to expand on my translation and 
consider what this passage amounts to. In this paragraph, Epicurus lists 
some basic sources of extreme mental disturbance.10 False beliefs about 
divine beings, false fears about death, and irrationality produce and 
nurture our misery. First, people are disturbed when they think that the 
gods are perfectly happy and immortal but also that they take an active role 
in h u m a n  life. In Epicurus's opinion, these beliefs are inconsistent: perfect 
happiness excludes anger and desire such as, say, the Homeric gods display. 
Second, people fear death, either because they think that they will go to 
Hades, as the myths foretell, or because they believe that death will be a 
horrible eternal nothingness, utterly without sensation or consciousness. 
Third, many times people have the attitudes they do for bad reasons or for 
no reason at all. Their ideas may be inherited from the people around 
them or poorly thought out. Such people often have fears and worries 
thoughtlessly and irrationally, and the very irrationality makes it difficult 
for them to improve their lives.
As tortuous as it is, this sentence does use parallelism to distinguish 
these three problems. Each source of disturbance has it own clause, each of 
which opens with ev plus an articular infinitive. The skeleton of this 
sentence is thus xapocxoq yivexai (1) ev xqj...8o^d£eiv...(2) ev xcp f\ rcpoaSoicav rj 
U7t07txeueiv...(3 ) ev xcp rcaaxeiv -  disturbance comes about (1) because of 
believing etc., (2) because of either expecting or suspecting etc., and (3) 
because of suffering etc. Since Epicurus greatly expands each ev clause and 
overfills the sentence with qualifications, this neat structure is not
10 In keeping with the topics of the letter, he omits mention of excessive desires, 
which are the final canonical source of -capaxf|.
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especially obvious. But if we hold on to the overarching arrangement, the 
sentence becomes far more coherent.
Causabon's changes are in the second ev clause -  the one concerning 
the fears of death. Since he is remarkably brief, we should consider what 
he has to say for his emendations:
ei'xe Kara xauxRv x r v  avaiaG Raiav etc.] Suspicor 
leg en d u m , xouq Kai auxRv x r v  avaiaG R aiav 
(popoviievouq x r v  ev xtp xeGvavai, coarcep oiSaav K a i  
avxouq. nisi malis Kax’ auxouq. sed illud erit ut figura 
Attica pro, <aq xtjq xe avaiaORaiaq Kai auxcov vizap ovxcov. 
vide infra in epistola ad Menoeceum.11
One m ight have expected Causabon to argue for his two changes in
tandem, one gaining plausibility from the other. Some mindless scribe
switched Kai for Kaxa and Kaxa for Kai; this may seem unsurprising given
the number of times that Kai and Kaxa occur in the passage. Oddly,
however, Causabon does not link the two changes, and, moreover, he is
rather diffident about the second. He thinks that he can make sense out of
the manuscript reading in the second case, and it may be unfair to credit (or
blame) him without qualification for this latter emendation.12
The clause makes fine sense without Causabon's first suggestion. If 
we keep the manuscript's Kaxa xaijxRv, then the clause has an underlying 
balance. Picking up xapaxoq yivexai, it reads 'D isturbance com es 
about...because (people) either expect or suspect some eternal terror, afraid 
either in accordance with the myths or in accordance with that lack of 
sensation in death.' The participle (popoupevouq serves as the subject of
11 It is vaguely terrifying to me that Causabon was able to change the text of this 
letter forever with four words 'suspicor legendum ' and 'nisi malis' -  and these relatively  
casual words at that.
12 I don't know what figura Attica is, nor can I find any reference to it, but I basically 
take the words as he suggests.
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both articular infinitives 7cpoa5oK&v and utcotcteueiv.13 These people are 
afraid with greater or lesser conviction — they expect or only worry about a 
bad future — and their fear has two potential causes — either they fear what 
the myths foretell, i.e. Hades, or they fear utter nothingness. The two 
grounds for fear are each contained in a Kara clause, and eite joins the two 
x a td  units.14 So, however clumsy the expression may be, we do find a 
balanced structure: people are afraid, with more or less conviction, for this 
reason or for that reason.
Causabon's emendation mars what little order the clause possesses. 
Consider Bailey's translation o f Causabon's suggestion, w hich runs, 
'disturbance...arises...because they are always expecting or imagining some 
everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends, or even fear the loss of 
feeling in death.' This is broken-backed. It suggests that the fear is a third 
thing, distinct from  expecting or im agining. But gram m atically 
(poPoupEvovq is not on the same level as TtpoaSoicav and i)7t07CT£t)eiv. 
Epicurus is trying to say too much at once, but at least he maintains some 
symmetry: people are afraid of death (cpoPoupivouq) with greater or weaker 
conviction (ii 7tpoa5oK&v f\ ■u7to7CTE'ueiv), for one of two reasons (kcct(x this 
eite xaxa that). Causabon only makes matters worse by breaking the 
thought in half.
Moreover, Causabon's emendation leaves the solitary site worse off 
than it already is. It is rare to find the standard correlatives eite. ..eite
13 The participle modifies an understood 'people' which is easily supplied from tcuq 
av8o(Q7twaic yuxaiq above.
14 This implies another eite to proceed Kara zovq puGouq. The omission of the first eixe 
is rare in prose, but it does occur; cf. Denniston 507-508, section iv. The nearest parallel that 
I can find is in Plato: Sophist 217el-2  anopriKuveiv Xoyov avyybv kcct’ epautov, eite r a i  npoq 
etepov.
without the first eixe, but in the manuscript wording at least the lonely eixe 
joins parallel items -  the two Kaxa clauses. In Causabon's version, it is 
unclear what eixe connects to what. All parallelism is lost. Hence it seems 
best to keep the manuscript reading and to reject Causabon's emendation.
There is a second especially hard phrase in the passage. In my 
version, the people who fear lack of sensation wrongly think of this 
condition Gjarcep ouaav Kai auxouq. The coarcep clause clearly attributes to 
these people some justification, presumably a false one, which they have 
for their fear. But what kind of justification is the thought that Tack of 
sensation exists and they'? Epicurus is brutally brief here, but following 
Causabon, I take this to be a reference to an argument in the Letter to 
M enoeceus. Epicurus argues there that lack of sensation occurs outside the 
limits of a life. There is no time during which there is avata0Ticr{a and the 
person. Only one or the other exists at a time: when the person exists there 
is not avaia0T|cha, and when there is dvaia0Rcna, the person does not exist. 
So the point in the Letter to Herodotus is that people (wrongly) fear lack of 
sensation 'as if that ever exists when they do.'
In view of the obscurity of the manuscript's reading, Causabon 
tentatively suggests the alternative cocncep ouaav Kax’ auxovq. Apparently 
scholars take this to mean that people fear lack of sensation, 'as if it were 
anything to them.' Translators, at least, have taken the phrase in this 
manner. Such an idea would be perfectly consistent with Epicurean 
doctrine, and it would also refer to a pertinent argument in the Letter to 
M enoeceus (124). The emendation, however, is not satisfying since Kax’ 
auxouq does not really mean this.
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The natural way in Greek to express the idea that something does (or 
does not) matter to someone, is to say that it is (or is not) rcpoq that person. 
Consider the following two examples. Aristippus said that only present 
pleasures were good, 'believing that past pleasures and future pleasures 
were nothing rcpoq ounov/ that is of no importance to him (G 174.8-9). And 
Epictetus says that he would welcome even deception in order to learn that 
external goods and things beyond our control are nothing rcpoq ruiaq/ that 
is that they are nothing to us (Dfss. I 4.27). Most important of all, Epicurus 
habitually uses this type of expression about death: o Gocvaxoq ouGev rcpoq 
TUJ.a<; (EpM  125), priSev rcpoq ruiaq eivai xov Gavaxov (EpM  124), oike ouv 
rcpoq xouq ^covxaq eaxiv ouxe rcpoq xouq xexeA.euxnicoxaq (EpM  125), o Gtxvaxoq 
ot)8ev jcpoq tipaq (KD 2 and VS 2).15 I cannot bring myself to believe that 
Epicurus used an unnatural form of words in place of his perfectly natural 
and stereotypical phrase.
This argument may seem perverse since the paragraph under 
consideration is obviously full of unnatural and difficult phrases. But I 
would point out, first, that here we would have to imagine that he used an 
odd phrase instead of an easy phrase which he used all the time, and, 
second, that even if an author is difficult and odd, we do not gain the 
license to add unusual Greek to the text. The reading xal auxouq may be 
hard and obscure, but it has on its side that it is the consensus of our three 
best manuscripts for this letter of Epicurus.
Finally there is confusion concerning the word K apacrxaaiq . 
Epicurus claims that people can suffer disturbance iir 86£aiq...aA.A,’ dA,6yq> 
ye xivi rcapaaxaaei, that is not because of beliefs but because of some
 ^5 And compare Lucretius's 'nil ad nos' III 8 3 0 ,8 4 5 ,8 5 0 ,8 5 2 .
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irrational T tapdoxaaiq . A sam pling of translations produces little 
agreement about the meaning of this rare word.16
Unfortunately, LSJ's entry on the noun m pdaxaaiq is unhelpful, but 
in any event, it is easier and better to begin with the verbal root. The word 
n a p a ax a ax q  is a verbal noun from JtapiaxRiii, the most basic meaning of 
which is 'place beside, cause to stand beside' (LSJ s.v. 7tapiornp.i A I). But 
the verb was commonly used in a psychological sense, meaning 'set before 
the mind, present' (A II). Insofar as one person presents something in one 
way rather than another, the person inclines others to think of the matter 
one way rather than another. The w ord, thus, naturally takes on 
connotations of disposing people, prompting them towards or away from 
certain courses of actions or trains of thought (A II 1-2). In its intransitive 
forms, the verb signifies the mental state of one who has an idea or 
thought occur to him, or the mental state of a person who comes to see 
things in one way or another, that is to take on a certain attitude or 
disposition (B HI iv).
When the noun stands for this range of the verb's meanings, it 
generally expresses a highly specific attitude, but it need not always do so. 
What I mean by specific is that the word 7tapdaxacn.q often stands for a 
particular state of mind, especially for an extreme of excitement, courage, 
or desire (LSJ s.v. n ap aax aa iq  II 7a-d). Thus, LSJ groups both appearances 
of the noun in Epicurus under the heading 'desire' (II 7d). But as the
16 For example, 'not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentim ent' 
(Bailey), 'an irrational perversity' (Hicks), 'non in seguito a proprie opinioni m a per una 
specie di irragionevole insania' (Arrighetti), 'u n  transport vraim ent irrationnel' (Bollack, 
Bollack, and Wismann), 'non per un saldo convincimento m a per una sorta di delirio mentale' 
(Gigante), and 'nicht auf Grund fester Vorstellungen, sondem  durch irgendeine gedanklose 
Einstellung in diesen Zustand gerat' (Gigon).
Glossarium  Epicureum  points out, the word can be much more general, 
and they gloss it as 'm ens animi (bewusstsein), intentio, vel affectus 
(voluntas) anim i' (516).
Some such broader meaning, e.g. 'disposition', 'attitude', 'state of 
mind' is much more appropriate to both occurences in Epicurus. As the 
first instance, in his death-bed letter Epicurus asks Idomeneus to care for 
M etrodorus's children 'a^icoq rnq £K peipaKiou rcapacrcdaecoq rcpoq epe Kai 
(piA,oao<p(av/ that is 'in  a manner worthy of the attitude that you have 
shown to me and philsophy since adolescence.' A reference to 'desire' or 
'ardor', as LSJ suggest, would be very out of place. Similarly in our passage, 
people suffer 'not because of beliefs but because of some irrational attitude 
or state of mind.' Again, the notion of 'desire' would make nonsense out 
of this sentence. O laf Gigon hits the nail right on the head, when he 
translates, 'n ich t auf Grund fester V orstellungen, sondern durch 
irgendeine gedanklose Einstellung' -  not on the basis of firm beliefs, but 
rather through a kind of thoughtless attitude (28).
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APPENDIX THREE 
THE TWO THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN m  843-861
Lines 843-861 form a digression in the exposition of the main argument 
that non-existence is nothing to us (830-869), and they raise two questions. 
First, how does the digression fit into its surrounding context? Second, 
w hat do they say? Obviously the two answers will shed light on each 
other. If we see what the lines mean, we will better see why Lucretius 
places them where he does. Alternatively, once we understand the general 
role of the verses in their context, we may have a clearer start on working 
out their precise significance. In the case of lines 843-861, both questions 
are difficult, and so there is no obvious way into the problem. I should 
stress at the outset that my sense of the lines is provisional and open to 
debate.
As a start, the following should be uncontroversial. In lines 830-869, 
Lucretius lays out his argument that non-existence is nothing to us. Since 
death is our utter annihilation, nothing -  not even non-existence itself -  
can harm us. Lucretius sketches this argument in lines 830-842, and he 
offers greater precision in lines 862-869. In the intervening verses, those 
which concern us here, he anticipates and shoots down two potential 
objections. In both cases, Lucretius finds that the objections don't dent his 
case. It may seem odd that he takes up objections before he finishes his 
own argument, but in a larger sense his purpose is clear: he is shoring up 
his case against potential objections.
More specifically, the objections that Lucretius rejects are objections 
to his claim that death is our complete end. His own account is that death
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is the separation of the body and soul and that the soul is destroyed by the
process of separation. The objections consider variants on this idea. In the
first case, he imagines that the soul survives its separation from the body 
(843-846). In the second case, he considers a kind of atomic reincarnation 
(847-861). In either scenario, it may be possible that death is not our final 
end. Lucretius maintains, however, that his argument works even if the 
objections are true. In order to understand this better, we need to look at 
the two sets of verses more closely.
Although Lucretius has spent the earlier portion of Book HI proving 
that the soul is mortal and perishes when it separates from the body,1 he 
now grants that the soul survives death and continues to function.
et si iam nostro sentit de corpore postquam 843
distractast animi natura animaeque potestas 844
nil tamen est ad nos, qui comptu coniugioque 845
corporis atque animae consistimus uniter apti. 846
And if the nature of the mind and power of the soul continue 
to have sensation after they have been tom  from our body, 
nevertheless that is nothing to us -  we who consist, fashioned 
together into one thing, of the ordered union2 of body and 
soul.
Lucretius sticks to his guns. Even if the soul survives, that does not matter 
to us. For, as Lucretius has already said (838-839), 'w e' are an ordered 
arrangement of a body and a soul.
Earlier in the book, Lucretius considered the idea that sensation 
might continue after soul and body separate (624-633). He had argued that 
if the soul continues to enjoy sensation, it would need to be endowed with
1 For these arguments, see chapter 2.
2' I take 'comptu coniugioque' to be a hendiadys, and I take 'com ptus' <  com o to refer
to an orderly arrangement (like the Greek Koa|io$). Hence my translation, ordered union .
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the five sense organs. Since sensation as we know it requires the sense 
organs, a soul without a body can have no access to sensation as we know 
it. In lines 843-846 Lucretius returns to this idea.
But here we reach our first major problem : w hat exactly does 
Lucretius grant in these verses? Does he grant that a disembodied soul 
could have sensation qualitatively like that of an embodied soul? Or does 
he only grant that a soul could have some form of sensation by itself but a 
form unlike any we know?3 Unfortunately, the four lines he offers are 
noncommittal on this issue. He entertains the thought, for the sake of 
argument, that a soul continues to have sensation without a body, but he 
does not explicitly say what kind of sensation he is thinking of. Since his 
admission is only hypothetical, it is impossible to be certain. He may mean 
that the soul continues to enjoy sensation just like it enjoys in a body, but 
he might mean that a disembodied soul could have a sni generis form of 
sensation without a body. When Bailey assumes the latter ( I I 1134), he goes 
beyond what the verses explicitly say.
W hatever exactly Lucretius grants for the sake of argument, he 
maintains, and clearly maintains, that it does not affect his case. A person 
is a functional union of a soul and a body. Even if a soul could function 
alone, in whatever way, this would not matter to us, since we are a soul 
and body compound. Survival of the soul alone w on't cut it.
This suggests one way to support Bailey's construal of the verses. 
Lucretius has a better argument if we take the point as Bailey does. If 
disembodied souls could have sensory experiences just like ours, it might
3 To put it another way, does he grant the direct denial of his previous argument, or 
does he only consider a weaker but related idea?
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seem odd to deny that such souls could be us. Perhaps personal identity 
could survive the loss of a body. But if a soul with no body could only 
have sensation unlike any we have ever known, then it seems reasonable 
to deny that such a soul could preserve our identity at all. Since nothing 
positively forbids this interpretation, considerations of charity make it hard 
to resist. In either case, however, Lucretius considers the idea that the soul 
survives death and remains functional, but he insists that this would not
matter since we are a soul and a body.
The next verses also consider an odd puzzle about identity, and
again Lucretius digs in his heels.
nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas 847
post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est
atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae,
pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, 850
interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri.
et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante
qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor.
nam cum respicias immensi temporis omne
praeteritum spatium, turn motus materiai 855
multimodis quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis,
semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta
haec eadem, quibus e nunc nos sumus, ante fuisse. [865]
nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente: [858]
inter enim iectast vitai pausa, vageque 860[859]
deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. [8601
Nor, if time collects our matter after death and brings it back into 
its current state and the light of life is again given to us, would it 
matter at all to us that this had been done, when our recollection 
of ourselves had been interrrupted once and for all. And now 
nothing reaches us from 'ourselves' before we existed, nor does 
difficulty from them affect us. For when you consider all the 
previous expanse of measureless time and the manifold motions 
of matter, you could easily believe this: often these same atoms 
from which we now are m ade were previously placed in the 
same order as they now are. Nor nevertheless are we capable of 
recalling this with a remembering mind, for a pause of life has
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been interposed and all the motions from sensations have 
wandered every which way.
If in the previous verses Lucretius says too little, here he says too much.
He asks us to imagine that at some time in the future our atoms may
recombine and form a person just like us. But the double will not really be
us because it will not have our memories. Hence even if this bizarre
duplication comes to pass, death is still the utter end of us. There is an
obvious incoherence here: the double is and is not us.
It is unclear what the details of this duplication should be, but one of 
three options seems most likely. First, there may be a kind of 'eternal 
recurrence of the same'. On this picture, at some point in the future, 
everything in this world, including ourselves, will recur in exactly the 
same form as now. The Stoics appear to have had some such idea (cf. L & S 
52). Alternatively, perhaps the duplication is not of everything together, 
but just of individuals separately. At some time in the future my atoms 
may recombine, and there will be a new me; but this new me will exist in a 
very different world than the one I inhabit now. But there are two 
versions of this notion available. On the one hand, I might be 'bom  again' 
as an infant in the normal way, or, alternatively, I may pop into existence, 
just as I now am, at a more mature state of development. So the three 
options are, first, global recurrence of the same, second, random rebirth of 
individuals, or, third, random instantaneous reform ation of grown 
individuals. Lucretius does not make clear which of these options he has 
in mind.
Lucretius places one clear limitation on any interpretation of this 
scenario. Unlike the previous idea of a functional, disembodied soul, 
Lucretius does not consider the doppleganger notion to be impossible. In
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fact, in lines 852-853, he states in the indicative that already in the past 
there have been such duplicates of us. Hence we can rule out options if we 
can safely say that any of them are impossible according to Epicurean 
theory. W ith this limitation in mind, I think that we can rule out one 
option entirely and cast severe doubt on another.
According to the Epicureans, people cannot pop into existence out of 
thin air, and so this construal of the verses is no good. In Book I, Lucretius 
argues that nothing can come from nothing, and he backs up his claim by 
pointing out that things come about in fixed ways. He considers a number 
of perverse and spontaneous births -  men bom  from the sea, birds and fish 
popping from the sky -  and he reminds us that such births are impossible 
since creation follows regular patterns (159-173). He continues by pointing 
out that such spontaneous generations would also allow for irregular 
growth -  people could become adults without any time for development. 
But as he says, 'It is clear that none of these things happens since 
everything grows little by little, as is appropriate, from a fixed seed' (188- 
189). Clearly, Lucretius did not think it was possible for people to pop into 
existence, in an advanced state of growth, by spontaneous reformation of 
their atoms. They must follow the fixed cycle of human creation and 
development. A twenty-eight year old could not, in Lucretius's universe, 
suddenly come into existence fully formed.
The m ost common interpretation of lines 847-861 also seem s 
unlikely, if not impossible. Commentators generally attribute to Lucretius 
the Stoic idea of 7todiYYeve<na.4 They refer us to a passage of Justin in order
4 So Heinze, Bailey, and Kenney.
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to make this plausible.5 According to Justin (U 283a), Epicurus believes 
that atoms are immortal and therefore it is possible for them to reform, 
after death, into a body which has been previously destroyed. This is 
obviously the same idea that we find in Lucretius, but neither Justin nor 
Lucretius licenses the Stoic style interpretation. All that Justin and 
Lucretius say is that individuals may recombine at random in the future. 
They never say that the entire world may reform all together just as it is 
now. Although this latter idea may not be im possible, according to 
Epicurean physics, it would require a staggering amount of coincidence. If 
one body recombines, then its constituent atoms must come back together 
by chance. This may seem unlikely, but how much more unlikely is it that 
all the atoms of everything should reform just as they are now, and all at 
the same time? The coincidence would be almost immeasurably large.
The Stoics, who do believe in the recurrence of the whole world and 
its inhabitants, can support their belief by recourse to teleology and 
providence, but the Epicureans have no such recourse. If this is the best of 
all possible worlds, then it may seem reasonable that everything in it is just 
right and that nothing should entirely disappear into the past. Hence it 
may seem right that this best of all possible worlds should be repeated, just 
as it is. And if a rational, divine mind oversees the w orkings of 
everything, then that all-powerful mind can make sure that the repetition 
goes right. But the Epicureans are staunch anti-teleologists and they deny 
providence of any kind. It is bizarre to imagine a global recurrence of the 
same which takes place entirely by chance.
5 Note that it is prima facie unlikely that Epicureans and Stoics should share any  
such position, since the Stoic position relies on teleology and providence -  both of which the 
Epicureans reject.
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If these two options won't do, we seem to be left with the idea that, 
at random, a person's atoms may come back together and a person may be 
bom  again. These duplicates would start out like us, in some sense, but 
they would have no initial memory of us, since they would start out, as we 
did, with no memory at all. And since they would go through a different 
life, by the time they get to where we are now, they would not have our 
personality or memory. They would be formed differently by different 
experiences in a different world. Hence, in a deeper sense, they are not us,
even if they share our atoms.
The problem with this option is that it does not seem to capture all 
of what Lucretius says. Lucretius seems to envisage absolute atom for 
atom identity: the future us has all our atoms in precisely the same 
positions as ours (857-858). But my interpretation cannot provide such 
com plete identity, because in a different world w ith a d ifferent 
development, there may be large-scale duplication, but it w ill never be 
absolute and numerically identical. The other two options could guarantee 
total duplication, but they have other problem s that m ake them 
unappealing.
This is where this thought experiment comes apart. Apparently 
Lucretius makes two claims. First that the duplicates are absolutely 
identical, and, second, that they have different memories. But without a 
breach in his materialism, these two claims are incompatible. Memory just 
is a product of atomic states, and so two creatures with num erically 
identical atomic states would have the same memories. Lucretius cannot 
have it both ways. Either the two people are utterly identical or they are 
not, but if they are, then they have the same memories. In order to salvage
anything of what Lucretius says here, we must weaken or qualify one of 
the two claims.
His overall goal shows which way we should go. Lucretius argues 
that the past and future twins are not really us since they don't share our 
memories (850-851, 859-861). This is an argument that he used earlier 
against the idea of reincarnation (670-678). Lucretius m ust maintain the 
thesis that the twins are not us. Otherwsie his case is vulnerable because of 
a possible, if bizarre, form of post-mortem survival for us. Thus, it seems 
best to keep this claim and to give up the strong version of the identity 
claim. Instead of saying that the future duplicate will be like us atom for 
atom, we must say something weaker. Duplicates may share a great deal of 
atomic makeup, but the overlap is not complete. In particular the atoms 
that constitute memory must differ. Only if they don't share memories 
will they be different people.
The passage from Justin may indirectly reinforce my interpretation 
(U 283a). In his view, Epicurus believed that our atoms may fortuitously 
come to form the same body (a©|ia) again. Since memory is a function of 
the soul's atoms, it may be significant that Justin says that the 'body' will be 
the same rather than that the person will be the same. Both bodies and 
souls consist of atoms. At birth we start out with a certain group of atoms, 
and as we develop, these atoms develop and they take on certain forms. 
Souls come to have certain  memories by storing particular atomic 
configurations which can be recalled into consciousness. Perhaps Lucretius 
and Justin mean that duplicates start out with the same atoms in the same 
formations. Since their worlds and developments are different, they will 
become distinct over time -  in particular their memories will differ. This
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would explain why Justin says that the bodies are the same, since the 
important distinction between the two individuals is in the soul. In some 
sense the two people have the same body, but their souls, in particular 
their memories, distinguish them.
If we take this line, we get a further structural bonus. In 830-842, 
Lucretius argues that death does not matter to us since we are compounds 
of soul and body and these compounds break down at death. On my 
interpretation, the two thought experiments in 843-861 take up, one at 
time, the two components of this compound. Lines 843-846 show that a 
soul alone is not sufficient to maintain our identity -  granting that a soul 
could function without a body. And, on my interpretation, lines 847-861 
show that a body alone cannot preserve identity. Thus the verses as a 
whole should demonstrate that a person is a soul and body compound, and 
neither alone w ill do. Unfortunately, unlike Justin, Lucretius does not 
make his specific concern for the body clear in lines 847-861. But if such a 
focus is implicitly present, it would give coherence to the passage as a 
whole.
His argum ent in lines 830-869 would then run thus. Death is 
nothing to us since we are compounds of soul and body and these are 
destroyed at death. On the one hand, even if the soul survives (which it 
does not), the person nevertheless perishes; the only continuity between 
soul and body would be sensation, and perhaps even this would be 
different for a disembodied soul. On the other hand, a bodily duplicate is 
not a duplicate of the person; we know this because a bodily duplicate 
would lack our memories, and without our memories it could not be us. 
Hence, the separation of soul and body at death destroys us irrevocably.
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Since harm  requires an existent subject and death rem oves any such 
subject, death is no harm. If there is no harm in death, then we should not 
fear it. There are still problems about the details of 843-861, but this is at 
least a coherent overview  of how the verses function in the larger 
argument. Perhaps that is all we should ask for in the end.
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